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As Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) begins to enter the wider market, it promises to 
substantively change the way arbitration works in the justice eco-system. As such, the 
justice community must determine the fundamental values to be incorporated into the 
online justice environment so that it can address ethical and regulatory issues in the 
design of ODR. This thesis is the first attempt of any ODR scholar to identify the 
fundamental values that must be embedded in the decision making portion of the ODR 
process.  
 
This thesis advocates for the principle of judicial independence and impartiality: 
decision makers in the arbitration system must be both impartial and independent, 
without exception, even if the adherence to this rule of law principle conflicts with 
maximizing the efficiencies of the overall system. As it relates to the decision making 
process that incorporates technology within the model, technology driven bias must be 
identified and mitigated against. Consequently, the ODR system must be examined 
through the lens of risk identification and mitigation principles. This thesis is the first, 
to examine the ODR model within the technology driven aspects of model design.  
 
This thesis examines Rule of Law within the context of decision making in the online 
justice environment. The thesis argues for adherence to seven rules of action: (1) the 
rule of law (RoL) must be protected within the online justice environment; (2) an 
independent and impartial decision maker is an essential RoL principle, such that no 
departure from the principle should be allowed; (3) it is the method of ensuring the 
independence and impartiality of the decision maker that is open for greater debate; (4) 
it is the model design that mitigates dependence and bias; (5) the reduction of 
negatively impactful bias is the current “best practice” standard; (6) there must be a 
human within the final step of the technology driven decision making model; (7) 
accountability is essential as ODR is part of the justice eco-system. The thesis 
concludes by creating a first of its kind, best practices guidelines with specific examples 
of risk identification and mitigation principles that must be built into the design.   
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Technology is becoming ubiquitous in our daily lives. Enormous swathes of sectors 
such as finance, transport, and banking have all moved online, with speed, convenience 
and growing trust. The justice environment, while it has lagged behind business in its 
deployment of virtual communications, is also on the threshold of change. Many are 
now envisioning a fully online justice system. From kiosks and online platforms that 
allow citizens to speedily resolve traffic tickets, to e-discovery, to the electronic 
submissions of pleadings, many justice systems around the world have already begun 
the long process of technological transformation. Online Dispute Resolution (ODR), a 
form of arbitration, is one area of the justice ecosystem that is introducing technological 
transformation.  
 
Online dispute resolution will be unlike any brick-and-mortar justice system before it. 
It will also be qualitatively different from previous deployments of technology in the 
arena of justice. For today, reliance upon technology increasingly implies the use of 
automation and artificial intelligence. And while no one is 100% sure what an online 
court will look like, many believe that it will require no brick-and-mortar courtrooms. 
A few believe it may not even require a human decision maker. 
 
Justice systems around the world have already embraced automation to varying 
degrees. Automation, that is the technological process by which a procedure is 
performed without human input, is used in everything from paying parking tickets to 
disputing land boundaries. Until recently automated processes have been strictly 
limited to what can be accomplished using Yes/No decision trees. Conventional 
automated processes are rigid and non-deliberative. Most ultimately deliver 
information to a human decision maker. The introduction of artificial intelligence, 
however, raises the possibility of courts that operate with no physical space and no 
human decision maker. 
 
So, now is the time to consider the fundamentally important issues raised by the use of 
non-human intelligence in the arbitration decision making process. As their full 
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implementation becomes feasible, we must be conceptually, legally and ethically 
prepared. This thesis will focus on the role of the decision maker in upholding one key 
aspect of the principles of rule of law, impartial decision making. Can technological 
solutions provide that? Will they support impartiality? Will they raise or lower the 
citizenry’s expectation of it? 
 
Before we can respond to these questions, we need to understand what computer-based 
decision making is. According to Greg Corrado from Google: 
Machine learning systems are made up of three major parts: (1) Model: 
the system that makes predictions or identifications; (2) Parameters: the 
signals or factors used by the model to form its decisions; and (3) 
Learner: the system that adjusts the parameters — and in turn the model 
— by looking at differences in predictions versus actual outcome.1 
Computer models of legal reasoning and computer models of legal argument seek to 
break down a complex set of human tasks into discrete steps, or an algorithm.2 Thus, 
the key to discussing the design is to consider the model, which includes the 
incorporated parameters and the learning process of the system.3 
 
In addition, to understand the following discussion it is important to have a brief 
historical overview of why arbitration is a central part of a justice system. First, 
regardless of which judicial system we consider, there is little room to debate the fact 
that many individuals face extreme limitations of access to justice.4 Second, most 
judicial systems recognize the value of alternative dispute resolution as a mechanism 
of reducing these limitations.5 And the majority consider arbitration as a well-
 
1 Danny Sullivan, How Machine Learning Works, As Explained By Google, 
MARTECH: MANAGEMENT (Nov. 4, 2015)(describing in detail the process). 
2 See discussion, infra Chapter 4, Section A. 
3 See id.  
4 See discussion, infra Chapter 1, Section B and Table A. 
5 See discussion, infra Chapter 2, Section A. It is important to note, on August 7, 
2019, the United   Nations   Commission   on   International   Trade  Law, United 
Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting From 
Mediation (March  2019)(hereinafter, the Singapore Convention) opened for signature 
in Singapore. Over 40 states, including China, India and the U.S., have signed the 
treaty. See id. As such, the Convention is expected to enter into force shortly. See id. 
The Singapore Convention requires member states to enforce settlement agreements 
and gives effect to settlement agreements such that they may be used to prevent 
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entrenched alternative to traditional brick-and-mortar justice.6 Beyond these points of 
similarity, however, there are major differences. There is a growing split between the 
E.U. and the U.S. when it comes to the prevailing approach to regulating arbitration. In 
the U.S., the system is governed primarily by federal law, resulting in a “hands off” 
regulatory approach, meaning the dispute resolution mechanism is a product of 
contract, crafted between two parties, with little interference from government.7 What 
limited regulation exists is very pro-arbitration. In the E.U., a different approach is 
taken, resulting in a more protectionist regulatory structure, focusing on fundamental 
rights, limitations (or prohibitions) on the use of pre-dispute resolution clauses, and 
restrictions on the use of arbitration, especially as it relates to the use of technology.  
 
In the U.S. context, the ODR system is developing in a private market, designed by 
private entities who seek to resolve disputes in a low-regulation environment, standing 
upon and seeking to maintain a long history of Supreme Court permissiveness toward 
arbitration. For business, the historical shifts introduced by technology present an 
opportunity to tailor contracts and the dispute system to their advantage, sometimes 
without observing the fundamental protections afforded to individuals in the traditional 
brick-and-mortar system. Because of this strategic advantage, we can assume that U.S. 
based businesses will continue to increase their use of technology as a decision maker 
in the resolution of disputes. In contrast, ODR in the E.U. is being developed by the 
existing justice system, thereby creating a stronger presumption that the technology 
will incorporate existing fundamental protections.8  
 
parties from litigating the matter. See id. Convention Article 1 (3), specifies 
““Mediation”  means  a  process,  irrespective  of  the  expression  used  or  the  basis  
upon  which  the  process  is  carried  out,  whereby  parties  attempt  to  reach  an  
amicable  settlement  of  their  dispute  with  the  assistance  of  a  third  person  or  
persons. . .” Id. The use of the term ‘person’ may implicate awards issued in an 
automated process.  Because the Convention is legally untested, part of an emerging 
international mediation community, and may require a ‘person’ as a mediator, the 
Convention will not form a central portion of the discussions within the thesis. 
However, as the Convention develops in the international commercial community, it 
should be considered as an important additional protection that could thus, be within 
the ODR process.  
6 See discussion, infra Chapter 2, Section C. 
7 See discussion, infra Chapter 2, Introduction. 
8 See id. 
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This thesis does not treat either system as presumptively good or bad. Rather, the 
differences between them will point us toward many of the key structural decisions that 
must be considered in the design of ODR. What is the ideal relationship between 
technological design and fundamental principles of the rule of law?9 What are the 
essential features a judicial decision maker must embody in order to uphold the rule of 
law?10 As they establish guiding principles and best practices, model designers will 
need to consider the legally proscribed parameters and protections associated with the 
legal conceptualizations of the key terms independence and impartiality as well as the 
mechanisms needed to ensure a neutral decision maker.11 It is also important to ask 
what risk model should be used to evaluate the new systems being designed, and what 
mitigation can be deployed to reduce identified risks.12 
 
On June 4, 2019 the Law Society of England and Wales published a report that 
concluded “that algorithm-based machine-learning has the potential to improve the 
criminal justice system — but warns of 'a worrying lack of oversight' over current 
experiments.”13 This thesis arose out of the same concerns becoming readily apparent 
to the author during her years of work with U.N. Working Group III, Online Dispute 
Resolution. While ODR can improve access to justice and can open the door to greater 
efficiencies in the justice environment, the community must be careful to consider the 
essential elements of a justice environment, especially one that serves as an alternative 
to the traditional brick-and-mortar based system.  
 
Early in the drafting of the thesis it became clear to the author that simple, uninformed 
arguments based on limited understanding of the full meaning of jurisprudence are no 
longer acceptable, especially in the face of mounting pressure from various sources to 
 
9 See discussion, infra Chapter 1. 
10 See discussion, infra Chapter 5, Section A. 
11 See discussion, infra Chapter 5,  Section B. 
12 See discussion, infra Chapter 5, Section C. 
13 Michael Cross, Justice Algorithms “Need Urgent Oversight” – Society, THE LAW 
SOCIETY GAZETTE, (4 June 2019) available at 
https://www.lawgazette.co.uk/law/justice-algorithms-need-urgent-oversight-
society/5070478.article (last visited Aug.5, 2019). 
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value speed and efficiency over Rule of Law. The thesis therefore, starts with an 
examination of the Rule of Law in one of the most essential areas of the justice system, 
and the one that stands to be most radically transformed with the advancement of 
technology, the decision maker. The author intends to demonstrate that the RoL 
demands adherence, without exception, to the principle of an impartial and independent 
decision maker, a key actor  in a bias-free process. This commitment to impartial and 
independent decision maker demands that the final step in any dispute decision process 
resolved in arbitration must involve a human actor. As the thesis explores and explains 
in subsequent chapters, the  current technology limitations, the absence of data to build 
bias free prediction, and the significant hesitations that arise from the way that humans 
interpret outcome predictions cannot be overcome via design. The technology captures 
the systemic bias that exists and while mitigation can lessen the impact, the impact is 
still- with existing technology and design- far too great to allow technology, via 
prediction devices, to simply produce an outcome.  
 
 
Chapter 2 considers the existing alternative justice environments. While a review of 
existing options finds several similarities, especially in the area of the decision-maker 
appointment and challenge process, there is also a great deal of variation. The author 
views this as an opportunity to use the lessons learned in the creation and administration 
of these environments to inform the development of the emerging ODR eco-system. 
The justice community should embed well-founded and widely supported traditional 
approaches to alternative justice into new systems, while also embracing the use of 
technology as a means to improve the justice eco-system.  
 
Chapter 3 considers the history of ODR and surveys the newest platforms within the 
area. Drawing from a short history, the thesis moves into guiding a consideration of 
technology deployments and their growing influence on the justice eco-system. While 
these are exciting times, technologists lead the delivery of the emerging system, 
creating an imperative for the justice system to develop an adequate understanding of 
the technology and craft guidance to ensure the rule of law is embedded within the 
online justice eco-system. Unfortunately, few guiding documents exist. Chapter 3 sets 
out the basic features of the existing ODR world, including the emergence of smart 
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contracts, and sets guideposts for the following chapters consideration of decision 
making model design.  
 
Chapter 4 seeks to explain the basics of artificial intelligence and the law. Because it 
became increasingly clear that technologists were the ones designing the ODR system, 
the thesis works through the issues of risk and risk mitigation in the design/delivery of 
new technological models. The chapter surveys some more well-known technology 
deployments that embraced prediction mechanisms, especially those deployed in 
justice or enforcement environments as these are the most relevant corollaries to the 
data within the justice environment being used to build predictive outcome 
mechanisms. The examples are briefly examined to demonstrate to the reader that there 
are grave concerns about prediction in judicial and criminal enforcement environments. 
These examples, highlights and briefly explain how the use of data, gathered within a 
system of systemic inequality can and should not be used to build a predictive tool that 
is deployed in a justice environment. In response to these concerns, those who design 
technology have created design enhancements, Chapter 4 explains one of the common 
design approaches and introduces the risk identification, impact assessments and 
mitigation concepts and applications. Chapter 4 explains one of the common design 
approaches and introduces the risk identification, impact assessments and mitigation 
concepts and applications. 
 
Chapter 5 is the culmination of the thesis in which the system itself is designed. While 
many imagine robots as judges, the technology is simply not that advanced. That is not 
to write that technology is not entering the justice environment, it’s just not going to be 
walking into a courtroom any time soon. Design best practices are set out and a 
schematic of the potential system is introduced. Common risks are identified and 
potential mitigation actions are described.  
 
Ultimately, this thesis seeks to inform the design of the new technological models that 
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Chapter 1: The Rule of Law 
 
As a society, we must ask, “How will we ensure that the rule of law is embedded within 
the technologies of the justice system?” This question is all the more important in light 
of the growing use of black-box, algorithm-based technology within the justice 
environment. As Chief Justice McLachlin notes, “[t]he rule of law may be undermined 
by laws which may require courts to operate in secrecy, away from the cleansing glare 
of sunlight.”14  
 
This chapter seeks to provide an overview of the rule of law in terms of ODR 
compliance. It examines broad (but complex) historic and modern conceptualizations, 
then moves into an in-depth examination of the rule-of-law principle of an independent 
and impartial judiciary. The chapter closes by addressing considerations relating to the 
fundamental principles necessary within legal reasoning. Chapter 4, Section C. will 
return to the topic of technology impacts on RoL, and seek to resolve technology-driven 
challenges to the RoL.  
 
A. The Rule of Law  
 
According to former U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon, 
The rule of law refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, 
institutions and entities, public and private, including the State itself, are 
accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and 
independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international 
human rights norms and standards.15 
 
14 Beverley McLachlin, Reflecting Upon The Relevance of Magna Carta in Today’s 
World, Magna Carta Lecture: Relevance of Magna Carta in Today’s World, BINGHAM 
CENTRE FOR THE RULE OF LAW (June 18, 2015) available at 
https://www.biicl.org/documents/700_chief_justice_mclachlins_magna_carta_lecture
_-_slh.pdf?showdocument=1 (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
15 United Nations, Rule of Law, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law 
and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, available at  
http://www.un.org/en/ruleoflaw/index.shtml (last visited Aug. 5, 2019).  
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The rule of law encompasses many overlapping, highly complex governance issues.16 
Some argue that the rule of law, as a set of restraints on the state and the members of 
the ruling elite,17 is rooted in the political and legal context of ancient Greece.18 In a 
more modern understanding, the rule of law is often used to mean maintaining order 
among people, or as a proxy for “social harmony.”19 The rule of law is an important 
component of the founding political documents of the U.S., including the U.S. 
Constitution. As John Locke proclaimed, “Wherever law ends, tyranny begins.”20 
Today many argue the rule of law embodies two ideals: protecting people from 
government and protecting people from each other.21  
 
Scholars divide the rule of law into two broad categories: formal and substantive.22 
Formal rule of law is considered to include the manner in which the law is formulated, 
the clarity of the established law, and the prospective nature of the law.23 Substantive 
 
16 See e.g., Adriaan Bedner, An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law, 2 HAGUE 
JOURNAL ON THE RULE OF LAW, 50-52 (2010) (discussing the “Rule of law 
definitions seem bound to vary over time, place, context, and from author to author.” 
Id at 48.); Jeremy Waldron, Is the Rule of Law an Essentially Contested Concept, 
LAW AND PHILOSOPHY 21 (2):137-164 (2002) (stating: “there are bound to be alarm-
bells ringing in analytic circles when a term like “the Rule of Law” is invoked so 
frequently on so many sides of so many issues in a fraught political debacle.”)  Id. at 
139. 
17 See Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What’s the 
Relationship?, 36 GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 827, (2004-
2005). 
18 See e.g., Brian Tamanaha, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS THEORY, 7-
14, CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS (December 13, 2004). 
19 See e.g., Nicolas Hachez and Jan Wouters, Promoting the Rule of Law: A 
Benchmarks Approach, 4, (April 30, 2013), available at 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2258331(last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
20 John Locke, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT, Chapter 17, sec. 202, 1690, in 
online edition Jonathan Bennett (ed.) (2017) available at 
http://www.earlymoderntexts.com/assets/pdfs/locke1689a.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 
2019). 
21 Adriaan Bedner, An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law, supra note 16 at 50-
52 (2010); Brian Tamanaha, A Concise Guide to the Rule of Law, ST. JOHN’S 
UNIVERSITY LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, No. #07-0082, 3-7, 
(September 2007) available at: 
http://www.ruleoflawus.info/The%20Rule/Tamanha%20Concise%20Guide%20to%2
0Rule%20of%20Law.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
22 See e.g., Bedner, An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law, supra note 16, at 55. 
23 See id. at 56. 
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rule of law scholars acknowledge the same principles, but also tend to go farther and 
envision the rule of law as including substantive rights that are derived from adherence 
to the rule of law.24  
 
Joseph Raz articulates a set of specific attributes that laws should have to be in 
compliance with the rule of law. He articulates the following standards:  
Laws should be prospective, not retrospective. 
They should be relatively stable. 
Particular laws should be guided by open, general and clear rules. 
There should be an independent judiciary. 
There should be access to the courts. 
The discretion which law enforcement agencies possess should not be 
allowed to undermine the purposes of the relevant legal rules.25 
The rule of law, according to Raz, should function as a protection ensuring that specific 
laws are passed in the correct manner, and that individuals are enabled to make 
decisions and guide their own conduct based upon the law.26  
 
Building upon the work of formal rule of law scholars, Dworkin adds a “capturing of 
moral right” component, arguing the rule of law must go beyond the formal. He defines 
the “moral rights” conceptualization of rule of law as follows: 
It assumes that citizens have moral rights and duties with respect 
to one another, and political rights against the state as a whole. 
It insists that these moral and political rights be recognised in 
positive law, so that they may be enforced upon the demand of 
individual citizens through courts or other judicial institutions of 
the familiar type, so far as this is practicable. The rule of law 
conception is the ideal of rule by an accurate public conception 
of individual rights. It does not distinguish, as the rule book 
conception does, between the rule of law and substantive justice; 
 
24 See id. at 63. 
25 Joseph Raz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in Joseph Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF 
LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY (Oxford Univ. Press)(1979), Published to 
Oxford Scholarship Online, (March 2012) pp. 216-17 [hereinafter Raz, THE 
AUTHORITY OF LAW] available at 
(http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198253457.001.00
01/acprof-9780198253457-chapter-11 (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
26 See Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 25, at 212. 
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on the contrary, it requires, as part of the ideal of law, that the 
rules in the book capture and enforce moral rights.27 
 
 
Tom Bingham has advanced a definition of rule of law in terms of eight principles that 
encompass both procedural (sometimes called “thin”)28 and substantive (sometimes 
called “thick”)29 principles.30 Thick and thin principles of the conceptualization of the 
rule of law is not without supporters and detractors, like the majority of topics within 
the broad discussion of the rule of law.31  For example, Brian Tamanaha is often cited 
 
27 Ronald Dworkin, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, 11-12 HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS; 
Reprint edition (October 1985). 
28 See Bedner, An Elementary Approach to the Rule of Law, supra note 16, at 55. 
29 See id. at 55. 
30 See Tom Bingham, THE RULE OF LAW, 37 (Penguin; Reprint edition (24 Feb. 2011) 
[hereinafter Bingham, RULE OF LAW]. 
31 The definition of the rule of law [summarizing, “these disagreements strongly 
indicate that the rule of law is an essentially contested concept” see Jørgen, Møller 
and Svend-Erik Skaaning, Systematizing Thin and Thick Conceptions of the Rule of 
Law, JUSTICE SYSTEM JOURNAL, Volume 33, Issue 2: Rule of Law (2012) at 136-7 
(examining the variance amongst definitions and concepts captured within the rule of 
law) ], and what the rule of law entails [see Raz’s assertion that the rule of law “is not 
to be confused with democracy, justice, equality (before the law or otherwise), human 
rights of any kinds or respect for persons or for the dignity of man.” Raz, supra note 
xx at 211)]  notion that a hierarchy of rule of law conceptualizations  exist (or not) 
[See Brian Tamanaha, ON THE RULE OF LAW; HISTORY, POLITICS AND THEORY, 
Cambridge University Press: New York (2004); Lauth and Sehring (2009) and]  
There is almost no limit the vastness of debates within the rule of law. The author is 
not the first, to attempt to “elucidate the dominant understandings of the concept and 
to order these in a unified typology.”  [see Svend-Erik Skaaning, above in note, at 
137] Despite prior authors, and wide discussion in various and broad topics, there is, 
however, a clear concession to be made, the author has focused on very specific 
aspects of rule of law, to focus attention into a very narrow category- independence 
and impartiality of the decision maker.  The narrow, often binary focused examination 
contained in the thesis, is a potentially, and likely is, a massive bias.  The author 
support this limitations as not being enough to subject the scholarship to wider 
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for his book entitled On the Rule of Law; History, Politics and Theory32 in which he, 
like others,33 distinguish systematically between different definitions of the rule of law, 
focusing on the distinguishing characteristics between formal and substantive 
definitions of the rule of law.34 He then creates, within each category continuum 
between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ definitions.35 The question arises, can the hierarchy and/or 
continuums be collapsed into a single dimension?  While this approach has been viewed 
with scrutiny- and some disagree with this approach36- the outcomes had led some 
scholars to support the basic premise of ‘thin’ as formal and ‘thick’ as “substantive” 
and to be able to consider these divergent aspects in a single consideration, especially 
in some areas of consideration, like consent.37 For example, as was explored earlier in 
the thesis as a mechanism of setting key attributes,38 the World Justice Project has a 
definition of rule of law,39 and then breaks this broad definitional set principles into a 
 
scrutiny based in the widespread agreement amongst scholars, nations, and the global 
legal community that arbitration is a voluntary process of dispute resolution where the 
parties are empowered to select from various options and the nations are capable of 
reviewing arbitration through the process of recognition and enforcement, via the 
New York Convention. (see Chapter 2, Introduction) As such, the thesis has adopted 
the common approach to examining the argument based in crafting of law into code- 
the division between objective driven rules and procedures and subjective aspects of 
decision making, often occurring in the substantive portion of deliberation and 
decision making. [For a more full explanation of this distinction, see Kevin Ashley, 
infra Chapter 4(A) note 161 at 4 and corresponding footnotes.  
32 Brian Z. Tamanaha, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY, 
Cambridge University Press (2004). 
33 See Møller, Systematizing Thin and Thick Conceptions, supra note 31 at 142. 
34 See Møller, Systematizing Thin and Thick Conceptions, supra note 31 at 4 
(summarizing the academic field). 
35 For example, Tamanaha, On Rule of Law, supra note 31 at 91. 
36 See Møller, Systematizing Thin and Thick Conceptions, supra note 31 at 149. 
37 See id. at 149. 
38 See infra, Chapter 1(B)(Table A) and corresponding discussion. 
39 See id. 
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granular level of specific attributes and then creates measures in particular areas.40  
Within the project, conceptualizations of thick and thin are combined in each granular 
metric.41 Similar to Tamanaha42 and Jorgen Moller/Sven-Erik Skaaning43 the World 
Justice projects creates a list of attributes to measure rule of law44 and although those 
attributes are granular, they fit into a larger analysis to determine rule of law definitions 
and measures.45 Similarly, both Tamanaha46 and Bingham47 argue for a hierarchy of 
attributes to be expected within the concept of the rule of law. The hierarchical 
approach is present in the thesis, yet, much has been eliminated or not directly 
addressed as the narrowing of the discussion to arbitration as an institution, builds in 
some of the necessary attributes, which are briefly explored but then not returned to as 
the focus of the thesis narrows, substantially.   
 
For example, while many argument can be advanced and undoubtedly a much larger 
conversation should be undertaken about the importance of the rule of law, democratic 
process, the authority empowered to make such important rules, and the concept of the rule 
of law is a universal human good, as Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 explore in specific detail, 
there is no arbitration system, institution, or nation that fails to recognize the importance 
of the independence and impartiality of the ultimate decision maker, this is especially true 
in arbitration proceedings.48 As delineated in Chapter 2, the global community has widely 
 
40 See id. World Justice Project “Access to justice is provided by competent, 
independent, and ethical adjudicators, attorneys or representatives, and judicial 
officers who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the 
makeup of the communities they serve.” See id.  
41 See infra, Chapter 1(B)(Table A) and corresponding discussion. 
42 See Tamanaha, On Rule of Law, supra note X at 91. 
43 See Moeller, supra note 31.  
44 See Chapter 1, Table B. 
45 See Moeller, supra note 31 
46 See Tamanaha, On Rule of Law, supra note 31 at 91. 
47 See infra, at pages 24-27   (examining Bingham, supra note 30 ) where the thesis 
author breaks down the attributes Bingham relies upon.  
48 See Chapter 2 (A); Chapter 3(B)(1). 
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supported arbitration and arbitration institutions as appropriate rule makers, so long as there 
is a series of checks and balances to ensure notions of law and public policy.49 As 
arbitration institutions have been empowered with authority to craft such rules50- and 
arbitration and institutional selection occurs through a process of voluntary consent,51 
Chapter 2 specifically details the parameters of independence and impartiality of the 
decision maker in arbitration.52 Chapter 3 uses the same analysis for the emerging Online 
Dispute Resolution (ODR) providers,53 but criticizes some providers as departing from the 
establish expectations of arbitration as an alternative to traditional justice environment.54  
Thus, the question with the rule of law context, in light of the specific, narrow topic on the 
thesis, is what exactly do these two broad concepts mean- and how do they break down (or 
operationalize) in the context of a technology driven final decision maker located in a 
justice environment.55  
The importance of this clarifying the topic, the crafting of definitions, the identification of 
key aspects of a topology and the objective measures to ensure a system is compliant with 
the rule of law in this narrow category is an essential aspect of furthering conversations 
about the use of technology as a decision maker in online justice environment. As Moeller 
and Svend-Erik Skaaning write when considering the importance of seeking definitions 
and fleshing out concepts prior to broader discussion: 
Why is this exercise relevant? Seen from the higher ground, the 
problem pestering the rule-of-law research agenda is exactly that 
the term is often employed without justifying or even spelling 
out the definition and, a fortiori, without selecting empirical 
measures that match the intended definition Such nonchalance is 
problematical because the establishment of a technical language 
based on sound logical premises is important for rigorous and 
cumulative research In this connection, it is clearly worthwhile 
to remember Sartori's dictum that "concept formation stands 
 
49 See infra, page 42, including footnote. 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See Chapter 1, Table B at page 44. 
53 See Chapter 1, Table D at page 76 and Table F page 108; Chapter 3, Section B 
54 See Chapter 1, Table H at page 121and text immediately following at pages 125-27. 
55 Specifically done within Chapter 5, Section 3. 
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prior to quantification." This, in turn, demands that the 
competing definitions are clarified and ordered…56 
 
Although narrowed to a specific aspect of potentially a much larger topic, and undoubtedly 
a debate, the exercise of identifying the issue, finding various potential approaches, 
identifying commonality and specifying a definition, and then operationalizing of those 
aspects into the design process of the decision making portion of the ODR world, is 
essential first step in advancing broader conversations in the area of online justice. 
For the purposes of this thesis the approach taken by Lord Bingham, in which he does in 
fact draw together the thick and thin aspects of rule of law, especially as it relates to the 
primary focus of the thesis, impartiality and independence of the decision maker, will be 
used. 
 
According to Lord Bingham, 
(1) The law must be accessible and, so far as possible, intelligible, clear 
and predictable.57 
(2) Questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by 
application of the law and not discretion.58 
(3) The laws of the land should apply equally to all, save to the extent 
that differences justify differentiation.59 
(4) Ministers and public officials at all levels must exercise the powers 
conferred to them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the 
powers were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers and 
not unreasonably.60 
(5) The law must offer adequate protection of human rights.61 
 
56 Møller, Systematizing Thin and Thick Conceptions, supra note 31 at 137.  
57 Id. at 37. 
58 Id. at 48. 
59 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 55. 
60 Id. at 60. 
61 Id. at 66. 
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(6) Means must be provided for resolving, without prohibitive cost or 
inordinate delay, bona fide civil disputes which the parties themselves 
are unable to resolve.62 
(7) Adjudicated procedures provided by the state should be fair.63 
(8) The law requires compliance by the state with its obligations in 
international law as in national law.64 
To begin analyze these framing principles, Lord Bingham argues that:  
all persons and authorities within the state, whether public or private, 
should be bound by and entitled to the benefits of laws publicly made, 
taking effect (generally) in the future and publicly administered in the 
courts.65  
Lord Bingham demands that “any departure from the rule I have stated calls for close 
consideration and clear justification.”66 Lord Bingham asks policymakers to understand 
that “belief in the rule of law does not import unqualified admiration of the law, or the 
legal profession, or the courts, or the judges.”67 His principles do not a call for rigid and 
blind adherence, but rather should prompt robust consideration of any departures.  
 
Note that an online justice environment appears to stand at direct odds with the 
principle that justice must be publicly administered by the courts.68 In regard to the 
courts aspect, ODR’s proponents have benefited from years of support for arbitration 
as an alternative to the traditional brick-and-mortar justice environment, as will be 
explored in detail in Chapter 2. Arbitration in general is already established as an 
acceptable alternative to the court system. In other words it presents a departure from 
Lord Bingham’s rules deserving of scrutiny,69 but one that has clear justification and 
years of well-founded support. When considering the “public” expectation, we must 
 
62 Id. at 85. 
63 Id. at 90. 
64 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 110. 
65 Id. at 8. 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 9. 
68 See Paul Magrath, Online Courts And Cyber Judges, InfoLaw Newsletter, (March 
2017) (calling into question the ability of online courts to meet the standard of public) 
available at https://www.infolaw.co.uk/newsletter/2017/03/online-courts-cyber-
judges/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
69 See Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 9. 
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refine the definition. There is growing support for a view that successful RoL requires 
“the cooperation of state and society, and is an outcome of complex and deeply rooted 
social processes.”70 If the purpose of the expectation that dispute resolution be public 
is to support an informed citizenry able to engage in debates about the social 
construction of justice and the parameters of such conversation, then we can reasonably 
unpack the definition of “public” to imply an expectation of transparency, of both 
process and outcome. If public necessarily implies that an individual can physically be 
present in a court room, then online justice faces a fundamental problem. Assuming, 
however, that the more substantive definition is correct, transparency is possible in the 
online justice eco-system.71  
 
Continuing his argument, Lord Bingham, building upon the work of Sir Matthew Hale, 
addresses the importance of judges and of the manner in which they conduct 
themselves.72 For his part, Sir Hale addresses the responsibility of the decision maker 
to ensure that their own conduct is in compliance with the rule of law, laying down the 
expectation: “[t]hat in the execution of justice, I [the judge] carefully lay aside my own 
passions, and not give way to them however provoked.”73 We call this today the 
expectation of judicial impartiality. Hale also specifies, “[t]hat I never engage myself 
in the beginning of any cause, but reserve myself unprejudiced till the whole be 
heard.”74 Thus, the conduct expected of the decision maker is to be impartial, 
independent, and to act “irrespective of public opinion.”75 Lord Bingham emphasizes 
that “the judges’ role in maintaining the rule of law is crucial . . .”76  
 
 
70 Michael Johnston, Good Governance: Rule of Law, Transparency, and 
Accountability, UNITED NATIONS PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION NETWORK, available at 
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/un/unpan010193.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
71 See discussion, infra Chapter 4, Section C. 
72 See Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 21 
73 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 20 citing Sir Hale, THINGS NECESSARY 
TO BE CONTINUALLY HAD IN REMEMBRANCE. 
74 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 21. 
75 Id. at 21. 
76 Id. at 22. 
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These issues form the backbone of this thesis: the role of the decision maker, the 
influence that is to occur in making the decisions, and the accountability of the decision 
maker. They will be returned to continually throughout the thesis. As a short preview, 
it is important to note that technology can, and perhaps should, be allowed to enhance 
the trustworthiness of the justice eco-system through careful, well-governed, 
deployments. As will be explored more in Chapter 4, this is type of governance is 
possible, and can be achieved as outlined in Chapter 5.77  
 
Third, Lord Bingham believes that:  
Judges do have a role in developing the law, and the common law has 
grown up as a result of their doing just this. But, and this is an all-
important condition, there are limits.78  
He goes on to explore the line between judicial discretion and judicial activism. He 
warns against exercising discretion in “radically innovative or adventurous ways”79 to 
the point that the law becomes “uncertain and unpredictable.”80  
[T]he rule of law does not require that official or judicial decision 
makers should be deprived of all discretion, but it does require that no 
discretion should be unconstrained so as to be potentially arbitrary.81  
To prevent chaos, “rules have grown up to direct the exercise of this discretion.”82 Thus, 
decision makers are guided by the law, bounded by the rules, and are directed in the 
application of rules that govern appropriate moments for discretion.  This crucial 
balance of stricture and discretion is all the more important to achieve when 
undertaking departures from the ordinary rule of law.  
 
As will be discussed in much greater detail in Chapters 3 and 4, the ODR environment 
will be based upon a carefully crafted set of legal rules. However, human-based 
discretion is almost impossible to capture in this format, and currently the judiciary 
relies heavily upon discretion to address situations that fail to be fully captured in the 
legal rules. Thus, when discretion will be allowed and how it will operate are two 
 
77 See discussion, infra Chapter 4, Section B and Chapter 5, Section C. 
78 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 45. 
79 Id. at 46. 
80 Id. at 46. 
81 Id. at 54. 
82 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 52. 
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important questions for the designers of ODR. Chapter 5 will outline a potential 
approach to developing a form of judicial discretion in ODR.  
 
Finally, Lord Bingham argues: 
Any departure from the general rule of equal treatment should be 
scrutinized to ensure that the differential treatment is based on real 
differences.83 
Thus, differential treatment is allowed, so long as it is scrutinized to ensure that real 
differences exist, and are relevant in the context of the question being asked. This aspect 
of rule of law, appropriately differentiated treatment, has proven incredibly 
controversial in the ODR community. Why? Much of the ODR community subscribes 
to the belief that efficiency is the primary value of ODR, and this type of deliberative 
reasoning is simply not as streamlined as the simpler decision-trees that make no 
allowance for scrutiny.84 Some argue that efficiency is such an essential consideration 
that other aspects of rule of law can and should be adjusted in order to prioritize it.85 
Sophie Nappert demands ODR policy makers consider if “technological development 
entails downscaling arbitral due process in favor of time and cost-saving measures.”86 
This has emerged as one of the most difficult, and important, questions within the ODR 
community. Currently, many argue that low-cost disputes can and should be decided 
through an automated process,87 one that includes no human decision maker, while 
maintaining that those with high-value disputes should remain entitled to a human 
decision maker. The question facing ODR policy makers in this instance thus becomes: 
 
83 Id. at 56. 
84 See Anjanette H Raymond and Scott Shackelford, Technology, Ethics And Access 
To Justice: Should An Algorithm Be Deciding Your Case? 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 485, 516-7 (2014) (arguing for that a  Balance  Must  be  Struck  
between  Efficiency  and Justice). 
85 See id. 
86 Sophie Nappert, Game changers: Defining and Defending Values in International 
Arbitration, 2019 International Arbitration Dispute Resolution Symposium, 
Washington University, Keynote Presentation, Video, (March 1, 2019) available at 
https://lecturecapture.wustl.edu/mediasite/Play/43893c65920f46b990595d877f55487
d1d (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
87 For example, in the case of blind bidding negation, such as CyberSettle. See 
discussion, infra Chapter 2, at Table D. 
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should the total value of the recovery sought determine which type of justice the 
plaintiff has access to?  
 
Advocates of efficiency in the ODR community are emboldened in their argument by 
a significant and immediate need to improve access to justice around the world.88 
Nonetheless, this thesis joins others in the ODR community89 in arguing the position 
that the several protections, responsibilities, and commitments embedded in the rule of 
law are crucial to the relationship between government and citizens, and that efficiency 
cannot be gained at the expense of damage to these aspects of rule of law. As the Chief 
Justice Beverley McLachlin remarked as she reflected upon the Relevance of Magna 
Carta in Today’s World:90  
But the rule of law embedded in the Magna Carta is more than a mere 
demand for legal primacy. The document supplements it with an 
insistence that the law must be just, available and free from corruption. . 
. .The twin notions of the primacy of law and the effectiveness of the law 
— an insistence that the law be just, impartial and available to all — 
combine to create what we call the rule of law. Both are essential to the 
rule of law. If the law is subordinated to other forms of power, there is 
no rule of law. Nor can the rule of law survive if the law is partial, corrupt 
or inaccessible to citizens. The Magna Carta contains the germs of both 
 
88 See e.g., Daniel Rainey, Access to Justice and ODR, National Center for 
Technology and Dispute Resolution, (March 14, 2019)(asserting “If we really want to 
increase access to justice, we need to target not just easy access to the courts for 
traditional parties, but apps and education for those who have traditionally been 
voluntarily disenfranchised by their own fear or reluctance to approach a court, online 
or offline.”); Daniel Becker, Andrea Maia, ODR as an Effective Method to Ensure 
Access to Justice: The Worrying, But Promising Brazilian Case, MEDIATE.COM, 
(Sept. 2019) (arguing “even though "access to courts" was granted by the Brazilian 
justice system, it failed to grant ”access to justice" to Brazilian citizens. . . . “ODR 
methods will undoubtedly serve to improve access to justice since these methods are 
capable of reducing the judicialization of ordinary conflicts of a simpler nature.”) Id. 
available at https://www.mediate.com/articles/becker-odr-effective.cfm (last visited 
Aug. 14, 2019).  See also, World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index, (2019), 
Table A, infra Section 1, Subsection B. 
89 See e.g., Julia Hornle: CROSS BORDER INTERNET DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 256, 
Cambridge University Press (2009) (asserting “the main concern of this book is the 
fair resolution of Internet disputes, and it has been argued that, in order to achieve 
this, minimum due process standards, set at a higher level that those pertaining to 
traditional arbitration, should be incorporated into all online arbitration procedures.”) 
Id. at 256. 
90 McLachlin,  Relevance of Magna Carta in Today’s World, supra note 3.  
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these ideas — ideas that were developed in later centuries to produce the 
modern concept of the rule of law.91 
 
Tracing its origins to the Magna Carta, today’s modern concept of the rule of law may 
be broken into two important sub-concepts: the primacy of the law and the effectiveness 
of the law. Both are essential to our discussion, but it is the second notion, effectiveness, 
understood as an “insistence that the law be just, impartial, and available to all”92 which 
most concerns us. As noted by United Nations in its Declaration Of The High-Level 
Meeting Of The General Assembly On The Rule Of Law At The National And 
International Levels: 
We are convinced that the independence of the judicial system, together 
with its impartiality and integrity, is an essential prerequisite for 
upholding the rule of law and ensuring that there is no discrimination in 
the administration of justice.93 
This thesis seeks to ensure the principles of impartiality and independence are 
embedded into the design of any decision maker within the online justice environment.  
 
B. The Rule of Law: Measuring the Rule of Law  
 
As explained by Christopher Stephens, 
Over the course of the 800 years since the Magna Carta, organisations. 
. . institutes, universities, think tanks, NGOs, and law societies have, 
through a relentless focus on the rule of law, raised the concept to a 
normative principle that is almost universally recognised as an 
aspirational premise of civil society. 94 
However, determining by what metric to measure the success of rule of law is no less 
challenging than distilling a precise definition of the rule of law. These are incredibly 
important challenges, as “the rule of law has become a globally recognised normative 
 
91 Id. at 12. 
92 Id. 
93 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration Of The High-Level Meeting Of The 
General Assembly On The Rule Of Law At The National And International Levels, 
A/Res 67/1 (Nov. 24, 2012) at para 13 available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/67/1 (last visited Aug. 
14, 2019). 
94 Christopher Stephens, The Rule Of Law In Development, at 29, in Jeffrey Jowell, J 
Christopher Thomas, Jan van Zyl Smit, (eds), RULE OF LAW SYMPOSIUM (2014): THE 
IMPORTANCE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN PROMOTING DEVELOPMENT (2014). 
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value among nations.”95 The issue is even more complex; however, than it may first 
appear, as explained by Martin Krygier: 
[R]ule of law is not something you either have or not . . . rather, like 
wealth, one has more or less of it. Whether one has enough of it is a 
judgment to be made along continua — multiple continua — not a 
choice between binary alternatives.96 
Overly simple measures, especially those that focus merely on institutions and not on 
outcomes and processes,97 are inadequate to measure meaningful compliance with the 
rule of law. Several institutions have attempted to capture the complexity in indices 
designed to evaluate individual nations’ justice systems and note areas of needed 
improvement. There are three widely regarded rule of law indices promulgated, 
respectively, by: the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Justice Project.  
 
First, the United Nations attempts to set the aspirational definition of the rule of law as 
a:  
[p]rinciple of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, 
public and private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that 
are publicly promulgated, equally enforced and independently 
adjudicated, and which are consistent with international human rights 
norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence 
to the principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, 
accountability to the law, fairness in the application of the law, 
separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal certainty, 
avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency.98 
This definition is further developed into a detailed rubric. To measure a given state’s 
compliance with the rule of law, the United Nations: 
…assesses the functioning of the police (41 indicators), judiciary (51 
indicators), prisons (43 indicators) by looking at the following elements: 
 
95 Id. at 31. 
96 Martin Krygier, False Dichotomies, Real Perplexities and the Rule of Law, at 261, 
in: András Sajó, (ed.) HUMAN RIGHTS WITH MODESTY: THE PROBLEM OF 
UNIVERSALISM, (Leiden/Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). 
97 See Rachel Kleinfeld Belton, Competing Definitions of the Rule of Law: 
Implications for Practitioners, 27 (Carnegie Papers no. 55, January 2005), available 
at: http://carnegieendowment.org/files/CP55.Belton.FINAL.pdf (last visited Aug. 14, 
2019). 
98 United Nations, Rule of Law Indicators: Implementations Guide and Project Tools 
(2011) at pages  v. and vi. available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/events/peacekeepersday/2011/publications/un_rule_of_law_ind
icators.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
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(i) performance, (ii) integrity, transparency and accountability, (iii) 
treatment of vulnerable groups and (iv) capacity.99 
However, the United Nations measures are narrowly focused on justice in criminal 
cases. As such, they fail to be fully useful in the instance of a justice system designed 
to handle a wider array of cases. As our focus is primarily on civil dispute resolution, 
it is not an adequate tool for the purposes of this thesis. 
 
A second widely regarded mechanism designed to measure compliance with the rule of 
law has been established by the World Bank. It sets its aspirational definition of the 
rule of law as: 
Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular 
[captures] the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, 
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.100 
The World Bank mechanism for measuring compliance is positioned within a larger set 
of benchmarks for governance, the World Governance Indicators Project.101 The 
limitation of the World Bank’s measure for rule of law is that it is focused on external 
perceptions of the trustworthiness of a given justice system. This captures indicators 
that may be relevant to many considerations, for example, corporate decisions to enter 
foreign business environments, but for the purposes of this thesis it again too narrowly 
focused.  
 
Finally, the World Justice Project (WJP) is an independent nonprofit organization 
whose mission is to “develop communities of opportunity and equity by advancing the 
rule of law worldwide.”102 One of the major initiatives of the WJP is the Rule of Law 
 
99 United Nations, Rule of Law Indicators, supra note 60, at 4. 
100 See World Bank, World Governance Indicators, Rule of Law, available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc (last visited Aug. 14, 2019) 
discussed in detail in Daniel Kaufmann Aart Kraay Massimo Mastruzzi, The 
Worldwide Governance Indicators Methodology and Analytical Issues, Policy  
Research  Working  Paper 5430 at 4, (Sept. 2010). 
101 Kaufmann, The Worldwide Governance Indicators, supra note 62.   
102 See World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index, (2019) available at 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). Our focus here is on the 
indicators that measure: accessibility and cost; the absence of unreasonable delays; and 
ADR, because these factors demonstrate a global need to begin to consider a greater 
use of ODR. 
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Index (2019), which is a quantitative assessment tool that offers a detailed and 
comprehensive picture of the extent to which countries adhere to the rule of law in 
practice.103 It contains a larger data set, more nuance in the various categories than other 
indices, and specifically addresses civil justice. As such, the index provides the most 
suitable framework for our discussion.104 
 
The civil justice portion of the WJP index measures seven key factors:  
• people can access and afford civil justice 
• civil justice is free of discrimination 
• civil justice is free of corruption 
• civil justice is free of improper government influence 
• civil justice is not subject to unreasonable delays 
• civil justice is effectively enforced 
• alternative dispute resolution mechanisms (ADRs) are 
accessible, impartial, and effective.105  
 
The WJP asserts that access to civil justice “requires that the system be accessible, 
affordable, effective, impartial, and culturally competent.”106 
 
 
103 See World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index, basic information page, (2019) 
available at https://worldjusticeproject.org/our-work/wjp-rule-law-index  (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2019). 
104 See Mark David Agrast, Juan Carlos Botero, and Alejandro Ponce, The World 
Justice Project, World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2011, 117 (2011), available 
at 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/WJP_Rule_of_Law_Index_2011_Rep
ort.pdf  (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
105 See WJP Rule of Law Index, (2019) supra note 61, available at, 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table  (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). The table includes 
the WJP indicators that measure: accessibility and cost; the absence of unreasonable 
delays; and ADR, because these factors demonstrate a global need to begin to consider 
a greater use of ODR. See id. 
106 Id. According to Professor Mauro Cappelletti, there are three main obstacles that 
make civil and political liberties inaccessible in many parts of the world. First, due to 
economic reasons, individuals are unable to access information or adequate 
representation. Second, due to organizational obstacles, the isolated individual lacks 
sufficient motivation, power, and information to initiate and pursue litigation. Third, 
sometimes procedural processes are inadequate, that is, traditional contentious 
litigation in court might not be the best possible way to provide effective vindication 
rights for many individuals. See Mauro Cappelletti, Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Processes with the Framework of the Worldwide Access to Justice Movement, 56 MOD. 
L. REV. 282, 283 (1993). 
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I have produced an edited summary of WJP scores for several countries, selecting those 
measures most relevant to the points discussed in this thesis. Note that these data 
represent only a portion of the data publicly available on the WJP website. 
 
Table A: WJP Rule of Law Index 107 
 
107 World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index, (2019) supra note 51, available at, 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table  (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). A prior (2011) 
version of this chart appeared in my publication: Anjanette H Raymond and Scott 














































a 0.76 0.62 0.70 0.87 0.90 0.68 0.76 0.83 
Canada 0.70 0.57 0.58 0.90 0.89 0.47 0.73 0.78 
China 0.54 0.66 0.49 0.43 0.22 0.76 0.57 0.67 
Germa
ny 0.86 0.78 0.85 0.88 0.91 0.83 0.90 0.86 
India 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.50 0.64 0.18 0.39 0.58 
Italy 0.56 0.62 0.57 0.67 0.69 0.31 0.37 0.69 
Japan 0.79 0.70 0.80 0.94 0.77 0.71 0.75 0.88 
Mexico 0.40 0.43 0.33 0.34 0.47 0.28 0.40 0.56 
Norway 0.85 0.71 0.68 0.96 0.93 0.83 0.91 0.96 
Russia 0.52 0.58 0.52 0.54 0.32 0.70 0.42 0.55 
South 
Africa 0.59 0.49 0.46 0.66 0.65 0.51 0.60 0.75 
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      Source: World Justice Project (2019) 
 
The WJP measures offer insight into the existing justice environment around the world. 
The data points highlight the extent to which the United States, and many other nations, 
are lacking justice environments that are widely accessible. Also notable is the absence 
of ADR in many of these countries.  
 
This coupling of low levels of ADR with high rate of access-to-justice issues points 
toward the nuanced importance of carefully developing new dispute resolution 
mechanisms. On the one hand, these scores suggest that an opportunity exists for justice 
systems to use ADR more robustly to supplement brick-and-mortar courtrooms with 
alternate avenues of access to justice. It also indicates that countries which currently 
score low on indices of rule of law have an incentive to portray ADR as constituting 
adequate access, in order to improve their ranking. Finally, overall, the WJP table 
illustrates the importance of continued justice system improvement. No system has a 
claim to civil justice excellence based on its score. The table reveals no system should 
be comfortable with its rating and all systems would benefit from changes designed to 
improve both compliance with the rule of law and access to justice.  
 
C. The Rule of Law: An Independent Judiciary  
 
When considering the creation of an online justice environment, especially when 
considering potential issues of bias, dependency, and partiality, great consideration 
must be given to protecting the basic principles clearly embedded within the rule of 
law. As articulated by Raz, the rule of law requires that: 
The independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed. . . The rules 
concerning the independence of the judiciary—the method of 
appointing judges, their security of tenure, the way of fixing their 
salaries, and other conditions of service—are designed to guarantee that 




0.73 0.53 0.64 0.91 0.84 0.67 0.72 0.78 
United 
States 0.64 0.46 0.42 0.82 0.71 0.62 0.68 0.77 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  32 
authority save that of the law. They are, therefore, essential for the 
preservation of the rule of law.108 
 
From this we can see that ensuring independence of the judiciary is a complex aspect 
of ensuring the rule of law.  
 
Few international institutions proscribe the method of judicial appointment, but most 
international bodies consider appointment to be an essential consideration when 
discussing independence of the judiciary. Under the Basic Principles on the 
Independence of the Judiciary,109  
 
Persons selected for judicial office shall be individuals of integrity and 
ability with appropriate training or qualifications in law. Any method of 
judicial selection shall safeguard against judicial appointments for 
improper motives. In the selection of judges, there shall be no 
discrimination against a person on the grounds of race, colour, sex, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, 
birth or status, except that a requirement, that a candidate for judicial 
office must be a national of the country concerned, shall not be 
considered discriminatory.110 
 
This passage draws attention to both the manner of selection and the individual 
qualifications to be expected in a decision maker.  
 
The European Convention on Human Rights prescribes an: “independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law.”111 Interpreting this phrase (and others) the European Court 
of Human Rights has consistently held that: 
[I]n order to establish whether a tribunal can be considered 
“independent” for the purposes of article 6 § 1, regard must be had to 
the manner of appointment of its members and their term of office, the 
 
108 Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 25, at 217. 
109 United Nations Human Rights, Office of the High Commissioner, United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic 
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, General Assembly resolutions 40/32 
of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985, available at  
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/IndependenceJudiciary.aspx 
(last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
110 United Nations Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, supra note 57 at Art. 10. 
111 Council of Europe, CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS, Rome, 4.XI.1950, Art. 6(1). 
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existence of safeguards against outside pressures and the question 
whether it presents an appearance of independence.112 
 
This interpretation adds to manner of selection and candidate qualifications the 
additional criteria of safeguards against “outside pressure” and, interestingly, the 
“appearance of independence”. The latter consideration implies that transparency and 
public trust are important aspects. 
 
When it comes to “outside pressure,” a variety of documents have defined the term 
expansively, and outlined several important safeguards against it. For example the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights recommends that Member States 
…take the steps necessary to protect the integrity and independence of 
members of the Judiciary in the performance of their judicial functions, 
and specifically in relation to the processing of human rights violations; 
in particular, judges must be free to decide matters before them without 
any influence, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, direct or 
indirect, for any reason or from any quarter.113 
Terms of judicial employment may be considered important to preventing outside 
influence. The Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary include the 
provision: 
The term of office of judges, their independence, security, adequate 
remuneration, conditions of service, pensions and the age of retirement 
shall be adequately secured by law.114 
Thus not only the initial selection but the ongoing terms of judicial employment, for 
example security of tenure, are considered paramount to protecting judicial 
independence.  
 
And finally, many systems also prevent outside influence being placed upon the 
judiciary by requiring any discipline or other intervention taken against a member of 
the judiciary to occur through an independent panel that stands outside the sphere of 
 
112 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Incal v. Turkey, (9 June 1998), Reports 
1998-IV, p. 1571, para. 65. 
113 Organization of American States, Annual Report of the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights, OAS doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95, doc. 7 rev., (1996) at 
761. 
114 United Nations Human Rights, Basic Principles on the Independence of the 
Judiciary, supra note 57 at Art. 12. 
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the potential influence of the judge. For example, the Council of Europe 
Recommendations specify that “all  decisions  concerning  the  professional  career  of 
judges  should  be  based  on  objective  criteria”115 and “should be based on merit, 
having regard to qualifications, integrity, ability and efficiency.”116 Moreover, “In  the  
decision-making  process,  judges  should  be  independent  and  be  able  to  act  without  
any restriction,  improper influence, inducements, pressures, threats or interferences, 
direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.”117 
 
Collectively, these sources tell us that in order to fulfill the rule of law requirement of 
an independent judiciary, the online justice environment should be designed to ensure: 
(1) qualified decision makers; (2) whose appointment is free of influence; (3) whose 
tenure and salary are fixed by external agents, without reward or consequence based on 
outcomes; (3) further, that steps are built into the system to monitor potential outside 
influence and protect decision makers, while also protecting the overall integrity of the 
system; and (4) that the manner of selection, the rules that govern conduct and conflict 
of interest, and remuneration, are all publicly available. 
 
D. The Rule of Law: An Impartial Judiciary  
 
For rule of law to be sound, the judiciary must be not only independent but impartial. 
In general, impartiality “requires that an arbitrator neither favors one party nor is 
predisposed as to the question in dispute.”118 As such, it is a state of mind or attitude of 
the tribunal in relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case.”119 As Lord 
Bingham explains:  
 
115 Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers, Recommendation No. R (94)  12 Of 
The Committee Of Ministers To Member States on The Independence, Efficiency And 
Role Of Judges, Principle I -  General Principles On The Independence Of Judge, at c. 
116 Council of Europe, Role of Judges, supra note 88, General Principles On The 
Independence Of Judge, at c. 
117 Council of Europe, Role of Judges, supra note 88,  General Principles On The 
Independence Of Judge, at d. 
118 Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, with N. Blackaby and C. Partasides, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, para 4-51, (4th Ed.), 
(2004). 
119 Id. at 2. 
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[R]ules of natural justice have traditionally been held to demand, first, 
that the mind of the decision maker should not be tainted by bias or 
personal interest. . . “120  
Raz expands upon this expectation, placing it within the context of correct application 
of the law, declaring: 
The principles of natural justice must be observed. Open and fair 
hearing, absence of bias, and the like are obviously essential for the 
correct application of the law.121 
In the Declaration of the High-Level Meeting on the Rule of Law,122 Member States 
highlighted the independence of the judicial system, alongside impartiality and 
integrity, as an essential prerequisite for upholding the rule of law and ensuring that 
there is no discrimination in the administration of justice.123  
 
Linda G. Mills suggests that impartial decision making in practice has a profound 
relationship with bias, arguing: 
The doctrinal conception of bias is based on an opposition between bias 
and impartiality, a rejection of one for the other. Yet my findings and 
the studies that preceded them indicate that in practice, bias is a 
consistent dimension of what is considered “impartial” decision 
making.124  
Within the context of this thesis, impartiality and bias will be interpreted in a contextual 
manner, rejecting the treatment of the terms as interchangeable. Although Lord 
Bingham and others use the term bias as almost interchangeable with partiality,125 the 
term is being reviewed by these authors in the context of (necessarily human) decision 
makers in  the brick-and-mortar judiciary, whereas this thesis also considers them in 
the context of technology-driven decision making. Hence, in the context of this thesis, 
 
120 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 62. 
121 Raz, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW, supra note 25 at 217. 
122 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration of the High-level Meeting of the 
67th Session of the General Assembly On The Rule Of Law At The National And 
International Levels, A/RES/67/1, (Nov. 2012). 
123 See id. at para. 13. 
124 Linda G. Mills, A Penchant for Prejudice: Unraveling Bias in Judicial Decision-
Making, 13 UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN PRESS, (1999). 
125 See Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37 at 93 (discussing impartiality and 
demanding decision makers “alert themselves’ to “any extraneous circumstance 
which might bias their judgement.”) Id. at 93. 
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bias and partiality are not interchangeable. They are two separate considerations within 
the technology-driven environment.  
 
In the case of impartiality, this thesis will adopt the widest possible definition of 
impartiality. Philosophers often frame discussion of impartiality by writing about an 
impartial point of view, but this thesis takes the view that within the area of judicial 
decision making impartiality is better examined in terms of the impartial agent or 
observer. An impartial observer is a person who makes moral judgments without being 
influenced by the sort of contaminating biases or prejudices that tend to arise from the 
occupation of a particular point of view.126 Some authors, such as Firth, suggest that 
the ideal observer is both “disinterested,” meaning that the decision maker is “entirely 
lacking in particular interests,”127 and “dispassionate,” in that she is “incapable of 
experiencing any emotions at all.”128 Some commentators demand that the ideal 
impartial observer must embody practical wisdom, in the Aristotelian sense.129 
 
It is possible that John Stuart Mills captures the relevant features of impartiality best: 
Impartiality, in short, as an obligation of justice, may be said to mean, 
being exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed 
ought to influence the particular case in hand; and resisting the 
solicitation of any motives which prompt to conduct different from what 
those considerations would dictate.130  
 
126 See e.g., Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press.(1976); David Hume, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, Second edition, ed. L.A. 
Selby-Bigge & P.H. Nidditch, Oxford University Press (1978); Roderick Firth, 
Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL 
RESEARCH, 12(3): 317–345 (1952); Richard Brandt, The Definition of an ‘Ideal 
Observer’ in Ethics, PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH, 15, 407-13 
(1954). 
127 Firth, Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer, supra note 98 at 335. 
128 Id. at 340-41. 
129  Practical wisdom “is the ability to do the right thing, at the right time, for the right 
reason.” John Bradshaw, RECLAIMING VIRTUE: HOW WE CAN DEVELOP THE MORAL 
INTELLIGENCE TO DO THE RIGHT THING AT THE RIGHT TIME FOR THE RIGHT REASON, 
Bantam (April 28, 2009). 
130 J.S. Mill, Utilitarianism, In On Liberty and Utilitarianism, (1992) in Knopf: 
EVERYMAN'S LIBRARY, Volume 81. p. 154. See also Firth, Ethical Absolutism and the 
Ideal Observer, supra note at 336. 
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In the United States, judicial impartiality is most often characterized as the absence of 
judicial bias. Within this context, judicial bias involves positively or negatively 
prejudiced “feelings or spirit”131 toward the claimants in the cases being heard. 
According to prevailing U.S. judicial doctrinal conceptions, to apply the standard of 
judicial impartiality, judges must eliminate both any “hostile feeling or spirit of ill 
will”132 and “undue friendship or favoritism”133 toward any litigant that appears before 
them.134 It is an expectation, in short, about specific feelings that judges are obligated 
by the ideal of judicial impartiality to expunge from their reasoning and decisions.135  
 
Judicial bias jeopardizes the individual’s right to a fair trial under rule of law. The U.S. 
Supreme Court has specified: “The alleged bias and prejudice to be disqualifying must 
stem from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis 
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case.”136 It further defines 
fairness (within the context of a fair tribunal) as an “absence of actual bias.”137 
Consequently, the presence of actual bias, that is external events that are taken into 
consideration and that impact the outcome, is the standard measure which gives rise to 
questions implicating a fair trial in the United States. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has articulated a two-pronged measure of 
impartiality, dividing the considerations into: subjective and objective. “First, the 
 
131 46 AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 2d § 147. 
132 Id. at § 167. 
133 Id.  
134 See id. 
135 See id. § 147. 
136 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 583 (1966). See also Berger v. U.S. 
255 U.S. 22, 31 (1921) (“the reasons and facts for the belief the litigant entertains are 
an essential part of the affidavit, and must give fair support to the charge of a bent of 
mind that may prevent or impede impartiality of judgment.”) Id. at 255; Liteky et al. 
v. U.S. 510 U.S. 540 (1994)(determining recusal of a judge in a federal criminal case 
is subject to the limitation that has come to be known as the “extrajudicial source” 
doctrine which is measured by the judge: (1) relied upon knowledge acquired outside 
such proceedings, and/or (2) displayed deep-seated and unequivocal antagonism that 
would render fair judgment impossible.) Id. at 556. 
137 In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)( “A fair trial .in a fair tribunal is a 
basic requirement of due process. Fairness, of course, requires an absence of actual 
bias in the trial of cases.”) Id. at 136. 
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tribunal must be subjectively free of personal prejudice or bias.”138 In the Case of 
Daktaras the ECHR articulated, “Personal impartiality is presumed unless there is 
evidence to the contrary.”139 In addition, “[the tribunal] must also be impartial from an 
objective viewpoint, that is, it must offer sufficient guarantees to exclude any legitimate 
doubt in this respect.”140 Under the objective test, “it must be determined whether . . .  
there are ascertainable facts which may raise doubts as to their impartiality.”141 As 
summarized in Kleyn, “the question whether, in the circumstances of the case, [the 
Court] had the requisite “appearance” of independence, or the requisite “objective” 
impartiality.”142 As the ECHR, highlights 
In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What 
is at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society 
must inspire in the public and above all, as far as criminal proceedings 
are concerned, in the accused (...). 143 
In deciding whether there is a legitimate reason to fear that a particular 
court lacks independence or impartiality, the standpoint of the accused 
is important without being decisive. What is decisive is whether his 
doubts can be held to be objectively justified (...).144 
Despite broad consensus on the importance of an impartial judiciary and decision 
maker,145 as can be discerned from the above descriptions, the best measure of 
impartiality is open for debate. For example, some argue that the incredibly high 
standard of “actual” and/or “justifiable doubts” based upon verifiable facts is too high 
 
138 Case of Kleyn and others v. The Netherlands, [2003] ECHR, at  para 191. 
139 Case of Daktaras v. Lithuania, [2000] ECHR, at para. 30. 
140 Kleyn, [2003] ECHR at para 191. 
141 Daktaras, [2000] ECHR, at para. 32 
142 Kleyn, [2003] ECHR at para 193. 
143 Kleyn, [2003] ECHR at para 191 citing Morris v. the United Kingdom, no. 
38784/97, § 58, ECHR 2002-I. 
144 Kleyn, [2003] ECHR at para 194 citing Hauschildt v. Denmark, judgment of 24 
May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, § 48.  
145 For example, in addition to the texts described above the concept is enumerated 
within the United Nations Human Rights, International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, (1976), Article 14, (“All persons shall be equal before the courts and 
tribunals. In the determination of any criminal charge against him, or of his rights and 
obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to a fair and public hearing by a 
competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by law.” Id. at Art. 14(1)); 
Organization  of  African  Unity, African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights, 
(2012), Art. 26, (States  parties  to  the  present  Charter  shall  have the duty to 
guarantee the independence of  the  Courts). 
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a bar, instead arguing that the “appearance of impartiality” is in fact the appropriate 
standard. Many scholars argue that “appearance,” or the existence of reasonable 
suspicion of a lack of impartiality on behalf of a judge should be the measure. For 
example, Article 5 of the Universal Charter of the Judge reads:  
In the performance of the judicial duties the judge must be impartial and 
must so be seen. The judge must perform his or her duties with restraint 
and attention to the dignity of the court and of all persons involved.146 
While the independence of the decision maker is ensured primarily through the 
processes of appointment and discipline, which occurs outside the court itself, 
impartiality is protected largely in specific cases through the actions of judges and 
attorneys themselves via recusals and challenges.147 As noted by Lord Bingham, 
Of course, since judges and other decision makers are human beings and 
not robots, they are inevitably, to some extent, the product of their own 
upbringing, experience and background. The mind they bring to the 
decision of the issues cannot be a blank canvas. But they should seek to 
alert themselves to, and so neutralize, any extraneous considerations 
which might bias their judgement, and if they are conscious of bias, or 
of matter which might give rise to an appearance of bias, they must 
decline to make the decision in question.148  
 
Council of Europe, when enumerating  judicial responsibilities recommends that,  
[J]udges should withdraw from a case or decline to act where there are 
valid reasons that should be defined by law and may, for instance, relate 
to serious health problems, conflicts of interest, or interests of justice.149 
 
The inclusion of the phrase conflict of interest in this recommendation further expands 
the set of potential measures of bias, partiality and dependency issues. In this particular 
 
146 International Association of Judges, The Universal Charter of the Judges, Article 
5, (1999) (“In the performance of the judicial duties the judge must be impartial and 
must so be seen..”) Id. at Art. 5 available at http://www.iaj-uim.org/universal-charter-
of-the-judges/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
147 For example, both Kleyn, [2003] ECHR and Daktaras, [2000] ECHR were brought 
before the ECHR based upon prior significant involvement in the cases where the 
parties sought to challenge the impartiality of the tribunal. 
148 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37 at 93. This point is articulated by Justice 
Sonia Sotomayor in 2001, this will be explored in further detail in Chapter 5 Section 
A, 6. (b) Rejection of the “Robot” Decision Maker. See infra Chapter 5, Section 
A(6)(b). 
149 Council of Europe, Role of Judges, supra note 77,  Principle V- Judicial 
Responsibilities, subsection (c). 
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instance, it is argued that “conflict of interest” includes both issues of material conflict, 
as, for example when the judge stands to financially benefit from the outcome of the 
case,150 and of moral conflict, such as when a judge has close personal ties to the issue, 
a party, or some other aspect of the case.151  
 
In these situations, and many others, judges are expected to refuse to hear the case 
and/or to stand down if the issue arises or comes to light during the course of the 
proceeding. In situations where the judge declines to recuse him- or herself,  on the 
basis of potential bias or conflict of interest, the justice system typically introduces a 
process in which the parties themselves can challenge the judge’s participation. It is 
through this combination of self-monitoring and external appeal that the impartiality of 
the decision maker is ensured.  
 
It is easy to see the overlap between dependence and partiality issues. Despite the 
distinctions, in many situations dependence and partiality are closely linked.152As noted 
by Lord Bingham: “Closely allied to the requirement of independence is the 
requirement that the decision maker be impartial.”153  
 
In the creation of an online justice environment, the designers of the various platforms 
must ensure that the rule of law is followed, including the right to an impartial decision 
maker, understood as a decision maker free from external bias and from internal 
feelings of partiality. The online justice environment must: (1) define impartiality; (2) 
determine if actual bias, appearance of bias, or a hybrid contextual determination will 
be the governing standard; (3) determine a mechanism for the disclosure of potential 
impartiality and/or bias of the decision maker; (4) determine if an external third party 
 
150 See e.g., AT&T Corporation v Saudi Cable Co [2000] EWCA Civ. 154 (chairman 
of the tribunal held shares in corporation, however, the benefit would be de minimis 
and of minimal benefit to the arbitrator, thus chairman was not to be removed.) See id. 
at para. 55. 
151 See Case of Pescador Valero v. Spain, [ECHR] [4th section] (2003) (discussing the 
impartiality debate arising when the plaintiff had been laid off by the university with 
which the trial judge had close professional connections). 
152 Kleyn, [2003] ECHR at para. 192 (stating “The concepts of independence and 
objective impartiality are closely linked. . .”) Id. at 192. 
153 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37 at 93. 
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will adjudicate the determination of bias/impartiality or if the decision will be left to 
the parties; (5) create a process to allow the decision maker to withdraw from making 
decisions when alerted to bias; and (6) create a system to replace the decision maker in 
such a case. Solutions to these six problems will be presented within the final chapter 
which specifically suggests a model designed to address the issues presented 
throughout the thesis.  
 
E. Rule of Law: The Law and Legal Reasoning 
 
Because this thesis considers the impartiality and independence of the decision maker 
within the justice environment, one final consideration must be undertaken: the manner 
of decision making. In general, theories of adjudication, or how judges should decide 
cases, can be broadly divided into two general types, “formalist” theories and “realist” 
theories.154 Because the manner in which decisions are made is an essential component 
of considering the design of a decision making system, the following section will 
briefly explore these two broad categories of theory and their relationship to the 
questions of this thesis. 
 
1. Legal Formalism 
 
According to Brian Leiter, “Formalist” theorists claim that: 
 (1) the law is “rationally” determinate, i.e., the class of legitimate legal 
reasons available for a judge to offer in support of his decision justifies 
one and only one outcome either in all cases or in some significant and 
contested range of cases; and (2) adjudication is thus “autonomous” 
from other kinds of reasoning, that is, the judge can reach the required 
decision without recourse to non-legal normative considerations of 
morality or political philosophy.155 
It can be asserted that legal formalism is directly linked to the theory of law as objective. 
That is, if the law is objective then the outcome of any case to which the same set of 
legal rules is applied should be consistent regardless of the decision maker. Formalism 
is an ideal that posits that bias can be entirely eliminated. As such, technology-driven 
 
154 See, Brian Leiter, Legal Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PUBLIC LAW & LEGAL THEORY WORKING PAPER, No. 320 
(2010). 
155 Id. at 2. 
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decision-making systems that adopt the legal formalism approach should be designed 
with robust rules, ensuring predictable and consistent outcomes. Legal formalism 
embraces the idea that well-defined rules leave little room for alternative 
considerations, and outcomes are determined solely by rules, as in a closed system, 
without reference to the parameters of the external society or its commitments to 
morality. The rules guide the process, fully, without exception, to a predictable 
conclusion.  
 
2. Legal Realism 
 
According to Brian Leiter “realist” theorists purport to give “an unsentimental and 
honest account of what judges really do.”156 That is, realists advance a descriptive 
theory of adjudication according to which:  
(1) legal reasoning is indeterminate (i.e., fails to justify a unique 
outcome) in those cases that reach the stage of appellate review; (2) 
appellate judges, in deciding cases, are responsive to the “situation-
types”—recurring factual patterns (e.g., “seller of a business promises 
not to compete with the buyer, and then tries to break the promise”)—
that elicit predictable normative responses (“this is unfair” or “this is 
economically foolish”) from most jurists, responses that are not, 
however, predictable based on existing “paper” rules and doctrine; and 
(3) in the commercial law context judges look to the “normal” practices 
in the existing business culture in deciding what is the right outcome.157 
 
Realists argue, 
[T]he law is filled with gaps and contradictions, that the law is 
indeterminate, that there are exceptions for almost every legal rule or 




156 Id. at 3 citing Richard Posner, HOW JUDGES THINK (Harvard University Press, 
2008).  
157 For detailed discussion and evidence, see Brian Leiter, NATURALIZING 
JURISPRUDENCE: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND NATURALISM IN LEGAL 
PHILOSOPHY (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), esp. Chs. 1-3. For a more 
concise account, see Brian Leiter, American Legal Realism, in THE BLACKWELL 
GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (M. Golding & W. Edmundson 
eds. 2005). 
158 Brian Tamanaha, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST DIVIDE: THE ROLE OF 
POLITICS IN JUDGINg, 1, Princeton University Press (2009).  
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Realism seeks to establish a new theory that can track the logic of the day-to-day 
realities of judicial decision making.  
 
Of course, the binary between formalism and realism fails to consider a hybrid model 
in which objective law exists, yet legal realism is the decision making model employed. 
Extreme adherence to either formalism or realism could lead a judge to run afoul of the 
rule of law in three key areas: judicial activism, discretion, and equality before the 
law.159 
 
For example, judicial activism is a clear violation of the rule of law as it damages the 
predictability of the law as well as the expectation that the standards of the law are 
knowable at the time of the activity. Simply put, rule of law demands that citizens have 
the ability to know what the laws are, so they may inform their course of behavior and 
help them predict consequences and measure risk.160 Taking a legal realist perspective 
too far runs the risk of allowing judicial activism to “recast the law”161 and undermine 
this principle that the law should be stable enough that citizens can be expected to know 
what it is.  
 
Legal formalism, when taken to the extreme, can be just as problematic, as it does not 
allow for judicial judgement and/or discretion. However, court systems are necessarily 
full of instances of judicial judgement that do not rise to the level of discretion. As will 
be discussed later in Chapter 4, decisions are based on everything from witness and 
expert testimony to evidence and document production: while these issues are not 
considered discretionary, nonetheless they are all within the purview of the decision 
maker. Overly formalistic approaches to such discussions unnecessarily limit the 
function of the decision maker and negatively impact the rule of law.  
 
3. Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning 
 
 
159 See Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 45, 48-9, and 55. 
160 See id. at 37. 
161 See id. at 45. 
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Which of the widely divergent theories of judicial reasoning is used will have 
substantial implications for the design of the decision maker in the online environment. 
In fact, exploration of this problem is already well underway. As will be discussed more 
fully in Chapter 4, formalism is the backbone of current design, but it is already 
apparent that it will prove inadequate as we attempt to design more complex systems 
that address higher-complexity issues beyond mere compliance with statute. 
 
One might assume legal analytics is in its infancy as a discipline, but this would be 
incorrect. As Kevin Ashley explains,  
[T]he field of AI & Law has long studied how to design 
computer programs that can reason logically with legal rules 
from statutes and regulations. It has made strides, and 
demonstrates some success, but it has also developed an 
appreciation of just how difficult the problem is.162  
It should not surprise anyone that the law, as it is written, is difficult to decipher and 
even more difficult to teach a computer to apply in context. As described by Kevin 
Ashley, when commenting on statutory text, 
The problems of resolving syntactic ambiguity, reformulation, 
negation, counter factual conditions, and semantic ambiguities 
are problems of interpreting natural language text.163 
This comment is made in relation to statutory text, and does not even scratch the surface 
of the challenges associated with developing judicial decision making.  
 
While a legal formalism approach can be captured in code, legal realism, with its 
acknowledgement of discretion and the necessity of adjustment to particular 
circumstances, is difficult to capture in an algorithmic environment. Nevertheless, the 
designers of the online justice system must understand how to balance both approaches. 
As articulated in prior sections of the chapter, stable rules are important, but bounded 
discretion is also essential.164  
 
 
162 Kevin D. Ashley, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, NEW TOOLS 
FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE, Cambridge University Press, at 39 (2017). 
163 Id. at 52. 
164 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 48-55. 
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Online justice model designers must resolve the following issues: (1) Will the system 
reflect the written law in a purely formal way, will it reproduce the reality of current 
judicial reasoning processes and outcomes, or will it be a hybrid system the uses both 
approaches? (2) When will formalist, realist, and hybrid approaches, respectively, most 
effectively maintain the rule of law? (3) Assuming formalism is used in some measure, 
what limitations must be set on it? (4) Assuming realism is used in some measure, what 
limitations must be set on it? (5) What are the appropriate points at which to introduce 
judicial discretion into the ODR process? And, (6) what RoL considerations and what 
potential impacts on the RoL will need to be reviewed once technology becomes a 
central part of the justice eco-system? Recommended answers to these questions will 
be presented in Chapter 5. 
 
F. Rule of Law Conclusions 
 
The importance of the decision maker’s role in maintaining rule of law sets a high bar 
for the design of decision making in ODR. However, it is important to note at this stage 
that it is not necessarily the case that ODR will have no human decision makers — as 
we shall continue to explore in more depth later. In the meantime, we should also recall 
that departure from specific rules may be found allowable on Bingham’s account after, 
and so long as, robust consideration is first given.165 Rather than eliminating the human 
decision maker, ODR technology may be used to support them in achieving the 
independence, impartiality and freedom from the influence of public opinion called for 
by RoL principles. It might do this in several ways. First, technology can identify and 
thus facilitate the elimination of problematic dependency relationships prior to 
appointment of the decision maker. Moreover, supervising authorities and 
commentators will be able to monitor the outcomes of the ODR system for partiality, 
and both decision makers themselves and outside monitors will be able to receive 
feedback when patterns of partiality are discovered. As will be explored more in 
Chapters 4 and 5, technology deployed in such a manner can in fact reduce partiality 
and dependence issues. This is one of the positive arguments for expanding the use of 
technology in justice systems. 
 
165 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37, at 8. 
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CHAPTER 2: Arbitration Underpinnings  
 
Online Dispute Resolution draws much of its anticipated structure from the widespread 
use of arbitration as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. Although arbitration 
is not the only alternative to the justice system, nor is it the only option within the world 
of ODR,166 it has a rich and robust history that provides much of the context for the 
development of new solutions. There is an extensive literature on fair hearing issues 
that arise outside the traditional justice system in the context of arbitration. Thus, 
arbitration will be used to frame much of the present discussion of impartiality and 
independence in ODR. 
 
Let us first establish the basic tenets of arbitration. The arbitration process is juridical 
in nature; consequently, applicable national law places limits upon the parties’ freedom 
of contract.167 In general, this is because the tribunal stands in the place of the judiciary 
and its awards have the same final and binding effect as a judgement issued from a 
national court.168 Arbitral awards are enforced at a local level via the authority of the 
 
166 See discussion, infra Chapter 3, Section C. As explained in Footnote No. 5. It is 
important to note, on August 7, 2019, the UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON 
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS RESULTING FROM MEDIATION [United   
Nations:   United   Nations   Commission   on   International   Trade  Law, (March  
2019)(hereinafter, the Singapore Convention)] opened for signature in Singapore. 
Over 40 states, including China, India and the U.S., have signed the treaty. See id. As 
such, the Convention is expected to enter into force shortly. See id. The Singapore 
Convention requires member states to enforce settlement agreements and gives effect 
to settlement agreements such that they may be used to prevent parties from litigating 
the matter. See id. Convention Article 1 (3), specifies ““Mediation”  means  a  
process,  irrespective  of  the  expression  used  or  the  basis  upon  which  the  
process  is  carried  out,  whereby  parties  attempt  to  reach  an  amicable  settlement  
of  their  dispute  with  the  assistance  of  a  third  person  or  persons. . .” Id. The use 
of the term ‘person’ may implicate awards issued in an automated process.  Because 
the Convention is legally untested, part of an emerging international mediation 
community, and may require a ‘person’ as a mediator, the Convention will not form a 
central portion of the discussions within the thesis. However, as the Convention 
develops in the international commercial community, it should be considered as an 
important additional protection that could thus, be within the ODR process. 
167 Julian D. M. Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, Stefan M Kroll, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Ch. 5, 1.1 and 2.1, Kluwer Law 
(2003)[hereinafter Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION] 
168 See id. at Ch. 26, 3.1. 
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state;169 thus national law requires the arbitral proceedings and the composition of the 
tribunal to meet minimum standards.170 These standards provide a benchmark for what 
are usually considered to be essential elements within a justice environment.171  
 
This chapter will first explore the various institutional rules relating to impartiality and 
independence that have been developed for arbitration environments. Second, the 
chapter will analyze areas of convergence and divergence among these rules. Third, the 
chapter will examine existing rules relating to disclosure and challenges to the decision 
maker within arbitration. To further explore the nuances surrounding determinations of 
independence and impartiality, the chapter will consider the role of the traditional brick-
and-mortar court in the determination of impartiality and independence. And finally, 
the chapter will engage in a limited review of cases that set out parameters and 
standards when courts are called on to determine issues of decision maker dependence 
and partiality.  
 
A. Arbitration: Impartiality and Independence 
 
As emphasized by Lew, Mistelis, and Kroll: 
  
in line with his special adjudicative function, the arbitrator has to be and 
remain independent and impartial and disclose all facts which may be 
relevant.172  
 
One can thus isolate two timeframes during which impartiality and independence are 
at issue: (1) at the time of appointment, and (2) throughout the decision making process. 
The noted authorities assert that arbitrators must disclose all relevant facts, and one can 
infer they intend this to impose upon arbitrators a requirement of disclosure prior to 
appointment as well as an ongoing obligation to disclose all relevant facts that arise 
during the decision making process. The proscribed duty placed upon the arbitrator is 
a general, yet fundamental expectation.  
 
169 See id. 
170 See id. 
171 See id. 
172 Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 140 
at 255.  
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If international arbitration is to have a bedrock of commonly recognized 
core principles, it is essential for fundamental concepts such as 
independence and impartiality to have generally accepted meanings and 
standards in the international arbitration community.173  
The institutions of arbitration have developed more specific and detailed explanations 
of this duty. The following table is a compilation of the rules set forth by the major 
arbitration institutions in the area of independence and impartiality, gathered from the 
institutions’ websites and widely available online and in publications. 
 










Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 
UNCITRAL 
2013 




Article 11 “When a person is 
approached in connection with his 
or her possible appointment as an 
arbitrator, he or she shall disclose 
any circumstances likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
or her impartiality or 
independence.” 
[No individual qualification clause] 
 
173 Nick Gray and Deborah Crosbie, Winds of change? The Pending Publication Of 
LCIA Reasoned Decisions On Arbitral Independence, page 7, Slaughter and May 
Online Publication, (April 2009). 
174 The chart was compiled in August 2017 from the institutions, via their institutional  
websites listed in the first column.  
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Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 
LCIA 2014 Viewpoint 




5.3 “All arbitrators shall be and 
remain at all times impartial and 
independent of the parties.” 
5.4 “Before appointment by the 
LCIA Court…the candidate shall 
sign a written declaration stating: (i) 
whether there are any circumstances 
currently known to the candidate 
which are likely to give rise in the 
mind of any party to any 
justifiable doubts as to his or her 
impartiality or independence and, if 
so, specifying in full such 
circumstances in the declaration;” 













as arbitrators.)  
Article 11.1 “Every arbitrator must 
be and remain impartial and 
independent of the parties involved 
in the arbitration” 
Article 11.2 “Before appointment or 
confirmation, a prospective 
arbitrator shall sign a statement 
of…impartiality and independence. 
The prospective arbitrator shall 
disclose in writing to the Secretariat 
any facts or circumstances which 
might be of such a nature as to call 
into question the arbitrator’s 
independence in the eyes of the 
parties, as well as any 
circumstances that could give rise to 








Article 14(1) “Every arbitrator must 
be impartial and independent.” 
Article 14(2) “Before being 
appointed as arbitrator, a person 
shall disclose any circumstances 
which may give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his/her impartiality or 
independence. If the person is 
appointed as arbitrator, he/she shall 
submit to the Secretariat a signed 
statement of impartiality and 
independence disclosing any 
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Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 
circumstances which may give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to that 
person’s impartiality or 
independence…” 
ICDR 2014 Objective Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
Article 13.1 “Arbitrators acting 
under these Rules shall be impartial 
and independent and shall act in 
accordance with the terms of the 
Notice of Appointment provided by 
the Administrator.” 
Article 13.2 “The arbitrator shall 
disclose any circumstances that 
may give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to the arbitrator’s impartiality 
or independence and any other 
relevant facts the arbitrator 




Objective  Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
Article 24 “An arbitrator shall not 
represent either party, and shall be 
and remain independent of the 
parties and treat them equally.” 
Article 31.1 “An arbitrator 
nominated by the parties or 
appointed by the Chairman of 
CIETAC shall sign a Declaration 
and disclose any facts or 
circumstances likely to give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his/her 
impartiality or independence.” 
SIAC 2016 Objective Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
13.1 “Any arbitrator appointed in an 
arbitration under these Rules, 
whether or not nominated by the 
parties, shall be and remain at all 
times independent and impartial.” 
13.4 “A nominated arbitrator shall 
disclose to the parties and to the 
Registrar any circumstances that 
may give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to his impartiality or 
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Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 
independence as soon as 
reasonably practicable and in any 
event before his appointment.” 
Author compilation of online website information (Up-to-date April 2019) 
 
 
The table illustrates the difficulty of synthesizing a single standard. Institutions have 
used a variety of terminology to make rules about impartiality and independence. There 
is no single institutional rule or industry standard that encompasses all of the necessary 
determinations that go into the examination of arbitrator impartiality and independence. 
In fact, some rules do not explicitly prescribe the standards, but, by providing grounds 
on which an arbitrator’s participation may be challenged, imply them. Adding to the 
confusion, many institutional rules adopt familiar legal phrasing, but do so without 
definition or proscriptions for interpretation. As a result, terms such as “justifiable 
doubts” and “reasonable doubt” need to be interpreted on a case-by-case basis based 
on the applicable rule and local law. In addition, arbitration institutions, codes of ethics, 
and local law all use differing, yet similar, terminology. For example, the International 
Bar Association Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators consider impartiality and 
independence within the context of the elements that can bias the arbitrator.175 Finally, 
while institutional rules play an important part in the interpretation of the parties’ 
arbitration agreement, in the end much of the interpretation will be done in a traditional 
brick-and-mortar courthouse, leaving the interpretation subject to local law.  
 
The differences between the various institutions and corresponding institutional rules 
may be seen as providing a market opportunity, that is, an opportunity for the parties to 
an arbitration to select the institutional rules and jurisprudence that best fits their needs 
under the circumstances. This thesis, however, takes the position that there must be 
limits placed on this variability: the parties should not be able to simply contract around 
the basic protections of the rule of law. Yet, the ability of parties to select between 
 
175 See, International Bar Association, Rules of Ethics for International Arbitrators, 
Cannon 3 (1987) [Hereinafter IBA, Ethics]. 
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institutions and the voluntary, consent driven aspect of this choice is an essential 
consideration within the context of rule of law considerations, as was described in 




B. Arbitration: Disclosure and Challenges 
 
Arbitral institutions generally use two mechanisms to reduce the impact of dependence 
and partiality in the decision making process: (1) disclosure of information by the 
arbitrator, and (2) challenges to the appointment of the arbitrator. Each of these issues 




According to Lew, Mistelis and Kroll: 
To ensure compliance with the requirements of independence and 
impartiality, arbitrators are generally under a duty to disclose to the 
parties all facts which may be relevant in the respect.177  
As can be seen, arbitrators must disclose all relevant facts. The duty of disclosure leads 
to a series of questions: (1) When must this disclosure occur? (2) How should 
“relevant” be defined? (3) What must be disclosed to satisfy the duty of disclosing “all” 
relevant facts? (4) What point of view is to be considered when making the 
determination of the facts to disclose?  
 
The following table is a compilation of the rules laid out by the major arbitration 
institutions in the area of disclosure standards, as gathered from their respective 
websites and widely available online and in publications: 
 
 
Table C: Arbitral Disclosure Standards 
 
 
176 See Chapter 1, discussion at supra footnote 31.  
177  Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 140 
at 265. 
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Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 
UNCITRAL 
2013 
Objective  Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
Article 11 “When a person is 
approached in connection with his 
or her possible appointment as an 
arbitrator, he or she shall disclose 
any circumstances likely to give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to his 
or her impartiality or 
independence.” 
[No individual qualification clause] 
LCIA 2014 Viewpoint 




5.3 “All arbitrators shall be and 
remain at all times impartial and 
independent of the parties.” 
5.4 “Before appointment by the 
LCIA Court…the candidate shall 
sign a written declaration stating: (i) 
whether there are any circumstances 
currently known to the candidate 
which are likely to give rise in the 
mind of any party to any 
justifiable doubts as to his or her 
impartiality or independence and, if 
so, specifying in full such 
circumstances in the declaration;” 













as arbitrators.)  
Article 11.1 “Every arbitrator must 
be and remain impartial and 
independent of the parties involved 
in the arbitration” 
Article 11.2 “Before appointment or 
confirmation, a prospective 
arbitrator shall sign a statement 
of…impartiality and independence. 
The prospective arbitrator shall 
disclose in writing to the Secretariat 
any facts or circumstances which 
might be of such a nature as to call 
into question the arbitrator’s 
independence in the eyes of the 
parties, as well as any 
circumstances that could give rise to 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 









Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 








Article 14(1) “Every arbitrator must 
be impartial and independent.” 
Article 14(2) “Before being 
appointed as arbitrator, a person 
shall disclose any circumstances 
which may give rise to justifiable 
doubts as to his/her impartiality or 
independence. If the person is 
appointed as arbitrator, he/she shall 
submit to the Secretariat a signed 
statement of impartiality and 
independence disclosing any 
circumstances which may give 
rise to justifiable doubts as to that 
person’s impartiality or 
independence…” 
ICDR 2014 Objective Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
Article 13.1 “Arbitrators acting 
under these Rules shall be impartial 
and independent and shall act in 
accordance with the terms of the 
Notice of Appointment provided by 
the Administrator.” 
Article 13.2 “The arbitrator shall 
disclose any circumstances that 
may give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to the arbitrator’s impartiality 
or independence and any other 
relevant facts the arbitrator 




Objective  Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
Article 24 “An arbitrator shall not 
represent either party, and shall be 
and remain independent of the 
parties and treat them equally.” 
Article 31.1 “An arbitrator 
nominated by the parties or 
appointed by the Chairman of 
CIETAC shall sign a Declaration 
and disclose any facts or 
circumstances likely to give rise to 
justifiable doubts as to his/her 
impartiality or independence.” 
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Relevant Wordings of 
Qualification and/or Disclosure 
SIAC 2016 Objective Impartiality 
and 
Independence 
13.1 “Any arbitrator appointed in an 
arbitration under these Rules, 
whether or not nominated by the 
parties, shall be and remain at all 
times independent and impartial.” 
13.4 “A nominated arbitrator shall 
disclose to the parties and to the 
Registrar any circumstances that 
may give rise to justifiable doubts 
as to his impartiality or 
independence as soon as 
reasonably practicable and in any 
event before his appointment.” 
 Author compilation of online website information (Up-to-date April 2019) 
 
Unlike the varied standards for impartiality and independence themselves, the 
disclosure standards of the major arbitration institutions are incredibly similar. These 
standards can be collectively summarized as:  
(1) Disclosure must occur prior to the appointment, and must be of facts known 
to the arbitrator at the time of appointment. 
(2) The disclosure duty is ongoing. Consequently, if new facts should come to 
the attention of the arbitrator the facts must be disclosed, immediately. 
(3) “Relevant” is to be measured in the eye of the parties. 
(4) Yet, the terms “all” and “relevant” are limited to facts that give rise to 
“justifiable doubts” implicating the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence. 
While the requirements of multiple arbitration bodies can be easily condensed into this 
simple list, interpretation of the phrases, especially of the term “justifiable doubts,” has 
required courts to closely examine the true intention of these arbitration rules. The 
current trend articulated by some commentators is to “disclose anything and 
everything.”178 The “disclose everything” standard is reflected in the 2009 case of SA 
 
178 For example, the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) recommends  
“Any doubt as to whether a relationship should be disclosed must be resolved in 
favour of disclosure.” London Court of International Arbitration, Notes for 
Arbitrators, Section 2.6, (2014).  
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J&P Avax SA v. Société Tecnimont SPA,179 in which the Paris Court of Appeal annulled 
an arbitral award because the chairman of the arbitral tribunal had failed to disclose 
certain circumstances, even though the circumstances did not exist at the time of his 
appointment, nor did he become aware of the circumstances during the arbitral 
process.180  
 
Reliance upon court interpretation, however, leaves the ecosystem of international 
commercial arbitration dependent upon varying judicial readings of these standards. 
International commercial arbitration has always been resistant to court involvement, 
which introduces variable local interpretations of key features, as this variability tends 
to undermine the international nature of arbitration. Arbitration institutions seek to 
develop guidance to mitigate this problem, especially in essential areas of importance 
within the arbitration community, such as disclosure, independence and impartiality. In 
response to such concern, the International Bar Association developed Guidelines on 
Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration. Within the Guidelines, the 
Association seeks to protect the parties using the alternative justice system, to this end 
embracing a party-centric view:  
[I]t is important that more information be made available to the parties, 
so as to protect awards against challenges based upon alleged failures to 
disclose, and to promote a level playing field among parties and among 
counsel engaged in international arbitration.181 
 
 
The party-centric view of “disclose everything” had led to its own difficulties,182 
however, as arbitrators worry that they are being asked to disclose information that is 
otherwise not relevant, or that their appointments are likely to be blocked for trivial 
 
179 SA J&P Avax SA v. Société Tecnimont SPA, Court of Appeal of Paris, 12 February 
2009, Rev. Arb. 2009 186, discussed in Alexis Mourre, Conflicts of Interest: Towards 
Greater Transparency and Uniform Standards of Disclosure?, Castaldi Mourre & 
Partners, (May 19, 2009) available at 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2009/05/19/conflicts-of-interest-towards-greater-
transparency-and-uniform-standards-of-disclosure/  (last visited Aug. 14, 2019). 
180 See id.   
181 See International Bar Association, Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in 
International Arbitration, Introduction Comment 1, (2014). 
182 See discussion, infra Chapter 5, Section 3(b)(i). 
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reasons.183 For example, since the implementation of the 2014 Rules the LCIA has 
published Notes for Arbitrators,184 designed to assist decision making in key areas of 
interest for various parties in the arbitration process. Included in the Notes is specific 
guidance on independence and impartiality: 
Parties to arbitrations are entitled to expect of the process a just, well-
reasoned and enforceable award. To that end, they are entitled to expect 
arbitrators: to disclose possible conflicts of interest at the outset; to avoid 
putting themselves in a position where conflicts will arise during the 
course of the proceedings; to conduct the arbitration fairly, in a timely 
manner and with careful regard to due process; to maintain the 
confidentiality of the arbitration; and to reach their decision in an 
impartial manner.185 
 
The LCIA Section goes on to note: 
In completing their statements of independence, arbitrators 
should take into account, amongst other things, the existence and 
nature of any past or present relationships, direct or indirect, 
with any of the parties or their counsel. Any doubt as to 
whether a relationship should be disclosed must be resolved 
in favour of disclosure.186 
 
The LCIA and the IBA both seek to protect parties’ trust in the arbitration process as 
an alternative to the brick-and-mortar courtroom. Parties must trust the system and the 
requisite trust arises from adherence to rule of law principles, especially those 
articulated by Lord Bingham in relation to the neutrality of the decision maker.187 
Parties simply must have information such that they feel confident that the decision 
maker is free of dependency and partiality.  
 
The duty to disclose raises three issues from the point of view of the person bearing it. 
First, is it even possible for anyone to every disclose “everything,” and more 
importantly, should that be the expectation? Surely, as an arbitrator I have a right not 
to disclose certain aspects of my life that have no bearing on the case. Of course, that 
 
183 See IBA, Conflicts, supra note 153 at Comment 1. 
184 LCIA, Notes for Arbitrators, supra note 150. 
185 Id. 
186 Id. at Section 2.8 (2014) (highlights added). 
187 See Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37 at 91. 
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raises the issue of who should get to decide what information has a potential bearing 
on the case.188 Second, assuming arbitrators are willing to disclose “everything,” the 
level of complexity and time commitment needed to evaluate lengthy disclosures seems 
prohibitive in today’s world.189 Conversely, if the duty is interpreted narrowly, for 
example by being limited only to disclosing interpersonal relationships, disclosure may 
not effectively assuage concerns about partiality and dependence. Thus, I suggest a 
possible fifth standard component of the duty of the disclosure: 
(5) the expectation that the disclosure will provide sufficient information so the 
party to the arbitration can make an informed decision about the participation 
of the particular arbitrator in this particular proceeding. 
In other words, decision makers should be required to disclose enough information to 
allow a party to make an informed decision,190 but should not be required to disclose 
“everything.” Adding this fifth expectation to the general duty to disclose embeds the 
desired outcome, adequate information for all parties, into the duty to disclose, and 
should also serve to address the concerns of decision makers who are attempting to 
draw the line between failure to comply with disclosure expectations and over-
disclosure of personal information. 
 
To further limit, and provide guidance, on the “disclose everything” standard, the IBA 
included limits within the Guidelines, 
In order to promote greater consistency and to avoid unnecessary 
challenges and arbitrator withdrawals and removals, the [IBA] 
Guidelines list specific situations indicating whether they warrant 
disclosure or disqualification of an arbitrator.191  
 
188 See discussion, infra Chapter 5, Section 3(B)(i)(1). 
189 See id. 
190 Informed consent it an elevated expectation  in conversation concerning consent, it 
is the standard to be used in the thesis. The importance of consent, within the 
discussion of the rule of law is explored more fully in Chapter 1, discussion at supra 
footnote 31. 
191See IBA, Conflicts, supra note 153, at comment 3. However, note: “Although there 
may strictly speaking be a logical inconsistency between a subjective disclosure test 
and the Green List’s objective non-disclosure situations as noted by the ICC, it is 
suggested that this is not such a fundamental incompatibility but rather that the Green 
List is a sensible and workable compromise. The Green List has the potential to bring 
clarity and consistency to disclosure decisions. It is not likely unduly to restrict proper 
disclosure, but rather to encourage subjective disclosure where appropriate.” See Nick 
Gray, Winds of change?, supra note 146 page 3. 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  59 
Recognizing the limited value of a principle that presented without guidance on its 
applicability, the Guidelines also add level of detail and specificity to guide decision 
makers in their disclosure choices. For example, the Guidelines establish the “Non-
Waivable Red List”: 
1.1 There is an identity between a party and the arbitrator, or the 
arbitrator is a legal representative or employee of an entity that is a party 
in the arbitration. 
 
1.2 The arbitrator is a manager, director or member of the supervisory 
board, or has a controlling influence on one of the parties or an entity 
that has a direct economic interest in the award to be rendered in the 
arbitration. 
 
1.3 The arbitrator has a significant financial or personal interest in one 
of the parties, or the outcome of the case. 
 
1.4 The arbitrator or his or her firm regularly advises the party, or an 
affiliate of the party, and the arbitrator or his or her firm derives 
significant financial income therefrom.192 
Conflicts specified on the Non-Waivable Red List must be disclosed, and when they 
are discovered the parties are not allowed to waive the conflict; consequently, after such 
a disclosure the decision maker may in no circumstance continue to serve as arbitrator. 
Non-Waivable Red List conflicts are so fundamentally at odds with the expectations of 
the rule of law principle that there are no protections that can be placed within the 
process to offset them.  
 
Not every conflict rises to this level. As described in Chapter 1, when exploring Lord 
Bingham’s rule of law principles: decision makers are guided by the law, bounded by 
the rules, and are directed in the application of rules that govern appropriate moments 
for discretion.193 The Guidelines also establish a Waivable Red List of conflicts; these 




192 IBA, Conflicts, supra note 153, Non- Waivable Red List at Section 1, page 20, 
(excerpt). 
193 Bingham, RULE OF LAW, supra note 37; discussion, supra Chapter 1, Section A. 
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When confronted with conflicts of interest presented within the Waivable Red List, the 
parties to arbitration have the discretionary power to determine if the hearing will 
progress despite the disclosure. The following is a short excerpt from the list:  
 
2.1 Relationship of the arbitrator to the dispute 
 
2.1.1 The arbitrator has given legal advice, or provided an expert 
opinion, on the dispute to a party or an affiliate of one of the 
parties. 
 
2.1.2 The arbitrator had a prior involvement in the dispute. 
 
2.2 Arbitrator’s direct or indirect interest in the dispute. 
 
2.2.1 The arbitrator holds shares, either directly or indirectly, in 
one of the parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties, this party 
or an affiliate being privately held. 
 
2.2.2 A close family member of the arbitrator has a significant 
financial interest in the outcome of the dispute. . . . 
 
2.2.3 The arbitrator, or a close family member of the arbitrator, 
has a close relationship with a non-party who may be liable to 
recourse on the part of the unsuccessful party in the dispute.194 
 
2.3 Arbitrator’s relationship with the parties or counsel 
 
2.3.1 The arbitrator currently represents or advises one of the 
parties, or an affiliate of one of the parties. 
 
2.3.2 The arbitrator currently represents or advises the lawyer or 
law firm acting as counsel for one of the parties. 
 
2.3.3 The arbitrator is a lawyer in the same law firm as the 
counsel to one of the parties.195 
 
The Waivable Red List contains conflicts of interest, based on potential dependency or 
potential partiality, that are better evaluated on a case-by-case basis and may lead to a 
change of decision maker or may not. Dependency issues arising from prior 
representation are common, especially in global law firms. Hence, greater detail is 
 
194 IBA, Conflicts, supra note 153, Waivable Red List at Section 2, pages 20-22, 
(excerpt).  
195 Id. at Section 2.3, pages 21-22, (excerpt). 
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demanded and case-by-case consideration is essential before it can be determined 
whether to waive the conflict or not; a single rule will not be satisfactory in the majority 
of instances.  
 
In total, the Guidelines provide three lists, each with a different level of guidance for 
the decision maker. The third is the Green List, which sets out examples of relationships 
that should not cause any hesitation on the appointment of a decision maker. For 
example, the Green List contains situations such as “teaching in the same faculty or 
school as another arbitrator or counsel”196 and “arbitrator was a speaker, moderator or 
organizer in one or more conferences.”197 The presence of the Green List informs all 
that some relationships are allowed; parties are not to expect a complete detachment or 
absence of relationships in a decision makers’ environment. Second, in 2014 the 
Guidelines were updated to reflect the growing connectivity of the global community 
and law firms. For example, the 2014 Guidelines add: 
 
3.3.6 A close personal friendship exists between an arbitrator and a 
counsel of a party.198 
. . . 
 
3.3.9 The arbitrator and another arbitrator, or counsel for one of the 
parties in the arbitration, currently act or have acted together within the 
past three years as co-counsel.199 
 
These are situations where the circumstances may lead parties to the dispute to doubt 
the decision maker’s impartiality and independence. Thus, the parties should be 
informed and can elect whether or not to allow the process to move ahead with the 
particular decision maker in question.  
 
The IBA Guidelines are one of the best sources available to explore the issue of 
conflicts of interest, for two main reasons. First, the guidelines are created by an 
institution with years of experience and a wealth of members knowledgeable in 
arbitration. This point is incredibly important, as the arbitration community has always 
 
196 Id. at Section 4.3.3. 
197 Id.  
198 Id. at Section 3.3.6. 
199 Id. at Section 3.3.9. 
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functioned based on appointed decision makers. The courts have a system of 
appointment, governing law and local rules, and mechanisms to remove judges. As it 
became an increasingly popular alternative route to justice, arbitration needed to 
establish similar processes and rules. The international commercial arbitration 
community stepped up to this task, and in doing so, has already effectively considered 
and resolved some of the issues pertinent to the design of the online justice 
environment. Second, arbitration as an essential stage within online justice can benefit 
from existing arbitration norms, such as those embodied within the Guidelines. 
Moreover, the arbitration community has long embraced a commitment to the rule of 
law, especially adherence to impartial and independent process and decision makers. 
The ODR community’s willingness to embrace and comply with this commitment to 
the rule of law should not be underappreciated.  
 
It is important to note:  
[T]he Guidelines were only ever intended to be (and could realistically 
only ever have been) a starting point in a process that would, in order to 
meet its objectives, require the co-operation of the wider international 
arbitration community. As with any other code, statute, or general 
principle, it is therefore primarily and most effectively through reasoned 
decisions as to its application in any given situation that its meaning and 
application becomes increasingly clear and consistent.200 
Hence, the Guidelines serve as a crucially useful resource for developing the 
dependence and partiality limits within the ODR environment, as we will unpack in 
Chapter 5. However, a fully informed approach to designing ODR would not be 
complete without also understanding the importance of institutions and the courts in 
creating the full body of rules.  
 
2. Institutional Action Concerning the Decision Maker 
 
We have seen that decision maker disclosure and recusal are not always sufficient 
protections; parties must therefore have within their power a right to challenge the 
 
200 Gray, Winds of change? supra note 146 at page 4. 
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appointment of the arbitrator.201 We have also seen that several divergent standards 
have emerged to define grounds for such a challenge.202 The standard most prevalent 
amongst the various institutions is one of “justifiable doubts” about the decision 
maker’s impartiality and independence.203 However, even this standard is supported by 
less than a clear and overwhelming majority. 
 
Moreover, even when tests of impartiality and independence exist,204 the application of 
the rule and the applicable test is still something that must occur on a case-by-case basis 
within the authority of the arbitral institution205 or at the time of enforcement of the 
final award by the enforcing jurisdiction.206 For example, the LCIA has the authority, 
as established within LCIA Article 10, to “revoke any arbitrator’s appointment upon its 
own initiative, at the written request of all other members of the Arbitral Tribunal or 
upon a written challenge by any party . . .”207 The LCIA is thereby empowered as the 
selected arbitration institution to make the determination concerning the partiality and 
dependence of the arbitrator. When considering such an issue, the institution applies its 
rules to the case at hand and determines the ability of the decision maker to resolve the 
case.208 In other words, each institution is able to create its own test of impartiality and 
independence, the LCIA test described above being only one example. The parties to 
arbitration authorize that power in their choice of arbitration institution and its 
corresponding rules.209 Yet, since each arbitration institution determines the parameters 
 
201 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140 at 301 (“... it should be possible for the parties to remedy the situation and have 
the arbitrator removed.”) Id. 
202 See supra Chapter 2, Table C. 
203 See id. 
204 See supra Chapter 2, Table B. 
205 See discussion, Chapter 2, Section B(1). 
206 Please note: partiality and dependence of the decision maker can arise when a 
party seeks to remove an arbitrator and asks the assistance of the local judicial system 
or when one of the parties seek to enforce the final arbitration award. See infra 
Chapter 2, Section C: The Role of Brick and Mortar Courts.  
207 London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration Rules, Article 10.1, (2014). 
208 For example, the LCIA  standard is enumerated in Article 10 which states: “The 
LCIA Court may determine that an arbitrator is unfit to act . . “  LCIA, Arbitration 
Rules, Article 10.2. 
209 For example, the LCIA rules state: “the parties thereto shall be taken to have 
agreed in writing that any arbitration between them shall be conducted in accordance 
with the LCIA Rules. . .” LCIA, Arbitration Rules, Preamble. 
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and application of the test, defining the exact measure of impartiality and independence 
falls to them.  
 
Some institutions have published the determinations they have made at the institutional 
level; this is especially true as it relates to determinations of independence and 
impartiality. In 2011, the LCIA published 28 abstracts of decisions relating to arbitrator 
challenges that had occurred between 1996 and 2010.210 The database lists a further 32 
LCIA Court decisions relating to dependence and partiality covering the following 
period of 2010 to 2017. Since there are over 1,600 arbitrations registered with the 
LCIA,211 we can quickly see that challenges based on partiality and dependence are 
rare. The total number of successful challenges is even lower: of the “32 challenges 
detailed in the database, only seven were upheld in whole or part — the remainder were 
rejected by the LCIA Court.”212 Of course, the low number of challenges could occur 
for various reasons, from lack of trust in the system to enforce outcomes to a simple 
lack of awareness of the process. Such negative reasons seem relatively unlikely, 
however, as the process is well established in the international arbitration community. 
Thus it seems more likely that the low number of challenges is an indication that other 
safeguards are working well, leaving the parties without the need to formally challenge 
at the institutional level. 
 
3. Transparency of Outcomes 
 
Although transparency may not immediately be seen as an adjacent concern to the 
discussions surrounding the impartiality and independence of the decision maker, in 
the context of arbitration it is actually an important consideration. Unfortunately, 
transparency is not part of the commercial arbitration eco-system. Rather, 
 
210 See London Court of International Arbitration, Arbitration International, vol. 27, 
no. 3,(2011)(noting: “Of the 28 published abstracts, six cases were considered to be 
sufficiently problematic to satisfy the LCIA challenge standard, . . . about an arbitrator’s 
impartiality or independence.”) Id.  
211 LCIA, Facts and Figures, 2017 Casework Report, 4, (2018). 
212 Id. at 17. 
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confidentiality is a bedrock tenet.213 Arbitration is a process of dispute resolution that 
champions confidentiality as one of its selling points.214 The proceedings are 
confidential,215 the papers within the proceedings are confidential,216 the outcomes are 
confidential,217 most parties consider218 — and courts systems expect219 — the process 
to be confidential. Unfortunately, this has become a barrier preventing essential 
terminology from taking shape, and causing confusion and uncertainty for all involved.  
 
The lack of transparency came to the forefront of debate in 2004 when the First Edition 
of the International Bar Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International 
Arbitration commented: “existing standards lack sufficient clarity and uniformity in 
their application.”220 The IBA was not the only entity commenting on the uncertainty. 
For example, Yves Derains and Eric A. Schwarz point out in their Guide to the ICC 
Rules of Arbitration that the failure to define “independence” or to refer to 
“impartiality” has resulted in “confusion and controversy” about the nature of the 
requirement set out in [ICC] Article 7(1).221 Relying upon these commentaries (and 
others) Geoff Nicholas and Constantine Partasides argued in 2006 that the LCIA should 
publish the Court's decisions as they relate to challenges to the arbitrator. The authors 
conclude: 
There is something troubling about institutions choosing to withhold the 
guidance upon which they rely in making challenge decisions from the 
parties that are making or defending those challenges. Such withholding 
 
213 See Anjanette H. Raymond Confidentiality, In a Forum of Last Resort? Is the Use 
of Confidential Arbitration a Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AMERICAN 
REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION, 479 (2005). 
214 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140 at Chapter 24, Section 24-99. 
215 See id.   
216 See id.    
217 See id. at Section 24-101. 
218 See, White and Case/Queen Mary, School of International Arbitration, 2018 
International Arbitration Survey, entitled “The Evolution of International 
Arbitration,” White and Case Publication (2018)(“87% of respondents believe that 
confidentiality in international commercial arbitration is of importance. Most 
respondents think that confidentiality should be an opt-out, rather than an opt-in, 
feature.”) Id. at 3. 
219 See Raymond, Confidentiality, supra note 184 at 479. 
220 IBA, Conflicts, supra note 153, at Comment 3. 
221 Yves Derains and Eric A. Schwarz, GUIDE TO THE ICC RULES OF ARBITRATION, 
116 (Second Edition), Kluwer Law International, (2005). 
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is unnecessary, and increasingly difficult to justify to users (parties, 
counsel and arbitrators alike) in ever-greater need of such guidance. The 
LCIA can make a unique contribution in this regard by making publicly 
available the wealth of learning that it is accumulating in its reasoned 
challenge decisions.222 
 
As a result of these arguments, the LCIA announced its intent to publish its reasoned 
decisions on challenges to arbitrators, becoming the first arbitration body to do so.223 
As Nick Gray and Deborah Crosbie argue: 
… increased disclosure increases the probity and integrity of the whole 
system. Accordingly, reasoned decisions ought to show the distinction 
between disclosure and disqualification, thereby removing the common 
misconception that disclosure leads to disqualification, and at the same 
time increasing the confidence of all concerned to make and to receive 
disclosures appropriately.224 
Recognizing the value of publication, especially as it relates to challenges to the central 
decision maker, in 2015 the International Chamber of Commerce announced that the 
ICC International Court of Arbitration will start explaining its reasons for many of the 
decisions it takes under the 2012 ICC Rules of Arbitration.225 This includes but is not 
limited to “challenges to an arbitrator under Article 14 of the ICC Rules decisions to 
initiate replacement proceedings and subsequently to replace an arbitrator on the 
Court's own motion under Article 15(2) of the ICC Rules.”226 
 
C. The Role of Brick-and-Mortar Courts 
The traditional brick-and-mortar legal system performs an important function within 
the arbitration eco-system, as it is the national court system that both protects the 
fundamental right of individuals227 and stands as the main enforcement mechanism of 
 
222 Gray, Winds of change?, supra note 146 at 6. 
223 However, the first decision was not published until 2011. See Thomas W. Walsh, 
Ruth Teitelbaum, The LCIA Court Decisions on Challenges to Arbitrators: An 
Introduction, LCIA, ARBITRATION INTERNATIONAL (2011). 
224 Gray, Winds of change?, supra note 146 at 7. 
225 See Silvia Farre, ICC Court to Provide Reasoned Decisions, DLA Piper, 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION NEWSLETTER, (17 Dec, 2015). 
226 See Farre, ICC Court To Provide Reasoned Decisions, INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION NEWSLETTER, 17 Dec, 2015. 
227 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140, Chapter 15, Section 15-3 (stating: “courts may also intervene to guarantee that 
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arbitration clauses and awards.228 It is important to note, however, that within the 
context of the arbitration eco-system, the court system most often addresses issues of 
impartiality and independence only after the completion of the arbitration 
proceedings.229 The timing of this review usually occurs in the context of a party 
seeking to prevent the court system from enforcing an award.230 Within the court 
system, parties may challenge the award on various — although limited — grounds,231 
the most relevant to this discussion being that an arbitrator lacked impartiality and 
independence.232 The challenge or resistance to the enforcement of the award, however, 
occurs under applicable national law — as such, the local courts are involved and 
national law is implicated in the discussion.233 Fortunately, the international nature of 
the arbitration eco-system has prompted a convergence of approaches in some key 
areas, even when national laws are implicated. The convergence is especially in effect 
in the protection of fundamental rights, such as the parties’ right to an independent and 
impartial decision maker.  
 
the minimum requirements of procedural fairness are fulfilled and exercise a 
supervisory function.”) Id. 
228 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140, Chapter 15, Section 15-2. 
229 For example, Section 10(a)(2) of the U.S. Federal Arbitration Act provides that 
“evident partiality” by the arbitrator is one basis upon which an arbitral award may be 
set aside.  See generally, Gary Born and Claudio Salas, The Different Meanings of an 
Arbitrator’s “Evident Partiality” Under U.S. Law, KLUWER ARBITRATION BLOG, 
(March 20, 2013). 
230 This is because parties can challenge the appointment of an arbitrator under 
institutional rules, these challenges are, however, usually heard by the institution 
appointed. See discussion, supra Chapter 2, Section B(2). 
231 Both the New York Convention (United Nations Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (1958) ) and domestic law, which tends 
to follow the UNCITRAL Model Law (UNCITRAL  Model  Law  on International  
Commercial Arbitration1985, amended in  2006) both provide very limited grounds. 
See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 140 
at Chapter 25, 25-1, 25-15 (discussing the application of the Model Law to challenge 
awards) and Chapter 26, 26-3 (discussing the limited grounds for resisting 
enforcement) and 25-65 (discussing the limited grounds to refuse enforcement under 
the New York Convention). 
232 For example, when a party asserts the arbitrator lacked impartiality and as such, 
the New York Convention, Art. V(d): Irregularity in the composition of the arbitral 
tribunal or arbitral procedure must be considered.  
233 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140, Chapter 15, Section 2.6. 
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There is another area of convergence that is important to note up front, which is that in 
the context of contracts, most national laws recognize party autonomy as an essential 
contract principle234 that should be limited in only the most extreme situations. National 
courts respect party autonomy, which in the case of arbitration235 includes the parties’ 
right to select the arbitration institution,236 the applicable arbitration rules,237 and the 
choice of law.238 Consequently, national courts asked to enforce an award, but faced 
with questions regarding the impartiality and independence of the arbitrator, look to the 
parties’ agreement, and the incorporated institutional rules and applicable national law, 
as the primary guide.239 Assuming the agreement comports with the national law, the 
parties’ agreement will be honored, and this agreement will include whatever rules 
concerning impartiality and independence are held by the arbitration institution the 
parties selected.240 In instances where interpretations or standards are not specified 
within the arbitration rules or by the parties in their agreement, the court is left to look 
to national law.241 
 
D. A Review of English Language Cases  
 
In order to better asses the most frequently occurring cases challenging the impartiality 
and independence of the arbitrator (or arbitrators) a basic survey of international 
arbitration cases was conducted via Westlaw in February of 2019. A total of sixty-six 
 
234 See Alan Redfern and Martin Hunter, with N. Blackaby and C. Partasides, LAW 
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, (4th Ed.), (2004) at p. 
265 (“Party autonomy is the guiding principle in determining the procedure to be 
followed in an international commercial arbitration. It is a principle that has been 
endorsed not only in national laws, but by international arbitration institutions and 
organizations. The legislative history of the Model Law shows that the principle was 
adopted without opposition…” ) Id. 
235 See id. at 265. 
236 See id.  
237 See id.  
238 See id.  
239 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140, Chapter 8, Section 2.1. 
240 See Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 
140, Chapter 8, Section 2.6. 
241 See id. 
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cases were discovered, with fifty-two of the cases available in English or translated into 
English. Despite the small sample size, (which, as mentioned above, may in some sense 
be viewed as an encouraging sign that systems are working to prevent problems with 
judicial bias) several patterns may be discerned.  
 
1. Ties to a Party’s Legal Practice 
 
The most common challenge to an arbitration award is an allegation that an arbitrator 
had ties to one of the law firms or is representing or engaged in legal practice for the 
benefit of one of the parties. From this broad category, several more specific issues can 
be pulled. Notably, practicing within the same U.S. Circuit: this has been found not to 
have compromised the impartiality of an arbitrator. Judges in these cases have focused 
even further and found that, generally, belonging to the same law firm as the counsel 
of one of the parties is not sufficient to indicate partiality or dependence. For example, 
an arbitrator was found unlikely to have been influenced by a junior associate from the 
same firm who acted as assistant legal counsel for one of the parties.  
 
While tenuous connections to counsel’s legal practice were found insufficient to 
establish compromised independence or impartiality, direct involvement with the 
parties could be enough to cast doubt upon an arbitrator’s independence. For example, 
an award was thrown out after it was discovered that the arbitrator had also served as 
counsel to one of the parties in a different arbitration that had similar factual and legal 
issues. In other cases, simply acting as counsel at any point in time (the cases pulled 
indicated a window of six months to eight years) was considered enough to have an 
award thrown out.  
 
2. Prior Arbitration Work  
 
Another common issue was the frequency with which the same arbitrators were 
appointed to cases. When determining whether a decision maker is partial or dependent, 
the courts examined the frequency and nature of the disputes that an arbitrator had 
handled in the past. For example, upwards of fifty appointments by the same party to 
similar cases was determined to be corruptive to an arbitrator’s impartiality. The court 
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also dismissed an arbitrator for being partial after he was appointed eleven times by the 
same party for similar arbitration matters. However, when an arbitrator was appointed 
by different parties on the recommendation of a single law firm, the court found no 
issues with that arbitrator’s independence. Though the body of cases to support this 
trend is small, it appears that courts need both frequency and similarity to find major 
issues with an arbitrator’s independence when it comes to prior arbitration work.  
 
3. Other Professional Ties 
 
In addition to ties to legal practice, other challenges were raised regarding the 
professional ties of the arbitrator to a member of one of the parties. The more ties an 
arbitrator has to a party, the more likely a court is to question his or her impartiality. 
Distant ties were usually not an issue. For example, an arbitrator who was a non-
executive director of a competitor company of a party was not found to be partial and 
the award was enforced. Similarly, participation in the same arbitration conferences or 
meetings was not found to be an indicator of bias.  
 
The presence of financial ties also heightens the probability that an arbitrator will be 
found dependent or partial. For example, failing to disclose that a party provided 
funding to an institution that employed the arbitrator as a director was considered to be 
an indication of dependency. 
 
4. Social Ties  
 
Several interesting themes emerged in the cases where an arbitrator had social ties to 
one of the parties. Familial connections from the first to the third degree were generally 
considered to be an indication of dependence and partiality. Non-familial social 
connections were more difficult to challenge, and connections like membership in 
different Rotary Clubs or belonging to the same nationality were considered insufficient 
to challenge an arbitrator’s independence or impartiality.  
 
5. Multiple Arbitrator Parties  
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For the sample of cases of available, most tribunals with more than one arbitrator had 
a three-arbitrator panel to render decisions. Finding the impartiality and independence 
compromised in one of the three arbitrators was not enough to throw out an award, 
however, reasonable doubt about the impartiality and independence of two out of the 
three arbitrators was enough to render the award unenforceable. Lastly, a common trend 
in arbitration panels was that the independence and impartiality of the group was not at 
issue if the award had previously been thrown out with the order to reconsider the award 
given.  
 
E. Arbitration Overview Conclusions 
 
As a creature of contract, with oversight of agreement and awards by the judiciary, 
arbitration has struggled with many of the questions that are now being considered in 
the deployment of technology in the online justice eco-system. This chapter explored 
arbitration as a means to provide lessons for the creation of the online justice 
environment. For the purposes of this thesis, the primary considerations are ones of 
dependence and partiality of the arbitrator and the mechanism and procedures put in 
place to mitigate the possibility of a dependent or partial arbitrator participant in a case. 
In general, institutions are in control of the arbitrators who are allowed to hear cases 
within their system. These institutions are thus in a position to ensure independence 
and impartiality through the creation of rules and processes that ensure compliance with 
the applicable laws and more generally with the RoL. The embrace by arbitration 
institutions of the importance of compliance with the RoL and their willingness to take 
steps to ensure that few awards are susceptible to challenge due to a dependent or partial 
decision maker, has led to arbitration being widely regarded as an appropriate and 
respected alternative to the justice system.  
 
The chapter sought to explore if common terminology, such as dependence and 
partiality, could be distilled to a simple, clear, specific rule. Wide variance was 
discovered. While many argue this is a positive occurrence as it allows parties entering 
into an arbitration agreement to select from several institutions and to find the one that 
best matches their expectations, it does mean that the determination of partiality and 
dependence is handled on a case by case basis under several different frameworks. 
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Moreover, the increasing expectation that conflicts of interest can be eliminated by 
embracing the principle of full disclosure is a troubling one as many decision makers 
are being asked to over-disclose personal information. A balance can be struck, but it 
will need to ensure that the reason for asking for disclosure is not lost: that reason being 
that disclosure is the mechanism that allows parties to have adequate information when 
making a choice of the individual that is their decision maker. Arbitration is a creature 
of contract, and as such, in many ways parties create their own justice environment. 
However, parties should not be able to subvert or contract around key aspects of the 




CHAPTER 3: Online Dispute Resolution 
 
 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) suffers from lack of definition. Originally, ODR was 
simply Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in a digital environment: technology was 
used to support or replicate certain aspects of existing systems. Today, however, ODR 
is emerging as an eco-system of technology deployments that constitutes an area of the 
justice system in its own right. This chapter will briefly trace the shift from traditional 
ADR facilitated through the use of basic telecommunication technology, to justice 
provided in an online environment. First, the chapter will explore the basics of 
traditional ADR and briefly review the differences between private and public ADR 
systems. The chapter will then turn to the current issues related to judicial impartiality 
and independence within the current ODR eco-system. The chapter will finish with an 
overview of the newest conversations, occurring on an almost daily basis, about how 
smart contracts developers are embracing ODR and envisioning a new way to ensure 
the independence and impartiality of decision makers in the justice system.  
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A. From Alternative Dispute Resolution to Online Dispute Resolution242 
 
Some commentators have used ODR as a term referring to nothing more than the use 
of technology in an already existing judicial system.243 This usage encompasses 
instances in which technology facilitates document receipt, search and storage, and 
sometimes simple digital communication. Other authorities have argued that the 
definition of ODR must include ADR plus artificial intelligence (a term the meaning 
of which is contentious in itself). While the literature has not come to a definitive 
consensus, for the purposes of this thesis the author maintains the following: an ODR 
system must involve the resolution of a dispute through the use of technology that is 
more than a mere communication platform and must present the option of a neutral 
facilitator (mediation) and/or a neutral decision maker (arbitration). Briefly, Online 
Dispute Resolution must refer to more than an online complaint system, even if the 
complaint is ultimately resolved inside the system.244  
 
In general, the earliest versions of ODR were crafted around one of four processes: (1) 
consumer complaint resolution (sometimes known as negotiation),245 (2) mediation,246 
 
242 The Overview Section is an updated research stream that builds upon some of my 
prior writings, which are listed in the ‘Details of Collaboration and Publication” of the 
thesis.  In each instance, I was the author writing the ODR specific sections of the 
paper.  
243 See e.g., Joseph W. Goodman, The Pros And Cons Of Online Dispute Resolution: 
An Assessment Of Cyber-Mediation Websites, 2 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 1, 1-16 
(2003). 
244 Of course, technology can and should be used to reduce the number of disputes 
and should be used to improve access to justice- these technology uses may be 
included in the ODR eco-system, but are important additions surrounding and 
supporting the dispute resolution system. 
245 eNegotiation is a process that uses “a negotiation support system including 
computers or other forms of electronic communication that enable parties to negotiate 
their own agreement.” The most important aspect is that the parties are in full control 
of accepting or rejecting the outcome. See Ernest Thiessen, Paul Miniato, and Bruce 
Hiebert, ODR and eNegotiation, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND 
PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, 329 (eds 
Wahab, Katsh, and Rainey (2012)). 
246 The use and definition of this term is controversial. Generally the term is thought 
to be defined as ““A voluntary process in which an impartial mediator actively assists 
disputants in identifying and clarifying issues of concern and in designing and 
agreeing to solutions for those issues.” DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 278 
(Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999). The key is that a neutral third party is involved, parties’ 
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(3) arbitration,247 and/or (4) a combination of all three. In the current domestic-based 
online dispute resolution (ODR) environment, ODR service providers are generally 
involved in providing platforms that can be used for any or all of these processes, with 
various amounts of technology supporting or fully instantiating the system.248 The 
digital transformation of justice that is occurring now is resulting in new uses of 
technology within the dispute resolution process.249 I would like to suggest three broad 
categories to describe the technology being deployed: (1) Traditional ODR or “Online 
ADR” in which technology provides storage and communication platforms that are 
utilized in a traditional ADR process. (2) Advanced ODR, which uses the traditional 
model but with a higher level of technology integration — for example, when the 
negotiation is fully automated. (3) Adventurous ODR, which deploys the newest 
technology, such as smart contracts and blockchain, in such a manner that the 
technology becomes a unique and full participant in the process.  
 
Dispute resolution platforms can be broadly divided into public and private 
categories.250 Public platforms are part of — or closely adjacent to — an established 
court system. Such a platform replaces or supports existing court processes and is 
therefore held to the same standards and complies with the protections that exist within 
a brick-and-mortar court system. In contrast, private platforms and processes may be 
external to the court system, and thus may or may not rely upon the court system for 
enforcement of outcomes. Legislation may exist placing limitations upon private 
platforms — generally these will be narrow and specific, aimed at protecting 
 
interests are considered and the outcome is often thought of as a win-win- or the 
product of compromise. See generally Noam Ebner, E-Mediation, in ONLINE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, (eds Wahab, Katsh, and Rainey, 2012). 
247 See Mohamed S. Abdel Wahab, ODR and E-Arbitration, in ONLINE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION, (eds Wahab, Katsh, and Rainey, 2012). 
248 See infra Chapter 3, Section B.  
249 See infra Chapter 3, Section C. 
250 This is an update of an explanation and examination of these two system contained 
in my article. See Anjanette H. Raymond and Scott Shackelford, Technology, Ethics 
And Access To Justice, supra note 58, at 501-6 (2014) (explaining the earliest ODR 
platforms in these two areas). 
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fundamental rights. With these basic parameters in mind, let us examine each category 
in detail.  
 
1. Private ODR Platforms 
 
Private ODR providers can generally be divided into two types: self-contained and full-
service.251 A self-contained provider resolves disputes within a community, and as such 
the members of that community are controlled by and agree to the terms of service and 
associated agreements that regulate the community and the use of the platform. In 
contrast, a private full-service platform provides any and all parties access to an ODR 
mechanism.252 This distinction is fundamental and highly important to the discussion 
as private providers are creatures of contract, and are—at the current time—largely 
unregulated.  
 
When considering private platforms, no discussion can begin without examination of 
the eBay marketplace members’ platform.253 When eBay launched in 1995 as 
“AuctionWeb,” it was rather small and known to relatively few users, so buyers and 
sellers mostly interacted like friends in a community.254 The creator, Pierre Omidyar, 
established a “Feedback Forum,” telling users to “[g]ive praise where it is due; make 
complaints where appropriate . . . .”255 Since then, eBay has developed an eBay 
Resolution Center that facilitates communication between the buyer and the seller in 
the event that something goes wrong with an eBay marketplace transaction.256 Buyers 
 
251 See id. 516-7 (describing early versions of public ODR platforms). 
252 See id. 
253 Of course, others also offer compliant services. For example, Amazon.com allows 
customers of third party sellers to file an A-to-z Guarantee claim if you purchased 
physical goods or eligible services on the Amazon.com website. See Amazon.com 
Author, Help: File a Claim, available at 
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html/ref=hp_left_sib?ie=UTF8&n
odeId=200783750 (last visited Aug 8, 2019). A similar service is offered by Etsy. See 
Etsy author, Escalate Your Case to Etsy’s Trust & Safety, available at 
http://www.etsy.com/help/article/35 (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
254 See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?: ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD, 130 (2006). 
255 Id. at 131. 
256 See eBay Author, eBay Resolving Buying Problems, available at 
http://pages.ebay.com/help/buy/protecting.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
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and sellers can “open a case” within the eBay marketplace platform which allows the 
parties to communicate and attempt to resolve the issue amongst themselves.257 After 
three days, if no resolution has been reached, a party can “escalate” the claim to an 
eBay representative.258 eBay will then resolve the issue within 24 hours.259 In some 
limited circumstances, eBay Buyer Protection may cover the purchase price plus 
original shipping.260  
 
Of course, the customer can also post negative feedback on the seller and can contact 
the eBay Trust and Safety team to investigate issues within the marketplace. For 
example, eBay India has used online negotiation and mediation to resolve reputational 
disputes. Known as the eBay Community Court, this eBay India system draws on 
trusted eBay community members to resolve reputation-reporting disputes among the 
buyers and sellers within the eBay platform.261 As platform designer and noted ODR 
authority Colin Rule highlights: “once each side has made their case (uploading 
material, etc.), the matter is put in front of a jury of twenty-one randomly selected eBay 
community members.”262 While the “jury” members do have to meet stringent 
eligibility criteria, they are uncompensated volunteers.263 The decisions are reviewed, 
when needed, for patterns and problems with outcomes and (in very rare cases) issues 
with the decisions of a particular member.264 Although some tinkering was initially 
 
257 See id. 
258 See id 
259 See id. 
260 The sellers redress options are different, mainly that the seller may both file a 
claim and seek to sell the original item still in its possession. See eBay Author, e-Bay 
Help, Sellers Questions, available at http://pages.ebay.com/help/sell/questions/no-
payment.html (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
261 See Zhao Yun, Timothy Sze, Tommy Li and Chittu Nagarajan, Online Dispute 
Resolution in Asia, 510-11, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, 
A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (eds Wahab, Katsh, and 
Rainey, 2012)  
262 Colin Rule & Harpreet Singh, ODR and Online Reputational Systems, 193, in 
ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY 
AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (eds Wahab, Katsh, and Rainey, 2012).  
263 See id. 
264 See id. 
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needed,265 the feedback on the Community Court has been very positive among all of 
the users.266  
 
Self-contained dispute resolution platforms have advantages over other private systems 
in that the marketplace can respond to parties that fail to comply with dispute outcomes. 
For example, within the eBay platform, eBay can take action against parties who fail 
to comply by suspending accounts and/or allowing the winning party to post negative 
feedback about the non-compliant party.267 Moreover, in many of these settings, the 
payment mechanism is internal to the marketplace. In these situations the payment 
portion of the marketplace can institute a delay in payment and/or can even reverse 
charges in the event that issues arise relating to the transaction. Systems that allow for 
delayed payments or that incorporate a “savings account” portion of the payment 
system allow for funds to be returned to the customer, without the need for merchant 
compliance with the mediated outcome.268 The use of such an internal payment 
mechanism, especially one that incorporates a chargeback facility,269 is an important 
means of compliance and is often heralded as one of the essential features of a 
successful private ODR platform.270 These systems, coupled with the internal “trust 
mark,”271 allow for a fully internal system of dispute resolution, relying on limited 
external support for enforcement of decisions.  
 
265 Such as the terms ‘jury’ and court’ which was changed to community review 
panels. See id at 181.  
266 See id. 
267 See id. 
268 For example, eBay. See Richelle Monfort, The eBay Seller’s Guide to PayPal 
Claims, Disputes, and Chargebacks, SaleHoo eCommerce Blog, (2019) available at 
https://www.salehoo.com/blog/the-ebay-sellers-guide-to-paypal-claims-disputes-and-
chargebacks (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
269 “A chargeback is a charge that is returned to a payment card after a customer 
successfully disputes an item on their account transactions report.” Julia Kagan (rev.) 
Chargeback, INVESTOPEDIA, (2018). 
270 See Vikki Rogers, Knitting the Security Blanket For New Market Opportunities, 
114-15, ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A TREATISE ON 
TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (eds Wahab, Katsh, and Rainey, 2012).  
271 Trustmark is, for example, a top rated seller designation based on customer 
feedback. See generally Pablo Cortes, Developing Online Dispute Resolution for 
Consumers in The EU: A Proposal for the Regulation of Accredited Providers 19 
INT'L J. L. & INFO. TECH 1 (2010)(describing the potential use of trustmarks in the 
E.U.). 
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Unfortunately, not all platforms offer the option to incorporate the chargeback process 
into the system. For example, some online environments lack financial integration,272 
while others exist in countries where chargebacks are impossible or limited under 
existing law.273 Moreover, it is often the case, regardless of the existence of a 
chargeback facility, that some disputes arise too late in the payment process for this 
option to apply.274  
 
The great benefit of offering arbitration through ODR is that it ties in higher-level 
enforcement mechanisms: Enforcement of the result of any arbitration process demands 
compliance with either the New York Convention275 or — in the U.S. and many other 
jurisdictions — the UNCITRAL Model Law.276 Both of these legal texts place 
restrictions upon the arbitration process277 and require adherence to basic notions of 
due process,278 including an impartial decision maker.279 Although many disputes never 
reach the arbitration stage, the use of arbitration as the final recourse has the beneficial 
effect of bringing private dispute resolution systems under the umbrella of the rule of 
law. Thus, private full-service platforms that fail to use arbitration in the final stage are 
left with limited options in the area of enforcement, relying primarily upon the good 
will of the losing party, or their incentive to protect their reputation.  
 
Self-contained dispute resolution platforms specific to a given company have been 
around for decades now.280 The new, private full-service platforms that are now 
 
272 See infra, Table D. 
273 See id. 
274 See id. 
275 The New York Convention grants parties the right to resist enforcement in 
situations where “The composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure 
was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement, 
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took place”  
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards, Art. V(d), (1958). See discussion, supra, Chapter 2, Section C.  
276 UNCITRAL Model Law, Art 12. See discussion, supra, Chapter 2, Section C. 
277 See discussion, supra, Chapter 2, Section C. 
278 See id. 
279 See id. 
280 See e.g., Ethan Katsh and Orna Rabinovich-Einy, DIGITAL JUSTICE, TECHNOLOGY 
AND THE INTERNET OF DISPUTES, 1-11, Oxford University Press (2017); Robert 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  79 
emerging are taking things to a new level by offering dispute resolution services that 
any party can use to settle any dispute, greatly expanding the sense in which these 
platforms can serve as an alternative to the traditional justice system. One of the 
significant players in the private ODR platform marketplace is Modria.281 The creator 
of the Modria platform, Colin Rule, was also the creator of the original eBay and PayPal 
dispute resolution systems.282 Modria allows parties to file any type of dispute.283 The 
Modria software helps diagnose the problem by collecting and organizing information 
about the issue and suggesting solutions.284 The software also enables the parties to 
discuss the matter online.285 If the parties fail to communicate online, the software 
guides them to mediation and arbitration, provided by members of the Modria team.286  
 
Impressively, the Modria platform has gained traction by securing several large 
businesses as clients.287 In fact, the Wall Street Journal has called the Modria platform 
“[t]he small-claims court for the 21st century.”288 More recently, the platform was 
purchased by Tyler Technologies and is working to expand its influence to a wider 
audience and even broader variety of disputes,289 focusing particularly on providing 
online dispute resolution (ODR) for government and commercial entities.290  
 
Ambrogi, Is There a Future for Online Dispute Resolution for Lawyers?, LawSites 
Blog, (April 11, 2016) available at https://www.lawsitesblog.com/2016/04/future-
online-dispute-resolution.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
281 The original Modria platform no longer is a stand- alone project. For descriptions 
of the platform, see Katsh Digital Justice, supra note 251, at 35, 38, 144, 151. 
282 See id. 
283 See id.  
284 See id. 
285 See id. 
286 See id. 
287 See id. 
288 Deborah Gage, VC Dispatch, Modria An Online ‘Small-Claims Court for 21st 
Century’, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Nov 2012). 
289 The Modria platform was acquired by Tyler Technologies, and has greatly 
expanded its influence and reach. See Gabrielle Orum Hernández, The Modria 
platform was acquired by Tyler Technologies, Law.Com, (June 2, 2017) and has 
greatly expanded its influence and reach. More information Tyler Technologies 
website available at https://www.tylertech.com/products/Modria (last visited Aug. 5, 
2019). 
290 As such, it now straddles both the private platform provider and the public 
provider. More information Tyler Technologies Website available at  
https://www.tylertech.com/solutions-products/modria (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
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Modria/Tyler Technologies is not the only ODR platform providing private ODR 
services; however, most of its competitors deploy more technology while providing 
fewer choices in terms of resolution mechanisms. Table E summarizes some of the 
notable players in this marketplace.  
 
Table D: Currently Viable ODR Platforms 
 
Name Description Key Features 
Cybersettle 
Cybersettle's patented system helps parties 
to a dispute, such as a claim against an 
insurance company, reach agreement 
much faster and at a much lower cost than 
they could using traditional negotiation 
methods. 
● Patented “double-blind” 
technology allows parties to 
submit confidential offers 
and demands which are 
never disclosed to the 
opposing party 
● Data Security & 
Encryption 
● Bulk submission of cases 
through proprietary API 
CPR Institute for 
Dispute Resolution 
Mediation and arbitration services through 
secure email. 
● CPR Dispute Resolution 
Services utilizes a secure 
email solution (Hewlett 
Packard Enterprise Secure 
Cloud) 
Cibertribunal peruano Arbitration and mediation via video calls, email, and online chat.   No longer available 
Camera Arbitrale di 
Milano - 
Risolvionline.com 
Italian Online mediation, primarily for 
retail purposes. Consumers initiate 
complaints; vendors are invited by the 
platform to participate; an expert provides 
a non-binding evaluation.  
● Provided by the Milan 
Chamber of Arbitration 
Netneutrals.com 
NetNeutrals.com helps consumers and 
businesses quickly resolve disputes. It 
offers the choice of a free direct 
negotiation forum, or the option to request 
a skilled Neutral with technical expertise 
to join the discussion and help the parties 
reach resolution. 
● Working with Ebay 
● Run by DeMars & 
Associates, Ltd. (DMA), 
national alternative dispute 
resolution consulting firm 
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Name Description Key Features 
Better Business Bureau 
Online Complaint 
System 
Consumers initiate complaints; vendors 
are invited by the platform to participate. 
Complaints are usually closed within 30 
calendar days. In some cases, BBB 
mediation or arbitration may be offered to 
assist in resolution.  
Will only handle a narrow 
set of disputes, generally 
governed by the BBB  
Arbitranet 
Brazil Online Arbitration Provider that 
promises a decision in 100 days. The 
online system chooses an arbitrator based 
on the indications of the parties  
Arbitration Clause available 
ADNDRC 
ADNDRC was jointly established by the 
China International Economic and Trade 
Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and 
the Hong Kong International Arbitration 
Centre (HKIAC) in 2002. 
Downloadable Domain 
Name Complaint Forms 
As a dispute resolution service provider 
accredited by ICANN, the Centre 
administers domain name dispute 
resolution proceedings through its four 
offices not only under the UDRP, but also 
under the following ICANN policies: 
● Fees based on number of 
domain names involved in 
the complaint and how 
many panelists decide the 
case 
Uniform Rapid Suspension System (URS)   
Trademark Post Delegation Dispute 
Resolution Procedure (TM-PDDRP) 
  
Registrar Transfer Dispute Resolution 
Policy (TDRP) 
  
Sunrise Dispute Resolution Policy (SDRP)   
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Name Description Key Features 
Charter Eligibility Dispute Resolution 
Policy (CEDRP) 
  
ADNDRC is also a Dispute-Resolution 
Service Provider approved by the 
Organization for the Promotion, Protection 
and Progress of Frogans Technology. 
They are a non-profit standards 
developing organization whose purpose is 
to hold, promote, protect and ensure the 
progress of the Frogans technology in the 
form of an open standard for the Internet, 
available to all, free of charge.  
  
SmartResolution 
SmartResolution is a platform designed 
for professionals to offer their own 
customized ODR services. 
Free, Open-source 
 
Specific modules available 





Diagnose the issue by gathering relevant 
information 
 
Enable an online negotiation between the 
parties 
 
Provide access to mediation if needed 
 
Refer the case for an evaluation 
Built-in chat 
 
Document and email 
templates 
Pre-built resolution flows 
 
Neutral parties can facilitate 
or decide an issue 
 
Real-time dashboards, pre-
configured reports, and data 




   
OnlineMediators.com This directory is for searching and contacting dispute resolution professionals 
Online Directory for ODR 
providers  
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Name Description Key Features 
for the purpose of acquiring dispute 
resolution services. 
Does not provide its own 
services 
 Author compilation of online website information (Up-to-date August 2019) 
 
As can be seen from the chart, technology is a large part of many of the existing ODR 
systems.291 And the technology embedded within the system can be used for a host of 
activities. For example, some negotiation support systems, such as the family mediation 
support platform known as DEUS,292 allow the parties to communicate within the 
platform, to exchange offers, and to view graphs and other interactive tools that 
compare the current offer to initial offers and the expectations that lead to the offer.293 
A few private systems exist that allow for technology-based metrics to be employed in 
online mediation as intelligent negotiation support.294 In these systems, parties rank and 
value each issue within the dispute by allocating a sum amongst all issues.295 The 
platform then uses the numbers to optimize each other’s identified interests and to make 
 
291 See Arno R. Lodder & John Zeleznikow, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute 
Resolution, 65, in ONLINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE, A 
TREATISE ON TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION, (eds Wahab, Katsh, and 
Rainey, 2012). “Modria’s goal is to resolve about 90% of cases through software, 
without humans.” Deborah Gage, VC Dispatch, Modria An Online ‘Small-Claims 
Court for 21st Century’, WALL ST. J. ONLINE (Nov 2012). 
292 See John Zeleznikow and Emilia Bellucci, Building Negotiation Decision Support 
Systems by Integrating Game Theory and Heuristics, DECISION SUPPORT IN AN 
UNCERTAIN AND COMPLEX WORLD: THE IFIP TC8/WG8.3 INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE 873-74 (2004). DEUS is a template-based system that helps mediators 
understand the extent of the issues in dispute. The goal of DEUS was to separate the 
people from the property at issue. DEUS helps mediators understand what issues are 
in dispute and the extent of the dispute over these issues. The system, however, was 
not concerned with the principles of justice. Its goal is to indicate the range and 
significance of issues in dispute. See id. 873-74. The choice of the developers in 
naming the platform DEUS highlights the power that programmers’ perhaps hope that 
such systems may wield, which bears on the question of whether this is in the best 
interests of the justice system. 
293 See Lodder, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 262 
at 65. 
294 These platforms, such as Smartsettle, assist the parties in clarifying interests, 
identifying trade-offs, and generating optimal solutions. See Lodder, Artificial 
Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 262, at 65. 
295 Id. 
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suggestions of a fair outcome.296 These platforms, such as Smartsettle,297 assist the 
parties in clarifying interests, identifying trade-offs, and generating optimal 
solutions.298 On the other hand, platforms such as Cybersettle and Clicknsettle assist 
parties in the entire negation process with no human intervention whatsoever.299 
 
Private platforms do have one immediate drawback: the outcomes can be difficult to 
enforce. As creatures of contract, ODR platforms rely upon two common types of 
enforcement: community enforcement rules (such as chargebacks or removal from the 
site) that are agreed upon as part of the terms of service, and/or the use of local legal 
doctrine. In the latter instance, as we discussed above, it is the use of arbitration that is 
the key to the ability to enforce outcomes. In general, mediation outcomes are 
essentially new contracts created by the parties during the mediation.300 Hence, 
mediation outcomes are enforced like any other contract301 — through a lengthy court 
proceeding.302 However, as previously discussed, arbitration is different.303 Arbitration 
is an alternative to the court that provides court enforcement of outcomes, so long as 
the arbitration complies with certain fundamental due process rights (such as 
impartiality of the decision maker).304 In fact, arbitration awards are treated like court 
judgments, so long as a simple legal process of filing the award is followed.305 Many 
traditional private ODR systems rely upon arbitration and thus interact closely with the 
justice system.306 But, some private full service platforms are more narrowly 
 
296 See id. 
297 See Smartsettle, http://www.smartsettle.com/ (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
298 See Lodder, Artificial Intelligence and Online Dispute Resolution, supra note 262, 
at 65. 
299 See Cybersettle, http://www.cybersettle.com  (last visited Aug. 8, 2019). 
300 See Ellen E. Deason, Procedural Rules for Complimentary Systems of Litigation 
and Mediation- Worldwide, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 553, 580 ( 2005)(discussing the 
manner of mediation enforcement). Do note, the United Nations Convention on 
International Settlement Agreements Resulting From Mediation may change the 
ability to enforce mediation outcomes, globally. See supra Chapter 1, footnote 5. 
301 Deason, Procedural Rules for Complimentary Systems of Litigation, supra note 
271 at 580. 
302 See id.  
303 See id. at 577-579; supra Chapter 2, Section Introduction. 
304 See, supra Chapter 2, Section Introduction. 
305 See, supra Chapter 2, Section Introduction. 
306 See e.g., supra, Chapter 2, Section A(1) (e-Bay market place discussion). 
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constructed, relying instead upon only negotiation and/or mediation.307 Because these 
platforms operate without the option of final and binding arbitration as the final dispute 
resolution step, these platforms are without a judicial enforcement mechanism. In these 
instances, communities — as discussed above — may enforce outcomes through 
payment or reputation mechanisms that are part of the system.  
 
If arbitration is not included in an ODR process, the parties are vulnerable to potentially 
biased dispute resolution that is designed in contract. Without the courts’ influence and 
insistence upon adherence to the rule of law when requesting the enforcement of an 
outcome, platform designers are fully within their rights to design a process that suits 
them, and there are few other safeguards to guarantee that this will be compliant with 
the rule of law. To date, not many platform designers have taken advantage of this 
situation, but there are examples where basic RoL protections have been rejected.308 
For example, PeopleClaim, a company whose tagline is “Online Dispute Resolution for 
Any Problem.”309 PeopleClaim allows individuals to file claims and to enter a system 
of negotiation with the other party in an online environment.310 In essence, this stage is 
an online communications portal for the parties to begin discussing and resolving their 
dispute. From here however, the system becomes less RoL-focused. Outcomes depend 
on individuals agreeing to a suggested solution. Suggestions can be submitted by 
multiple parties: as a member of the justice community, you are encouraged to “Find a 
case with the RHU (RHU Coin) icon. Suggest your idea for fair resolution. Receive a 
‘Yes’ vote from the community. Win five free RHU coins.*”311  It’s crucial feature is 
 
307 See e.g., eNegotiation, supra footnote 216. 
308 At the time of writing, People Claim comes to mind. See PeopleClaim website 
available at https://www.peopleclaim.com/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
People Claim allows parties to submit claims without verification of the claim, allows 
public shaming or businesses and individuals, allows an online jury- each of whom 
volunteer to participate- without screening or conflict disclosures- to decide the 
outcome based on a popularity of the party type process. See id. 
309 PeopleClaim website available at https://www.peopleclaim.com/ (last visited Aug. 
9, 2019). 
310 See id. 
311 Id. It is important to note, the RHU have no immediately transferable value to 
recognized currency. Instead, like many cryptocurrencies the coin are valued based 
within the community and those that extend value to the coin. It is too early in the 
development of these crypto based systems to determine the success or failure of such 
a system. However, former chairman of the U.S. Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan is 
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that the key to winning the RHU coins is to suggest a solution that the most people 
like.312 It should be noted, I have written about PeopleClaim before,313 and they reached 
out to me to help adjust the system. In fact the asterisk in the statement above was added 
after our discussion about issues with this “informed consensus”314 system. The asterisk 
leads the attentive user to learn that the platform can reject payment to dishonest 
individuals within the system. The developers responded to other items of feedback as 
well, by not calling the outcome arbitration, not advertising it as a resolution that could 
be enforced in court, and clarifying the nature of the platform as really a 
communications opportunity for parties. However, against this author’s 
recommendation, PeopleClaim elected to continue to use a “name-and-shame” 
approach to claim filing.315 Name-and-shame is the idea that big businesses are more 
attentive than ever to bad social media — a point PeopleClaim exploits. PeopleClaim 
posts all filed claims online, in a readily searchable database that is easily discovered 
by a simple Google search.316 PeopleClaim has no mechanism in place to ensure the 
claim is filed based upon any real harm; in fact a quick search though the claim database 
suggests no one at PeopleClaim follows up with individuals who are merely venting, 
often in a very negative, unverified manner, about a company or individual.317 Public 
name and shaming is a poor mechanism to encourage deliberative, non-adversarial  
communication and is a disaster without efforts to verify the accuracy of the filed 
information. There are websites that note issues with small business owners being 
 
not a fan of the traditional cryptocurrencies. See Sujha Sundararajan, Greenspan 
Likens ‘Irrational’ Bitcoin to Revolutionary War Currency, Coin Desk, (Dec. 7, 
2017) (discussing the volatility of the potential market). 
312 PeopleClaim website available at https://www.peopleclaim.com/ (last visited Aug. 
9, 2019). 
313 See Scott J. Shackelford and Anjanette H. Raymond, Building the Virtual 
Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation, and Regulation in 
the World of ODR, WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW 615 (2014). 
314 PeopleClaim website available at https://www.peopleclaim.com/ (last visited Aug. 
9, 2019). 
315 See id. 
316 See PeopleClaim website available at 
https://www.peopleclaim.com/faq.aspx?cID=1 (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
317 See PeopleClaim website available at 
https://www.peopleclaim.com/trial/directory.aspx (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  87 
wrongfully accused, without opportunity to defend themselves, yet the filing about 
them remains widely available.318  
 
The PeopleClaim case illustrates two major dangers that the author contends should be 
avoided. First, we cannot allow intentional mis-information to be disseminated about 
the services that the platform provides. Second, public name-and-shame situations 
should never be allowed without some mechanism of verification.  
 
2 Public ODR Platforms 
 
Many of the benefits of private platforms can be replicated in the public online justice 
environment. Public ODR platforms, however, have distinct advantages in terms of 
enforcement of outcomes. Public-based and/or judicially-supported ODR platforms 
have several enforcement mechanisms—the simplest of which is to have the local 
courts assist in enforcement should the losing party fail to comply.319 With this type of 
mechanism, no feedback, accreditation or account restrictions are necessary to 
encourage compliance. Instead, users agree to abide by particular rules and laws and 
allow a publicly supported ODR system to resolve issues.320 Moreover, the close ties 
between the platform and the court system demand the ODR platform comports with 
local law,321 which in most instances guarantees that it meets the requirements of the 
rule of law.322 As such, public systems are assumed to be compliant with the basic 
expectations of any other justice environment. 
 
One of the early advances in public ODR platform development occurred in Mexico. 
Called Concilianet, the platform is both hosted and supported by the government via 
 
318 See Site Jabber Reviews, available at 
https://www.sitejabber.com/reviews/peopleclaim.com (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
319 See e.g., the Civil Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia, Canada, (resolving via 
an ODR process, motor vehicle injury dispute and small claims (among others),  
available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
320 See id.  
321 See id. 
322 See id. 
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the Federal Attorney’s Office of Consumer (PROFECO).323 The Concilianet platform 
has been created to resolve disputes between registered merchants324 and their 
customers.325 The process is remarkable as it: (1) is straight forward; (2) has no direct 
filing costs; (3) allows online and in-person filing; (4) uses verified forms of personal 
identification for registration of a claim; (5) complies with local law on data retention 
and protection; (6) has trained assistants to assist the consumer through the process; (7) 
uses a secured electronic data capture and virtual courtroom throughout the process, 
and; (8) is able to resolve the majority of claims within a short, consumer-driven 
timeline.326 In fact, even merchants not registered with the service can have a claim 
filed against them, but the filing must be done in person (as use of the online platform 
requires consent via registration) at a local satellite office.327 It is also worthy of note 
that the entire system is both voluntary and produces a non-binding outcome that allows 
the consumer to retain his right to his day in court.328  
 
One of the better examples of a public-supported, multi issue- human centered focused 
ODR platforms currently exists within the province of British Columbia, Canada.329 
Unlike previously described systems, the British Columbia ODR platform engages the 
business once the complaint is filed.330 At this initial stage the parties to the dispute 
agree to proceed with the resolution process and also agree to have the outcome be final 
and binding (i.e., arbitration). Although the platform does not assist in the recovery, 
should the losing party fail to comply the final award can be taken to the judicial system 
 
323 Government of Mexico, Federal Attorney’s Office of Consumer, Concilianet, 
website,  available at https://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/Concilianet/  (last visited 
Aug. 9, 2019). 
324 For a full list, see Concilianet, list of participants, available at 
https://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/Concilianet/proveedores_que_concilian.jsp (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
325 See id.  
326 See id. 
327 See id. 
328 See Author, Concilianet FAQ,  
https://concilianet.profeco.gob.mx/Concilianet/comoconciliar.jsp  (last visited Aug. 9, 
2019). 
329 The Civil Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia, Canada,(resolving via an ODR 
process, motor vehicle injury dispute and small claims (among others), information 
available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
330 See id. 
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for enforcement. In the first seven months, “the system … handled nearly 14,000 small-
claims cases. Roughly 85 percent of the 700 cases resolved to date were settled. Only 
12 went to decision at the tribunal.”331 Since these initial figures the platform has 
grown, frankly at an exponential rate.  As of July 2019, the CRT Statistics Snapshot 
reports Small Claims explorations 50,337, Strata Property explorations 25,302, Motor 
Vehicle Accidents and Injuries explorations 2,180, Societies and Cooperative 
Associations explorations 79.332 
 
Interestingly, some of the modern platforms are developed with an eye toward taking 
the technology to the people. For example, a pilot program in San Francisco sought to 
reduce the number of evictions among its low-income population.333 The pilot program 
created a platform that could be accessed online, and intentionally expanded its 
accessibility by making it available via iPad.334 The Bar Association of San Francisco 
then hired law students to go into the affected communities and provide justice on 
sight.335 The application was designed with an eye toward compliance with existing 
landlord–tenant laws in San Francisco, so the Bar Association could be confident that 
even the newest of law students would be able to competently and accurately provide 
this important legal service.336  
 
Initiatives such as the one in San Francisco have provided important examples of 
success that may embolden more cities to use technology to improve access to justice 
through the ODR eco-system. The team who designed the British Columbia software 
mentioned above went on to design the largest public ODR system to be launched to 
 
331 Author, British Columbia ODR System Handles 14,000 Cases In First 7 Months, 
ABA NEWS, (Feb. 4, 2018) https://www.americanbar.org/news/abanews/aba-news-
archives/2018/02/british_columbiaodr.html (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
332 The Civil Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia, Canada, CRT Statistics 
Snapshot – July 2019, available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/crt-statistics-snapshot-
july-2019/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
333 See Simon Boehme, Housing Dispute? Handle It Quickly Online, BAR 
ASSOCIATION OF SAN FRANCISCO, (Fall 2018) available at 
http://www.sfbar.org/forms/sfam/q32018/conflict-intervention-service-2-SFAM-
Q318.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
334 See id. 
335 See id. 
336 See id. 
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date.337 As part of Canada’s commitment to improving access to justice and embracing 
the use of technology, the Civil Resolution Tribunal338 was started in 2016 to handle 
condominium disputes. It quickly expanded to handle small claims and most recently 
implemented a process to handle car accident and personal injury disputes.339  
 
Shannon Salter, Civil Resolutions Tribunal Chair, describes the system:340 
 
  
  Civil Resolution Tribunal Canada, (Japan APEC Workshop 2018) 
 
As can be seen from the diagram, the system involves multiple technology deployments 
to improve individuals’ access to the justice system, including an entire section of the 
platform and website that assists individuals in understanding the law and their rights 
within the law, and directs them toward options for resolution.341 For many involved in 
 
337 The Civil Resolution Tribunal in British Columbia, Canada, (resolving via an 
ODR process, motor vehicle injury dispute and small claims (among others)),  
information available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/ (last visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
338 See id.   
339 See id. 
340 Shannon Salter, Civil Resolution Tribunal presentation, APEC ODR Conference 
(November 2018). 
341 Id.  Called Solution Explorer, the platform is a free public legal information and 
tool with guided pathways , interactive question and answers, resolution or 
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ODR design, the first stage of the ODR eco-system is dispute avoidance, meaning that 
the system should assist individuals before a problem becomes a dispute.342 This is 
reflected in the priority given to “self-help” as the first tier of the service. In the self-
help process individuals are allowed to ask questions and receive some basic legal 
information based on the entered description of the issue. As can be seen in the diagram, 
the process can then move into a party-to-party negotiation phase where the parties 
communicate, without intervention, within the platform. Should the parties desire, the 
platform can then assist in the negotiation process. The process is completed when a 
decision is provided to the parties. In general, many of these systems envision the use 
of a human as the facilitator, meaning a unique human not party to the dispute enters 
into the communications environment. However, as will be further explored in Chapter 
4, as this technology develops it is quite possible the facilitation will occur without a 
human in the loop. While the CRT is one of the newer platforms, it is widely regarded 
as successful,343 so much so that the Civil Resolution Tribunal Act was amended to 
give the CRT “jurisdiction over motor vehicle injury disputes $50,000 and under, 
including accident benefit claims and minor injury determinations.”344 
 
In the United States, the National Center for State Courts345 notes that “ODR is utilized 
in only a small fraction of U.S. courts” and that “currently the U.S. lags well behind 
 
342 See id. For further discussion, see Katsh, DIGITAL JUSTICE, supra note 251, at 17. 
Adherence to dispute avoidance is one reason why the ODR community rejects too 
narrow of definition. The author believes, as noted in Chapter 1, the better choice is to 
allow the ODR community to embrace an eco-system approach to regulation.  
343 CRT Statistics Snapshot (December 2018) available at 
https://civilresolutionbc.ca/crt-statistics-snapshot-december-2018/ (last visited 
January 17, 2019) providing a total of 8,810 disputes with “75% are likely to 
recommend the CRT to others”. Participant Satisfaction Survey — April to December 
2018 (Jan 2018) available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/participant-satisfaction-
survey-april-december-2018/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
344 Effective January 1, 2019. See Lauryn Kerr, The CRT’s Legislation is Changing, 
(Dec. 2018) available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/the-crts-legislation-is-changing/ 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
345 “The NCSC is the organization courts turn to for authoritative knowledge and 
information, because it collaborates closely with the Conference of Chief Justices, the 
Conference of State Court Administrators, and other associations of judicial leaders.” 
NCSC Website, About US, available at  http://www.ncsc.org/About-us.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 9, 2019). 
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Europe and the Pacific Rim in adoption of ODR.”346 In fact, the report highlights: “the 
most ambitious and successful ODR initiatives today are going on outside the United 
States.”347 That is not to write that ODR is non-existent in the U.S.: early experiments 
are appearing alongside calls for further research. In fact, several organizations have 
produced guidance for ODR implementation which will be drawn upon in the 
examination of standards later in the chapter. Rhys West of Fairway Consulting has 




   Tyler Technology Presentation (APEC Workshop, Japan 2018) 
 
 
346 Joint Technology Committee, Conference of State Court Administrators, the 
National Association for Court Management and the National Center for State Courts, 
Case Studies In ODR For Courts: A View From The Front Lines, JTC Resource 
Bulletin, The National Center for State Courts Publication, 1, (Nov. 2017). 
347 Id. 
348 Rhys West, Online Dispute Resolution, Expanding Access to Justice, APEC ODR 
Conference, Materials, (November 2018). 
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The PEW Charitable Trust has been researching and writing in the area349 and has just 
produced a call for further research,350 as well as the possible creation of a national 
standard for ODR in the United States.351 
 
One of the most ambitious ODR-based systems to date was created by the European 
Union, when it passed a first-of-its-kind ADR Directive and corresponding ODR 
Regulation to facilitate the widespread use of ODR across the E.U.352 The ADR 
Directive creates a procedure covering all contractual disputes in every market sector 
(e.g., travel, banking, dry cleaning), and in every Member State.353 Similar to other 
systems,354 the ADR Directive requires traders to inform consumers about the 
availability of ADR,355 both on their websites and in their general terms and 
conditions,356 and requires ADR entities to meet quality criteria which guarantee that 
they operate in an effective, fair, independent and transparent way.357  
 
Complementing the ADR Directive, an ODR Regulation enables E.U. consumers and 
traders to submit disputes arising from online purchases to an online dispute resolution 
 
349 See Erika Rickard, Online Dispute Resolution Offers a New Way to Access Local 
Courts, Pew Charitable Trust Fact Sheet, (Jan. 4, 2019). 
350  See Author, Pew Welcomes Discussion For A National ODR Standards Body, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (March 6, 2019).  
351 The author is potentially part of the research agenda (as of May 2019). 
352 The ADR Directive will not cover the sectors of health and education as these 
areas are already heavily regulated and disputes arise are often of a more complex 
nature. EUROPA publication, A Step Forward For EU Consumers: Questions & 
Answers On Alternative Dispute Resolution And Online Dispute Resolution, Press 
Release, (Mar. 2013) [hereinafter EUROPA, Press Release]. The original website for 
the platform is available at http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/redress_cons/adr_en.htm 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
353 See EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 323. 
354 Anjanette H. Raymond Yeah, But Did You See the Gorilla? Creating and 
Protecting an ‘Informed’ Consumer In Cross Border Online Dispute Resolution, 19 
HARVARD NEGOTIATION LAW REVIEW 129, 129-171 (Spring 2014).. 
355 See Directive 2013/11/EU Of The European Parliament And Of The Council of 21 
May 2013 on Alternative Dispute Resolution For Consumer Disputes, at Art 7 
[hereinafter “ADR Directive”]. 
356 See id. at Art 7. 
357 See ADR Directive, supra note 326 at arts. 15-16; EUROPA, Press Release, supra 
note 323. 
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mechanism.358 The ODR Regulation attempts to create an E.U.–wide dispute resolution 
platform (“ODR platform”)359 that will link all the national ADR entities.360 This single 
entry point is designed to be a user-friendly and interactive website, available in all 
E.U. official languages and free of charge.361 In practice, consumers encountering a 
problem with an online purchase will eventually be able to submit a complaint online 
in the language of their choice through the ODR platform.362 The ODR platform will 
notify the trader that a complaint is lodged against him.363 The consumer and the trader 
will then agree on which ADR entity to use to solve their dispute.364 Importantly, as 
will be discussed later, it is arguable at this point as to whether the ADR submission 
agreement is created between the parties.365 When they agree, the chosen ADR entity 
will receive the details of the dispute via the ODR platform.366 Because the ODR 
platform will be connected to the national ADR entities,367 the platform will allow 
national ODR advisors to provide general information to consumers on consumer rights 
and redress in relation to online purchases,368 and assist with the submission of 
 
358 EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 323. 
359 Regulation (EU) No 524/2013 Of The European Parliament And Of The Council 
of 21 May 2013 On Online Dispute Resolution For Consumer, at Art 5. [hereinafter 
‘ODR Reg.’] 
360 EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 323. 
361 See ADR Directive, supra note 326, at art 9; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 
323. 
362 See ODR Reg., supra note 330 at Art 7; ADR Directive, supra note 326, at art. 17; 
EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 323. 
363 EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 323. 
364 See ODR Reg., supra note 330 at Arts 5 and 8; EUROPA, Press Release, supra 
note 323. See also, Raymond Yeah, But Did You See the Gorilla?, supra note 325. 
365 Pre-dispute arbitration clauses are generally thought of as unfair contract terms 
when E.U. consumers and their corresponding consumer protection laws are 
implicated in the transaction. This is NOT the U.S. position. See Ronald A. Brand, 
Party Autonomy and Access to Justice in the UNCITRAL Online Dispute Resolution 
Project 10 LOYOLA U. CHICAGO. INT'L L. REV. 11, 11 (2012); See also, Raymond 
Yeah, But Did You See the Gorilla?, supra note 325.  
366 See ODR Reg., supra note 330 at Art 8; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 323. 
367 In each Member State, a competent authority will be in charge of monitoring the 
functioning of ADR entities established on its territory. See ADR Directive, supra 
note 326, at art 27; ODR Reg., supra note 330 at Art 6.  
368 Including a high level of transparency about the process and prior outcomes, 
statistics, etc. See ADR Directive, supra note 326, at art 7. 
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complaints and facilitate communication between the parties.369 Most importantly, the 
new rules will provide for ADR entities to settle a dispute within ninety days,370 a 
significantly quicker process than many existing small claims courts throughout 
Europe.371 
 
Some of the E.U. Member States are exploring the use of technology within the entirety 
of the justice system. For example, in the United Kingdom, the Ministry of Justice and 
HM Courts and Tribunals Service “are implementing a wide-ranging court reform and 
digitalisation programme across the justice system.”372 This implementation, while in 
its early stages, is nonetheless expected to include developments in online dispute 
resolution.373  
 
3. Supra-National/Institutional Efforts  
 
Despite the growing success of ODR in both public and private domestic markets in 
many countries, the harmonized cross-border ODR market is surprisingly limited and 
sparse.374 In fact, until recently, only a few international institutions had even attempted 
to craft a cross-border legal instrument.375 This lag is notable given that the enormous 
growth and exponential potential of cross-border ecommerce has been a driver behind 
the development of each of the domestic initiatives so far discussed, including the 
 
369 See ADR Directive, supra note 326, at art 11; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 
323. 
370 See ADR Directive, supra note 326, at art 8; EUROPA, Press Release, supra note 
323.  
371 For example, the Regulation on European small claims the gives the defendant 
thirty days to respond to the complaint. See Regulation (EC) No 861/2007 of the 
European Parliament and of the Council of July 11, 2007, Establishing a European 
Small Claims Procedure (2007). 
372 Robert Thomas and Dr. Joe Tomlinson, The Digitalisation Of Tribunals: What We 
Know And What We Need To Know, Public Law Project (April 2018). 
373 See id.  
374 U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution), 
22nd Sess., Dec. 13-17, 2010, A/CN.9/716 at 31 (2010) [hereinafter “U.N., Working 
Group II Report Dec 2010”]. That is not to say that several regional and domestic 
systems do not exist, many of which have served as an influence to the U.N. ODR 
text. See id. at paras 32-34. 
375 See id.  
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European Union ADR/ODR regime.376 Most of these documents seek to resolve issues 
associated with commercial transactions,377 which produce a series of predictable 
issues, primarily associated with consumers and consumer law within the commercial 
environment.378 In many ways, this sole issue is a major barrier to cross-border ODR.379 
Taking up the challenge, several supra-national entities and international institutions 
have attempted to produce best practices, frameworks and guidance documents, 
primarily addressing conventional ODR.380 For example, the Internet Corporation for 
Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) uses an online dispute process which allows 
individuals to file claims within the area of domain names,381 while the Organization 
of American States created an “ODR Initiative for the Electronic Resolution of Cross-
Border E-Commerce Consumer Disputes.”382  
 
It is the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, however, that has 
made the most extensive attempt to harmonize the ODR eco-system across borders. 
Drawing its mandate from the U.N. General Assembly’s forty-third session,383 the 
United Nations Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) Working Group was tasked with 
creating, over a five-year period, a series of instruments to facilitate development of a 
platform offering a three-phase dispute resolution process.384 The instruments 
originally envisioned were: (1) procedural rules; (2) accreditation standards and 
minimum requirements for ODR providers/platforms; (3) guidelines and minimum 
requirements for ODR neutrals; (4) principles for resolving ODR disputes; and (5) a 
 
376 See discussion, text and corresponding footnotes, supra notes 323-341. 
377 See U.N., Working Group II Report Dec 2010, supra note 343, at 32. 
378 See id. 
379 See id.  
380 See id.  
381 See ICANN, Online Dispute Resolution Standards of Practice, ICANN website, 
(2010). 
382 See Colin Rule, Vikki Rogers, and Louis Del Duca, Designing a Global Consumer 
Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) System for Cross-Border Small Value-High Volume 
Claims—OAS Developments, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 42 
#3](2010). Interestingly, ICANN is a ‘community’ system because enforcement can 
be done by removing the domain name from a party who fails to comply with the 
outcome, while the OAS model used a traditional ODR process, culminating in 
arbitration. See id.  
383 See U.N., Working Group II Report Dec 2010, supra note 343, at para. 385.  
384 See id. at para 115. 
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cross-border enforcement mechanism.385 The overall goal was to create a quick, simple, 
and inexpensive means of resolving disputes involving low-value, high-volume, cross-
border, electronic commerce transactions.386  
 
In the end, the UNCITRAL Working Group (III) did not achieve this original broad 
mandate; it failed to produce even one of the documents originally envisioned. It met a 
later, revised mandate when it produced a set of Technical Notes on Dispute 
Resolution.387 At the February 2015 meeting, both the U.S. and the European Union 
suggested that work be abandoned since no consensus could be reached as to the 
content of the procedural rules.388 Ultimately, it was consumer law and the newly 
envisioned E.U. ODR initiative that ended the conversation as the U.S. and the E.U. 
each recruited allies and resisted compromise.389 Some commentators are quietly 
asking if technology will ever be able to overcome the power of local law or the 
significance of the state line in the psyche of legislators. The quiet discontent is partially 
responsible for the growth of regional attempts at public online ADR and private 
entrepreneurial ODR. 
 
The Working Group refused to let their hard work go unrecorded, and as such, produced 
Technical Notes which provide important insights into the role of the decision maker, 
which we will be explored in more detail the next section. But, before proceeding, it is 
necessary to emphasize that cross-border issues — relating to the rule of law, access to 
justice, and individual protections such as consumer protection and privacy rights — 
will continue to be sticking points for legislative drafting.390 UNCITRAL’s enormous 
 
385 See id. 
386 See id. 
387 See id. 
388 An occurrence I sat in the room and witnessed. It has also been reported by others, 
for example Karim Benyekhlef and Nicolas Vermeys, UNCITRAL Adopts Technical 
Notes on ODR, SLAW (April 2016). 
389 It is important to note, I was part of an NGO and at the meetings and part of the 
group frequently consulted by the US Delegation. I am still very active in the various 
groups. This is my opinion and should not be imputed to others, the group, or any 
NGO. 
390 This raises the issue of to what extent the Internet should be considered a 
“borderless” environment. Two schools of thought play out, one depicting cyberspace 
as a commons largely free from governmental interference, while the other considers 
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scaling back of an initially lofty goal is demonstrative of the difficulty of creating a 
cross-border legal text. For this very reason, in this thesis I have elected to draft best 
practices as opposed to legal standards. The UNCITRAL Technical Notes and similar 
documents are a good first step toward harmonization of the ODR justice eco-system, 
especially when legislative processes fail.  
 
At the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Economic Committee Workshop 
in Japan 2018, the ODR Working Group spent two days focused on The Collaborative 
Framework for ODR in APEC Accelerating Justice, Accelerating Trade.391 The 
primary purpose of the Workshop was for the members and invited participants to 
develop several things: a collaborative framework, ODR procedural rules and standards 
for a pilot with ODR providers, and Regional Arbitration/Mediation Centers.392 
 
The Collaborative Framework was specifically tasked with establishing an APEC–
sponsored initiative to use ODR to help global businesses, in particular Micro, Small 
& Medium Enterprises (M/o MSME), resolve business-to-business (B2B) cross-border 
disputes, focusing on low-value disputes. ODR Providers would be expected to adhere 
to the Procedural Rules developed within the APEC ODR Framework, yet APEC itself 
would not enter the market. Instead, ODR Providers would agree to abide by the Rules 
but would be free to design and deploy their own platforms. Moreover, APEC was not 
empowered to monitor nor advise the providers; instead the Strengthening Economic 
and Legal Infrastructural (SELI)393 Coordinating Group was tasked with maintaining a 
 
cyberspace to be an extension of national territory. See e.g., Dan Hunter, Cyberspace 
as Place and the Tragedy of the Digital Anticommons, 91 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 439, 
519 (2003) (depicting cyberspace as a traditional commons and warning that inaction 
will lead to an intractable digital anti-commons); David R. Johnson & David Post, 
Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STANFORD L. REV. 1367, 1367 
(1996) (arguing that “[g]lobal computer-based communications cut across territorial 
borders, creating a new realm of human activity and undermining the feasibility—and 
legitimacy—of laws based on geographic boundaries”).  
391 Author, APEC’s New Online Dispute Resolution Framework, NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR TECHNOLOGY AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (March 12, 2019)(discussing APEC 
embracing the ODR pilot designed in previous meetings). 
392 See id. 
393 SELI will also compile data from the various providers to measure the success of 
the pilot.  
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list of partners who are compliant with the ODR Cooperative Framework and will 
maintain a website so others can access this list. 
 
The ODR Framework “creates an electronic system for MSMEs in APEC participating 
economies providing ODR through negotiation, mediation and arbitration of B2B 
claims.”394 Thus, the Framework has a traditional ODR model in mind, yet supports 
departures from the traditional model. The Framework seeks to set out the steps needed 
to encourage participation and ensure legal compliance amongst APEC Member States. 
It is the Procedural Rules, however, which demand attention for the purposes of this 
thesis. 
 
The Procedural Rules are the first clear indication that APEC may be envisioning a 
significant change. Article 6 proscribes: “. . . the ODR administrator shall promptly 
appoint a neutral in accordance with Article 9 ...”395 Of course, this removes the 
appointment power from the parties. However, the Rules are ambiguous as to whether 
the appointed neutral party must necessarily be a human being.396 The Rules do 
envision a declaration, upon receiving notice of the appointment, of the impartiality and 
independence of the neutral397 and do allow either party to object to the appointment.398 
In instances of objection, the neutral is automatically disqualified.399 When a party 
objects to multiple appointments, the party is allowed 3 automatic disqualifications, 
after which the ODR administrator will determine whether the neutral shall be replaced 
and will make such determination based on “facts or circumstances that might give rise 
to justifiable doubts of the neutral’s impartiality and independence.”400 Although the 
process may sound complex, it is actually reasonably efficient and seamless, with few 
time delays. For example, the objecting party has two days to ask for an automatic 
disqualification.401 Hence, an ODR platform that complies with the Procedural Rules 
 
394 See id. 
395 APEC, Proc. Rules, Article 9. 
396 See id. 
397 See id. 
398 See id. 
399 See id. 
400 APEC, Proc. Rules, Article 9; UNCITRAL Tech. Notes, para 48(b). 
401 See APEC, Proc. Rules, Article 9. 
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will have a process of appointment that is reasonably quick and uses technology in an 
advantageous manner. In addition, the standard for measuring the independence and 
impartiality of the neutral402 is already recognized by a majority of institutions and 
states and hence should not cause enforceability issues. It will however, be interesting 
to see what happens when the system becomes fully automated, as these Rules, and 
others, enforce a requirement to “declare impartiality and independence.” 
 
B. Online Dispute Resolution: Appointment, Impartiality, Independence, and 
Disclosure  
To date, there are very few legislative guides, best practices or other governance 
documents that address how to build and ensure an online decision maker’s 
impartiality, independence and freedom from bias. However, as the online justice 
environment grows, a small body of research and policy in this area is beginning to 
form. This section will explore first the institutional attempts to provide this guidance 
and then some of the attempts of ODR providers themselves to ensure an independent 
and impartial decision maker.  
 
1. Institutional Guidance Concerning ODR Decision Maker 
 
We have touched on the recent attempts by the UNCITRAL Working Group to delve 
into the appropriate mechanisms required to ensure decision maker impartiality and 
independence in ODR.403 The Technical Notes404 this group published were created by 
some of the most respected authorities in the field after a lengthy process of discussion, 
and are likely to have greater impact than their name might suggest. As such, this 
document will guide the development of this section. 
 
 
402 See id.  
403 See United Nations Commission On International Trade Law, Technical  Notes  on  
Online  Dispute  Resolution  of  the  United  Nations  Commission  on  International  
Trade  Law, 71/138 (Resolution  adopted  by  the General  Assembly  on  13  
December, 2016)(2017)[hereinafter Technical Notes]. 
404 See e.g., United Nations Commission On International Trade Law, Report Of 
Working Group III (Online Dispute Resolution) On The Work Of Its Thirty-Third 
Session  (New York, 29 February-4 March 2016)(Section II listing participants list). 
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Let us first highlight two important points that provide necessary context for 
appropriate interpretation of these Technical Notes. First, because the Technical Notes 
are covering all of ODR, there was a need to consider all potential forms of technology-
driven dispute resolution. While this thesis has focused on arbitration, the Working 
Group was examining a more expansive set of possibilities throughout the drafting 
process. For example, the Working Group adopted terminology, such as “neutral,” that 
is not specific to ADR or any other existing process, without providing an official 
definition. This maximizes the future adaptability of their language; any other potential 
term, such as “arbitrator,” would have necessarily referenced a particular species of 
dispute resolution. The downside of using such a non-specific term is that it may create 
difficulties, for example when it comes to specific protections included in one process 
but not another, as previously discussed. The lack of specificity means that the process 
addressed by the Technical Notes cannot be presumed to include rule of law protections 
by default, and these issues must be actively examined.  
 
The second point of note is that the Technical Notes are aspirational, meaning that 
rather than producing strict proscriptions, they provide recommendations and leave the 
full development of the procedural rules to the platform developer or legislative body. 
(Chapter 5 will attempt to suggest just such a development.405) 
 
Narrowing down the discussion, there are three areas of interest relevant to the thesis: 
judicial independence, appointment of the neutrals and governance. Each will be 
explored in turn in the following sections.  
 
a. Appointment, functions and independence/impartiality of the decision maker 
 
In a process that looks notably similar to the appointment process within many 
arbitration institutions, the Technical Notes proscribe: 
Technical Notes Section X — Appointment, powers and 
functions of the neutral 
. . . 
 (b) The neutral {shall} be required to declare his or her 
impartiality and independence and disclose at any time 
 
405 See infra, Chapter 5. 
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any facts or circumstances that might give rise to likely 
doubts as to his or her impartiality or independence;406  
 
Note the expansive expectation of disclosure indicated by the phrasing “likely doubts.” 
These proscriptions are in line with the widely regarded international arbitration 
expectations as described in Chapter 2407; in particular, note that disclosure, in the 
interest of safeguarding impartiality and independence, is an ongoing obligation.408 The 
author therefore posits that the Technical Notes are compliant with RoL expectations 
regarding the decision maker, as described in Chapter 1. 
 
The Technical Notes also include a more novel expectation: that the neutral will “treat 
both parties equally.” This requirement has not been articulated in prior rules or 
legislation regarding commercial arbitration.409 Since the Technical Notes are intended 
to cover a wider subject area than commercial law, it may be that the Working Group 
envisioned this expectation as adding to the breadth of their relevance.  
 
The notes continue:  
(c) The ODR system provides parties with a method for 
objecting to the appointment of a neutral;410 
Presumptively, the objection would need to be based upon the previously expressed 
recommendation that “likely doubts” exist concerning the neutral’s impartiality and 
independence.411 There may also be an implied right of objection when a likely doubt 
exists relating to treating both parties equally. But this is a mere reading and has not 
been put into practice and is thus an untested standard. While there is not necessarily 
an expectation of the ability to object to the participation of a decision maker, the 
inclusion is considered a further protection of the RoL expectation of the presence of 
an independent and impartial decision maker. Hence, the provision may be thought of 
as essential in the process. 
 
 
406 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section X, at 48(b) 
407 See supra, Chapter 2, at Table B. 
408 Technical Notes, supra note 374,  Section X, at 49(d). 
409 See supra, Chapter 2, at Table B.   
410 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section X, at 48(c). 
411 See supra, Chapter 2, at Table B. 
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What entity holds the authority to make determinations relating to independence and 
impartiality? Like most institutional arbitration rules, the Technical Notes provide that:  
(d) In the event of an objection to an appointment of a 
neutral, the ODR administrator {shall} be required to 
make a determination as to whether the neutral shall be 
replaced;412 
This is consistent with standard practice: one of the hallmarks of arbitration is that the 
parties agree to make use of an authority413 — an arbitration institution or ODR 
platform — to make the majority of procedural decisions.  
 
This general rule is not without exception, however. Taking a somewhat different 
approach, the ABA Task Force focused more on the Providers as the primary source 
ensuring impartiality and independence, as opposed to focusing the primary disclosure 
requirements on the decision makers or the administrators/institutions. For example, 
“ODR Providers must disclose all matters that might raise a reasonable question about 
the impartiality of the ODR Provider or its neutral(s).”414 The ABA Guidelines are also 
more specific about disclosures and conflicts of interest.  
Specifically, ODR Providers should disclose the 
following: 
A. Relationship to others concerning providing ODR 
services. 
1. If the ODR Provider provides ODR services 
under a contractual relationship with other 
organizations, such as merchants, trade 
associations, etc. 
2. If the ODR Provider provides any referral 
compensation (referral fees, rebates, 
commissions, etc.), and if so: 
a) to whom it is paid, and 
b) the amount of the compensation or the basis 
for calculating the amount of the 
compensation.415 
 
412 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section X, at 48(d) 
413 See supra, Chapter 2, at Table C. 
414 American Bar Association Task Force On Ecommerce And ADR, Recommended 
Best Practices For Online Dispute Resolution Service Providers, at VI, [hereinafter 
ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices] available at  
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/dispute/documents/BestPract
icesFinal102802.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
415 ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices, supra note 385,  at VI. 
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The included list is more specific than generally included within a set of best practices 
designed with a brick-and-mortar arbitration environment in mind;416 however, the list 
serves to require the platform to provide disclosures, a necessity in an ODR 
environment. A privately developed technology platform may itself be influenced in a 
manner that a court system is not. The disclosure of certain information is thus essential 
to ensure the system itself is viewed as trustworthy and so the platform can ensure RoL 
compliance, especially relating to the decision process.  
 
The ABA Best Practices suggest that ODR Providers be held responsible for the 
disclosures of their neutrals. For example: 
3. An ODR Provider shall take reasonable steps to cause its 
Neutrals to disclose whether the Neutral or a person closely 
affiliated with the Neutral (e.g., spouse, relative, or business 
partner, etc.) has any conflicts of interest, including but not 
limited to: 
a) Any direct personal, business, professional or 
financial relationship with a party or its representative; 
b) Any direct or indirect interest in the subject matter or 
outcome of the dispute, including contingent fee 
arrangements; and 
c) Any personal knowledge that the ODR Provider or 
Neutral has of facts relevant to the dispute.417 
Placing responsibility on the platform/provider to ensure compliance with RoL 
disclosure requirements is an important and innovative assurance of a trustworthy 
system. As briefly reviewed in Chapter 2, arbitration institutions have not been viewed 
as responsible for the actions, or inactions, of their arbitrators. Placing responsibility 
upon the platform ensures some level of oversight and responsibility over the decision 
making process. Best practices that make the platform responsible for failures to 
comply with RoL standards will also help to ensure that any technology deployed in 
the decision making processes are carefully vetted. 
 
Neutrals themselves are also held to disclosure requirements under the ABA 
Guidelines: “Neutrals shall . . . Disclose all conflicts of interest and act with impartiality 
 
416 See supra, Chapter 2, at Table B. 
417 ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices, supra note 385, at VI. 
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and independence . . .”418 However, there are no clear guidelines as to what merits 
disclosure. Unfortunately, this means that ABA practice follows the traditional 
arbitration approach to both issues.419 That approach of course, should suffice to reduce 
or eliminate issues that may arise within the context of arbitration, award enforcement, 
and the New York Convention,420 but it is not fully adequate to regulate the technology 
that may gain wide use in the near future. While the inclusion of the platform/provider 
as a responsible party ensuring compliance in disclosures is an important step, this 
thesis argues that the ABA and other bodies must go further, by insisting that providers 






In terms of process governance, the UNCITRAL Technical Notes do make clear that 
the use of ODR should not be a mechanism to subvert or otherwise ignore basic 
expectations already well established within the justice environment.  
Technical Notes Section XII — Governance 
52. It is desirable for guidelines (and/or minimum requirements) to 
exist in relation to the conduct of ODR platforms and administrators. 
53. It is desirable that ODR proceedings be subject to the same due 
process standards that apply to that process in an offline context, in 
particular independence, neutrality and impartiality.422 
However, the Technical Notes drafters were well aware of the need to strike a 
balance between respecting RoL and answering the need for a less onerous and 
costly process than those offered by existing systems. 
50. While the process for appointment of a neutral for an ODR 
proceeding is subject to the same due process standards that apply to 
that process in an offline context, it may be desirable to use streamlined 
appointment and challenge procedures in order to address the need for 
ODR to provide a simple, time-, and cost-effective alternative to 
traditional approaches to dispute resolution.423 
 
418 ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices, supra note 385, at VIII A. 
419 See supra, Chapter 2, Section B(3).  
420 See supra, Chapter 2, Section B(3). 
421 See infra Chapter 4, Section C(3) and Chapter 5, Section (A). 
422 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section XII, at 52 and 53. 
423 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section XI, at 50. 
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In other words, due process is to be respected, but not in the form of a simple copy of 
the existing brick-and-mortar system. Streamlining is allowable, even desirable, so long 
as basic due process, and by extension the rule of law, is respected. So what are the 
most basic features of due process? In our particular instance, the author argues that 
respect for the rule of law and due process demands that the platforms, institutions and 
individuals involved in providing ODR ensure an impartial, independent, neutral 




To everyone from cyber security professionals to privacy experts, transparency is 
frequently considered an essential element in any cyber-governance.424 Yet, the exact 
parameters of the transparency, and the specifics of what and when items should be 
transparent are a matter of discussion. The Technical Notes drafters were well aware of 
this, and the Notes elaborate on two types of transparency: disclosure of relationships 
(decision maker independence) and transparency in data gathering/sharing/outcomes, a 
somewhat different, but as we shall explore, ultimately related concern.  
 
First, the UNCITRAL Technical Notes Section II, Principles: Transparency 
recommends: 
It is desirable to disclose any relationship between the ODR 
administrator and a particular vendor, so that users of the service are 
informed of potential conflicts of interest.425 
It is important to note that the transparency described in this section applies to the ODR 
administrator and encompasses the administrator’s connections to vendors and 
neutrals. As such, any connection among these entities should be disclosed in order to 
address conflict of interest concerns. The creation of a recommendation specifically 
focusing on the technology, through the administrator or vendor, is an important aspect 
of independence that could have easily been overlooked in the emerging cyber-justice 
ecosystem. The assurances that a system, the entirety of the system, even those 
administering or otherwise creating the technology, should disclose prior relationships 
 
424 See e.g., Scott J. Shackelford & Steve Myers, Block-by-Block: Leveraging the 
Power of Blockchain Technology to Build Trust and Promote CyberPeace, 19 YALE 
J.L. & TECH, 376 (2018)(discussing monitoring occurring through transparency of the 
public nature of the blockchain.). 
425 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section II Principles: Transparency, at 10 
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is an important one, as it demonstrates respect of the rule of law and ensures the 
independence of the entire process, technology included.  
 
The second type of transparency addressed in the ABA Best Practices concerns the 
selection of neutrals, specifically: 
How individuals are selected to become part of the panel of 
neutrals eligible to handle disputes. 
 
How a particular neutral is selected to handle a particular 
dispute. 
 
The process by which neutrals are required to certify that they 
have no conflicts of interest and have disclosed all matters that 
reasonably might affect impartiality with respect to a particular 
dispute. 
 
Procedures for disqualification of a neutral for cause.426 
 
And, the ABA document includes a provision not yet included in any other guidance:  
 
Identify and/or link to the ethical rules by which the neutrals are 
bound.427 
 
This provision relates to the fact that certain local rules may direct the decision maker’s 
disclosures; transparency about which rules they are following allows parties who feel 
their right may have been violated to know the appropriate reporting authority. Other 
parts of the best practices literature address outcome transparency. For example, the 
Technical Notes say: 
The ODR administrator may wish to publish anonymized data or 
statistics on outcomes in ODR processes, in order to enable parties to 
assess its overall record, consistent with applicable principles of 
confidentiality. 428 
 
All relevant information should be available on the ODR administrator’s 
website in a user-friendly and accessible manner.429 
 
 
426 ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices, supra note at VI B. 
427 ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices, supra note 385, at VI C. 
428 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section II Principles: Transparency, at 11. The 
ABA recommends a similar level of disclosure. See ABA Task Force, ODR Best 
Practices, supra note 385, at II A-C. 
429 Technical Notes, supra note 374, Section II Principles: Transparency, at 12 
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Those invested in the use of technology in the justice eco-system are aware of the 
necessity of ensuring outcome transparency, which allows for outcomes to be audited 
for issues such as dependency and partiality. This ensures that those viewing the 
process can be satisfied that the process is fundamentally fair.  
 
The ABA has also recommended transparency in terms of outcomes 
If the ODR Provider handles a substantial number of B2C disputes, 
regular periodic statistical reports should be published online that permit 
a meaningful evaluation of the proceedings and that respect the 
confidentiality of the participants and the individual proceedings.430 
 
However, where the Technical Notes provide broad language to cover a range of 
contexts, the ABA Best Practices zoom in to a more granular level, in particular 
distinguishing between business-to-consumer and other types of disputes that may be 
resolved within ODR.  
With respect to other disputes, particularly those resolved by 
arbitration, participants should be encouraged to allow the 
decisions to be published with any confidential or propriety 
information deleted.431 
 
Outcome transparency will be an integral part of any successful expansion of the use 
of ODR in justice environments. Transparency supports compliance with fundamental 
principles of justice, such as adherence to the RoL, and it allows individuals to gather 
information and make informed decisions about their choice of providers, with the 
ability to assess the providers’ adherence to RoL expectations. Moreover, as more 
portions of the system are captured behind technology-driven providers, transparency 
ensures outside entities can audit and monitor outcomes for adherence to the RoL as 
well as the absence of partiality, dependence, and bias from decision makers or the 
larger system itself.  
 
2. ODR Providers Identified Manner of Appointment 
 
With the technology already in implementation, the appointment process has become a 
matter of active concern to ODR developers. Several providers have developed and 
 
430 ABA Task Force, ODR Best Practices, supra note 385, at II D.  
431 Id. at II E. 
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deployed appointment processes that include the appointment of a human decision 
maker within the ODR platform. The following is a composite list of some of the 
appointment processes of the major institutions and providers. 
 
Table E: ODR Providers Selection of the Decision Maker  
 









decision in 100 
days. The online 
system chooses an 
arbitrator based on 
the indications of 
the parties 
  Any person of 
legal age who is in 
perfect mental 
condition and who 
is trustworthy can 
be an arbitrator. 
Under local 
arbitration law, the 
referee is not 
required to be 
lawyers or meet 
other technical 
requirements, but it 
is supposed to be a 











primarily for retail 
purposes. 
Consumers can 
file a complaint 
online. The vendor 
is invited to 
participate in the 
negotiation. An 







identifies the third 






The third party 
undertakes to 
comply with the 
Rules of 
RisolviOnline.com 
and the Rules of 
Conduct attached 
to them. 







assigned by the 
platform 
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render a legally 
binding, court-
enforceable 
decision. The suite 
of tools includes a 
smart settlement 
engine (FairOffer) 
with mediated chat 
(FairChat), AI 
mediation 








adopted by the 


















follows the pattern 
established by the 
Uniform 
Arbitration Act and 
the Federal 
Arbitration Act. 
The initiating party 
selects 3 or more 
mediators/arbitrato
rs, rank them and 
send the list to the 
opposing party 
along with an 
invitation to 










the Center’s web 





submissions in an 
electronic docket, 
by parties, 
neutral(s) and the 
Center, from 





  Parties may 
appoint their own 
arbitrators, 
mediators and 
experts, or may 
leave the choice to 
the Center. For this 
purpose, the Center 









represent a wide 
variety of 
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all actors in a 
WIPO proceeding 
by providing, in 
addition to the 
online docket, a 
case overview, 




all fields of 
intellectual 
property and in 
dispute resolution. 




over 1,000 persons 
from 70 countries. 
Author compilation of online website information (Up-to-date April 2019) 
 
The chart describes the common process for appointing a decision maker. It is 
important to note several important aspects of the appointment process. First, party 
autonomy is the default rule and is protected in all examples provided. Chapter 2 spends 
considerable time on the arbitration community’s commitment to party autonomy, 
which includes the parties’ ability to appoint a decision maker.432 Moreover, it is 
important to recall, in the context of arbitration, party autonomy is protected from 
contract creation because the parties select the institution and/or provider and as such 
are agreeing to that institution/provider’s process of selecting the decision maker. 
Second, if the parties have not selected a decision maker, the institution/platform rules 
set the standard. In general, there are two options (1) institutional selection, on behalf 
of the parties, and (2) agreement by the parties once the dispute is initiated, by selecting 
from a list of approved decision makers.433 Either way, two key takeaways apply: (1) 
the institution/platform controls the process, and (2) the institution/platform controls 
the individuals who are allowed to resolve disputes, through the use of qualification 
checks, the pool of decision makers, and the monitoring of behavior. The 
institution/platforms are designed to be active participants in the process, including the 
approval of the decision maker selection of the parties.  
 
 
432 See supra Chapter 2, Section B(2). 
433 See id. 
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3. Providers’ Rules of Independence and Impartiality 
 
Of course, the selection process is merely the first step in the appointment of the 
decision maker. Next the institutions/platforms enforce whatever rules they have 
established to ensure the independence/impartiality of the decision maker. The 
following is a composite list of these rules from major providers. 
 









The rules relating to the 
impartiality of the 
decision maker 
The rules 
relating to the 
independence 





A neutral is required 
for the dispute 




the neutral — the 
ODR administrator 
promptly notifies the 
parties of the name of 
the neutral and any 
other relevant or 
identifying 
information. 
The neutral is required to 
declare his or her 
impartiality and 
independence and 
disclose at any time any 
facts or circumstances 
that might give rise to 
likely doubts as to his or 
her impartiality or 
independence. 
 
The neutral is required to 
remain independent, 






from rules for 
ensuring 
impartiality. 
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The rules relating to the 
impartiality of the 
decision maker 
The rules 
relating to the 
independence 





The company will 
provide a list of ADR 
providers who can 
assist in resolving the 
complaint. (a) 
Initiating party 
selects a provider 
using the platform. 
(b) Initiating party 
may propose their 
own alternative 
provider if they do 
not wish to use any of 
the listed options. 
Both parties must 
agree on an ADR 
provider within 30 
days of the initial 
submission to the 






An arbitrator (a 
highly-educated and 
trained “private 
judge”) is randomly 
selected from a pool 
composed based on 
expertise and relevant 
knowledge. 
Arbitrators undergo a 
conflict check to ensure 
complete neutrality. The 
evidence submission 
process meets all 
industry encryption 
standards in order to 
provide a completely 




from rules for 
ensuring 
impartiality. 
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The rules relating to the 
impartiality of the 
decision maker 
The rules 
relating to the 
independence 




Initiate a case. 
Choose your 
preferred Neutrals. 
Invite the opposing 
party (as many as you 
want). You can also 
invite co-counsel to 
the case. You both 
agree to a Neutral. 
We have hundreds of 
Neutrals with lengthy 
experience…. 
Neutral Oath (that 
neutrals have to sign):  
 
1. Provide truthful and 
accurate information 
about my qualification, 
experience and 
credentials; 
2. Fairly, impartially and 
justly conduct my 
activities as a neutral 
based only upon the 
merits of each case; 
3. Disclose to the parties 
any information which 
may reasonably call into 
question my impartiality; 
4. Conduct my activities 
as a neutral in a prompt 
fashion; 
5. Comply with all 
applicable ethical rules, 
regulations and standards 
as from time to time 
adopted; 
6. Diligently apply all 
rules of procedure and 
law as agreed upon by 
the parties or adopted by 
any statute, regulation or 
rule of law; 
7. Keep all information 
obtained from the parties 
confidential and not 
disclose that information 
to any other individual 
without the express 
consent and authorization 
of all of the parties; 
Not 
distinguished 
from rules for 
ensuring 
impartiality. 
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The rules relating to the 
impartiality of the 
decision maker 
The rules 
relating to the 
independence 












Information about the 
credentials and 
experience of third 
parties shall be made 
available for the parties; 
 
Third parties shall be 
independent, without any 
type of personal or 
professional relationship 
with any of the parties; 
 
 
The third party, whenever 
this is feasible, shall not 
be linked to successful 
case settlement or to a 
recommendation or 
decision in favour of any 
particular party. When 
dealing with repeat 
players ODR service 
providers shall provide 
with a mechanism to 





from rules for 
ensuring 
impartiality. 




The chart reveals a few key takeaways for those designing policy and implementation 
rules for ODR platforms. First, while this author has argued that independence and 
impartiality are independent expectations under the RoL, in current practice the two 
terms have come to be measured as a single phrase and are in essence treated as the 
same standard. For example, return to the chart and look at the language used by Virtual 
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Courthouse to describe the responsibilities of the neutral: to “fairly, impartially and 
justly conduct my activities . . .”434 and to “disclose . . . any information which may 
reasonably call into question my impartiality.”435 It is important to not assume this 
standard eliminates all issues that could arise from dependence. Unfortunately, 
dependence itself is not explicitly addressed. 
 
Nonetheless, there are other systemic features that can address issues with dependence 
and partiality. The Arbitration Resolution Services requires a conflict check 
(presumably an automated process, although its standards are yet to be made 
transparent).436 It is worth noting that this system uses a random assignment, which 
certainly greatly lessens the chances of dependence and partiality — especially with 
the additional safeguard of the conflict check.437 Thus, while this author would argue 
for dependence to be more explicitly addressed, we should not overlook design 
features, such as random assignment, that are also relevant. 
 
A review of the chart reveals the ODR community’s commitment to RoL, as we can 
see the various providers explicitly addressing RoL issues in their process and rules, 
generally following well-established legal requirements from the international 
arbitration world. As discussed in Chapter 1, adherence to the RoL should be expected 
from any justice provider, including an alternative justice provider.438 As described in 
Chapter 2, arbitration has a long history of ensuring independence and impartiality. 
And while the exact parameters of such protections differ slightly amongst the various 
institutions, the expectation of the independence and impartiality of the decision makers 
is unwavering.439  
 
 
434 See supra Table F, at Virtual Courthouse, VirtualCourthouse Rules of Arbitration 
and Mediation. 
435 See id. 
436 See supra Table F, at Arbitration Resolution Services, information available at 
https://www.arbresolutions.com/arbitration-services-arbitration-resolution-services/ 
(last visited Aug. 10, 2019).  
437 See supra Table F, at Arbitration Resolution Services. 
438 See supra Chapter 1, Sections C and D. See also, infra Chapter 5, Section A (1). 
439 See supra Chapter 2, Section A and Table C.  
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C. Smart Contracts Develop a New Standard 
 
While the inclusion of smart contracts and blockchain driven environments may seem 
premature, in fact, virtual judges are in use and they do rely upon and resolve issue in a 
smart contract/blockchain environments. For example, it has been publicized that China 
is using a virtual judge- meaning a decision maker that is not human, and is doing the 
decision making based within a blockchain environment.440 Moreover, and more directly 
on point, groups such as Blockchain in Transport Alliance,441  which includes entities 
such as FedEx, Delta, Daimler, UPS, are actively considering dispute resolution in their 
evolving transport focused blockchain environment.442 
 
And international institutions are joining the growing conversation and are beginning to 
ask the difficult questions surrounding when a human must be part of the decision 
process. Institutions such as the World Economic Forum, and its soon to be (recently 
released) report entitled: Dispute Resolution for Blockchain-Based Transactions443 are 
designed recognizing the importance of dispute resolution to build a trusted mechanism. 
In these instances, and others, arbitration in a virtual environment is being considered, 
in the exact manner as described shortly and in the final stages of the thesis.   
 
The inclusion of the smart contract environment is essential, even as the conversation in 
the area is in its early stages of development as these entities are the ones fully 
considering arbitration, online dispute resolution, dispute resolution as a mechanism of 
trust, and the fundamental question of when a human must be part of the decision making 
process.  
 
440 Bryan Lynn, Robot Justice: The Rise of China’s ‘Internet Courts’ VOA LEARNING 
ENGLISH, (Dec. 11, 2019) available at https://learningenglish.voanews.com/a/robot-
justice-the-rise-of-china-s-internet-courts-/5201677.html  
441 BLOCKCHAIN IN TRANSPORT ALLIANCE: DRIVING STANDARDS AND ENABLING 
TECHNOLOGY ADOPTION, website information available at https://www.bita.studio/  
442 Id. 
443 See id. 
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The term “smart contract” was conceived to describe agreements between two or more 
parties that can be automatically enforced, without an intermediary.444 At its most basic, 
a smart contract is a computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify, or enforce 
the negotiation or performance of a contract.  
Smart contracts are rendered as computer programs. Users can request 
the execution of contracts by sending suitable transactions to the nodes 
of a peer-to-peer network. These nodes collectively maintain the history 
of all transactions in a public, append-only data structure, called 
blockchain. The sequence of transactions on the blockchain determines 
the state of each contract, and, accordingly, the assets of each user.445 
Smart contracts, thus, are not merely contracts, per se, but computer protocols that 
verify a specific aspect of a party’s performance within a proscribed set of parameters.  
 
Smart contracts, at least the theory behind the technology, have been around for well 
over 20 years.446 Recently a resurgence occurred as distributed ledger technologies, 
such as Ethereum and Hyperledger, became part of a cryptocurrency boom.447 There 
are many issues with smart contracts and distributed ledgers that lie well beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but for our purpose it is important to understand that even well-
crafted protocols will not eliminate disputes.448 Indeed smart contracts are designed 
with dispute resolution mechanisms in mind. For example, consider the smart contract 
system being built by the Accord Project.449 The Accord Project is attempting to build 
 
444 Nick Szabo, Formalizing And Securing Relationships On Public Networks, First 
Monday 2(9)(University of Illinois at Chicago) (1997) (explaining the technology 
behind smart contracts). 
445 See id. at Introduction. 
446 See id. 
447 See Nicola Atzei, Massimo Bartoletti, Tiziana Cimoli, Stefano Lande, Roberto 
Zunino,  SoK: Unraveling Bitcoin Smart Contracts, 7th International Conference on 
Principles of Security and Trust (POST), European Joint Conferences on Theory and 
Practice of Software (2018)(discussing smart contracts, ethereum, and consensus). 
448 See e.g., Amy J. Schmitz and Colin Rule, Online Dispute Resolution for Smart 
Contracts, 2019 Journal of Dispute Resolution 103 (2019)(discussing possible 
disputes that could arise and some solutions). 
449 “The Accord Project’s open source technology enables the creation of legally 
binding agreements that can “come alive” through connections to external sources of 
data and software systems that enable digitized and automated contract management, 
performance, and related operations — the full automation of business transactions.” 
More information can be found at the Accord Project Blog (July 28, 2018). 
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a “smart legal contract”450 and the Accord Project’s Dispute Resolution Working 
Group, of which the author is currently one of the co-chairs, is examining the dispute 
resolution process.451 The work of the Accord Project will serve as a model for 
explanation and discussion.  
 
At the current time (April 2019) the Accord ODR Working Group is beta testing based 
upon the following potential contract language: 
Late Delivery and Penalty 
In case of delayed delivery of Goods, “Betty Buyer” shall pay to “Steve 
Seller” a penalty amounting to 10.5% of the total value of the Goods for 
every 2 days of delay. The total amount of penalty shall not, however, 
exceed 55% of the total value of the delayed goods. If the delay is more 
than 15 days, the Buyer is entitled to terminate this Contract.452 
For a smart contract to work within an automated environment, this contract language 
must be converted into protocols for the technology to execute. The above clause can 
be converted into protocol as follows: 
Late Delivery and Penalty.  
In case of delayed delivery of Goods, [{buyer}] shall pay to [{seller}] a 
penalty amounting to [{penaltyPercentage}]% of the total value of the 
Goods for every [{penaltyDuration}] of delay. The total amount of 
penalty shall not, however, exceed [{capPercentage}]% of the total 
value of the delayed goods. If the delay is more than 
[{maximumDelay}], the Buyer is entitled to terminate this Contract.453 
 
In a conventional legal environment, this contract would be created by human parties. 
An individual would need to fill out forms, secure shipment space and begin the 
 
450 Accord Project, website, information page (about) available at 
https://www.accordproject.org/about/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2019). 
451 Accord Project Dispute Resolution Working Group website, available at 
https://www.accordproject.org/working-groups/dispute-resolution (last visited Aug. 
10, 2019). 
452 Accord Project, Training Slides and Beta Model Explanation (2018). It should be 
noted, the author is one of the leaders of the Working group. More information can be 
found at the Accord Project website at https://docs.accordproject.org/ (last visited 
Aug. 10, 2019). 
453 See id. Designed using Ergo - a domain-specific language that captures the 
execution logic of legal contracts. Id. 
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payment process though the banking system. Documents would need to be exchanged 
amongst various parties and institutions to allow shipment and payment to progress.454  
 
In a smart contract all of this process is automated, meaning little human intervention 
occurs — unless or until something outside of the protocol’s scope calls for it. In our 
example, the protocol language both sets penalties and, in the case of late delivery, 
enforces that clause. The non-breaching party will not need to take any action; the 
system will “charge” the breaching party the penalty amount through an “automated” 
payment.  
 
Some issues, however, will trigger human involvement. The following schematic 




     Accord Project, Working Group (Mar.8, 2019) 
 
As can be seen from the schematic, once a payment is late (late as defined in the 
contract) the harmed party receives a notice and then will be allowed to advance the 
 
454 See Ewan McKendrick, GOODE ON COMMERCIAL LAW, Chapter 35, 1055 (Penguin 
UK; UK ed. (March 1, 2017)(discussing documentary international sales). 
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issue and formally initiate the dispute resolution process, or to reject the process. The 
vast majority of developers design automations that follow this (overly simplified) 
outline, but their approaches to resolving disputes vary, as will be explored next. 
 
1. Smart Contracts and ODR 
 
To date, the majority of work in smart contract development has been focused on 
developing a real-world smart contract. A few potential market participants are seeing 
the value of exploring dispute resolution as a part of the smart contract process. Table 
G summarizes dispute resolution providers who are considering the use of ODR within 
the smart contract environment and who have used the traditional ODR 
conceptualizations of dispute resolution within their design model.  
 
Table G: Smart Contract Providers Considering ODR 
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Author compilation of online website information (Up-to-date August 2019) 
 
The chart reveals the growing universe of smart contract providers who are not only 
exploring the concept academically but designing real-world implementations, 
including a few who envision a dispute resolution process. For example, Smart Arb 
reports that they are preparing model clauses to be used in agreement within a smart 
contract environment.455 Moreover, several of the smart contract developers are using 
existing arbitration institutions and rules. Most envision an ODR process with a human 
arbitrator/decision maker. For example, SageWise, which includes well-known eBay 
ADR creator Colin Rule among its Advisors,456 envisions a full ODR process within 
 
455 See supra Chapter 3, Table G at Smart Arb.  
456 See supra Chapter 3, Table G at SageWise. 
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the smart contract/blockchain universe.457 Commitments to the use of existing 
institutions and rules will ensure smart contract providers are able to resolve disputes 
within an online, automated environment will remain committed to RoL and the 
standards already existing within international commercial arbitration. 
 
2. Smart Contract Developers Technology-Driven Solutions 
 
Some ODR providers envision a significantly different technology and dispute 
resolution process, especially as it relates to the decision maker within a cryptocurrency 
driven system. As such, these providers merit review in their own separate section. The 
following chart captures some current ODR developer provisions that relate directly to 
the role of the decision maker. 
 
457 The term “smart contract” is used to “describe agreements between two or more 
parties, that can be automatically enforced without a trusted intermediary.”  See Atzei, 
SoK: Unraveling Bitcoin Smart Contracts, supra note 414 at Introduction.  
 
Two of the more common ones are built in distributed ledger technologies, led by 
Ethereum and Hyperledger.   
In such incarnations, smart contracts are rendered as computer 
programs. Users can request the execution of contracts by sending 
suitable transactions to the nodes of a peer-to-peer network. These 
nodes collectively maintain the history of all transactions in a public, 
append-only data structure, called blockchain. . . .  
 
Bitcoin is a decentralised infrastructure to securely transfer currency 
(the bitcoins, B) between users. Transfers of bitcoins are represented as 
transactions, and the history of all transactions is stored in a public, 
append-only, distributed data structure called blockchain. Each user can 
create an arbitrary number of pseudonyms through which sending and 
receiving bitcoins. The balance of a user is not explicitly stored within 
the blockchain, but it is determined by the amount of unspent bitcoins 
directed to the pseudonyms under her control, through one or more 
transactions. The logic used for linking inputs to outputs is specified by 
programmable functions, called scripts. . . Bitcoin . . . transactions are 
grouped into blocks, and . . . each transaction must pay a fee to the 
“miner” who appends it to the blockchain.  
 
See Atzei, SoK: Unraveling Bitcoin Smart Contracts, supra note 414 at Introduction.  
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Table H: Smart Contract Developers Technology-Driven Attempts to Manage 
Independence and Impartiality of the Decision Maker  
 
BAF — Blockchain Arbitration Forum 
BAF offers a “Smart Contract Arbitration Library” which consists of a set of coded rules 
(based on United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) 
arbitration rules) that allow counterparties to pause, resume, modify and terminate a 
smart contract. Additionally, the Arbitration Library connects the software with human 
beings acting as arbitrators. The breach of a contract provides an example of how the 
automated mechanism works: “one party which considers the other party to be in a 
breach of the legal contract pauses the execution of the Smart Contract by triggering a 
(function) pause and send to arbitrator in the Arbitration Library. This function 
automatically notifies a so-called Appointing Authority defined in the Blockchain 
Arbitration Rules.” 
Brisq  
“In order to trade, the user must select at least one arbitrator. He can only select among 
arbitrators with whom he shares a language. By default the checkbox for auto-selection 
of matching arbitrators is enabled. That way the user will always have the maximum set 
of arbitrators matching his language. As there is no concept of arbitrator reputation, it 
makes no sense to deselect arbitrators, as this will only reduce his trading possibilities. 
Traders will only be able to take offers of users with whom they have at least one 
overlapping selected arbitrator. Naturally, an arbitrator cannot be selected for his own 
trades.” 
 Confideal  
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Arbitrators create their accounts on the platform and enter their personal data: languages, 
location, specialization, working experience, etc. An arbitrator for any particular deal is 
selected by both sides of the contract during its setup, before the actual signing. At the 
moment, it is only possible to select a single arbitrator per deal.  
 
In order to ensure a high level of professionalism and satisfaction with arbitration 
services, there is a rating system for arbitrators on the Confideal platform. It allows the 
best arbitrators to rise to the top of the ratings of available arbitrators and, consequently, 
receive more requests for dispute resolution from users. The position of each arbitrator 
in the ratings is determined by two types of factors: objective and subjective. 
 
Objective factors: speed of response, number of settled disputes, completeness of 
disclosed information about self. The weight of objective factors accounts for 70% of 
the arbitrator’s rating. 
 
Subjective factors: votes given to arbitrators by the CDL token owners. After the process 
of arbitration is over, the counterparties involved in the respective contract can evaluate 
the work of their arbitrator by liking or disliking. Subjective factors account for 30% of 
the arbitrator’s rating.  
  
Cryptonomica  
1. If the parties have agreed that a sole arbitrator is to be appointed, and if within 10 days 
after receipt by all other parties of a proposal for the appointment of a sole arbitrator the 
parties have not reached agreement thereon, a sole arbitrator shall, at the request of a 
party, be appointed by the appointing authority. 
  
2. The appointing authority shall appoint the sole arbitrator as promptly as possible. In 
making the appointment, the appointing authority shall use the following list-procedure, 
unless the parties agree that the list-procedure should not be used or unless the appointing 
authority determines in its discretion that the use of the list-procedure is not appropriate 
for the case: 
 
(a) The appointing authority shall communicate to each of the parties an identical list 
containing at least three names; 
 
(b) Within 7 days after the receipt of this list, each party may return the list to the 
appointing authority after having deleted the name or names to which it objects and 
numbered the remaining names on the list in the order of its preference; 
 
(c) After the expiration of the above period of time the appointing authority shall appoint 
the sole arbitrator from among the names approved on the lists returned to it and in 
accordance with the order of preference indicated by the parties; 
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(d) If for any reason the appointment cannot be made according to this procedure, the 
appointing authority may exercise its discretion in appointing the sole arbitrator. 
Juris  
When a dispute is escalated to a SNAP (Juris Suite Billing and Accounting) the Juris 
protocol will facilitate a polling and discussion process among all available Jurists. They 
will have a limited amount of time to review the details of the case and provide their 
judgment on an equitable solution via anonymous vote. 
 
If the parties are unable to resolve their conflict to the satisfaction of all, one or more of 
the parties may choose to escalate further to a Juris Peremptory Agreement for Neutral 
Expert Litigation (or PANEL) judgment. When a case is escalated, the Juris system will 
facilitate the selection of a panel of three High Jurists: those at the highest level of 
reputation, classified by domain experience and any other factors outlined initially in 
contract creation. This panel will be selected by U.N. mandated rules, and convene 
virtually through the Juris Platform. 
 
Jurists are classified by their rank in The Juris Reputation System, and by their areas of 
demonstrated expertise, all of which are attached to their JurisID. The reputation system 
is a blockchain-based means of storing and representing the following: proof of 
certification, merit, competence, and engagement. This pool will initially be seeded with 
existing, certified arbitrators and legal professionals. But anyone is welcome to sign up 
to start earning (or losing) reputation by voting on cases, taking part in discussion, and 
helping with opinions. Classified by expertise if specified, all Jurists are notified when 
there is a new case. If they take part in an initial SNAP vote they will be required to take 
part in the final vote, and are encouraged to take part in discussion. Reputation bleeds 
over time, and may be docked for bad behavior, and anyone is subject to rank demotion. 
All Jurist signups require proof of identity, and proof of certification if applicable. There 
are three reputation ranks: High Jurists are pre-certified and Juris Foundation vetted. 
They are arbitration professionals, and those who have earned advancement and 
maintained standing through the system. High Jurists are eligible for the more lucrative 
but time-consuming PANEL judgments. Good Standing Jurists have continued to 
contribute fruitfully to decisions and discussions on the Juris platform. They are able to 
vote in SNAP judgments, and the outcome of their anonymous votes will be included in 
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the case files and reports to involved parties. They are able to advance to High Jurist by 
gaining reputation. Good Standing level reputation may be initially obtained by 
providing proof of a law degree or equivalent certification. Novice Jurists are new 
signups not able to demonstrate any prior experience. They are allowed to take part in 
SNAP judgments and discussions, contribute to opinions, and earn reputation to advance 
to Good Standing.  
Jury Online 
Jury.Online Platform implements a smart contract protocol that includes specifications 
for deal execution and resolution, on the basis of the Ethereum blockchain, to connect 
counterparties and judges. (1) System chooses n random judges (2) Decision by absolute 
majority, (3) Identity of judges is unknown to the parties, but their competencies are 
presented. The Jury Online protocol defines the interactions between counterparties, 
judges and pools of judges, as well as the requirements for information encryption and 
side-channel communication.  
Kleros  
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Users have an economic interest in serving as jurors in Kleros: collecting the arbitration 
fee that every juror gets for his work. Candidates will self-select to serve as jurors using 
a token called pinakion (PNK)3. 
 
The probability of being drawn as a juror for a specific dispute is proportional to the 
amount of tokens a juror deposits. The higher the amount of tokens deposited, the higher 
the probability the user will be drawn as juror. Jurors who do not deposit pinakions do 
not have the chance of being drawn. This prevents inactive jurors from being selected. 
 
After candidates have self-selected specific courts and deposited their tokens, the initial 
selection of jurors is done randomly. Theoretically, a candidate may be drawn more than 
once for a specific dispute (but in practice it is unlikely). The amount of times a user is 
drawn for a dispute (called its weight) determines the number of votes he will get in the 
dispute and the amount of tokens he will win or lose during the token redistribution.  
 
 Author compilation of online website information (Up-to-date August 2019) 
 
It is important to notice within the chart several very different approaches to resolving 
disputes, from traditional to more novel. For example, Brisq requires the selection of 
an arbitrator in the original contract; the arbitrator must be on the approved list, but 
beyond that there are few restrictions on the selection.458 The Brisq system is similar to 
many or most of the systems so far reviewed in this thesis. Interestingly, Cryptonomica 
also uses a very traditional appointment process, in which the parties select an 
arbitrator.459 In the absence of agreement, the institution produces a list of acceptable 
decision makers and the parties rank options from the provided list.460 The institution 
then appoints based on the parties’ ranking. Both of these providers are using a smart 
contract environment, yet have adopted decision makers and an appointment process 
that imitate the existing international arbitration environment discussed in Chapter 2.461  
 
The remaining developers have developed dispute resolution systems that sit outside 
any particular smart contract/blockchain environment. These providers, it could be 
argued, are creating smart contract dispute resolution institutions, which function much 
like the International Chamber of Commerce of the LCIA discussed in Chapter 2 
 
458 See supra Chapter 3, Table H at Brisq. 
459 See supra Chapter 3, Table H at Cryptonomica. 
460 See id. 
461 See supra Chapter 2, Section A and Table B. 
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functions for traditional arbitration.462 Setting up dispute resolution providers that are 
not attached to a particular smart contract/blockchain environment frees the designers 
to think beyond the constraints of currently available arbitration environments. These 
can be broken down into two main groups: (1) institutions seeking to create their own 
pool of arbitrators and processes, and (2) those seeking to create an environment that 
resembles an online jury. For example, several providers are attempting to use 
technology (blockchain and smart contracts) as a means to create entirely new 
mechanisms for appointing decision makers. In Confideal, individuals who wish to 
serve as arbitrators create accounts presenting their professional resume with a focus 
on their experience as a decision maker.463 Within the system arbitrators are ranked in 
two ways, objective and subjective.464 Objective factors allow the platform developers 
to rank decision makers based on traditional metrics such as time taken prior to 
resolution, while the subjective ranking is derived from feedback from users of the 
environment.465 The use of both objective and subjective evaluation factors is common 
in reputation systems in other environments, and here it improves the reliability of the 
rankings and hopefully prevents gaming of the system.  
 
In contrast, Juris uses an online polling environment in which multiple individuals 
participate, mimicking the function of a jury more than a traditional arbitrator.466 
Individuals participate in discussions and are then polled to vote on a recommended 
resolution.467 If the parties are unable to resolve their dispute after receiving the 
recommendation, the process is escalated to a panel of decision makers.468 Within this 
environment individuals are ranked, using similar measures to those within the Juris 
environment, and the individuals with the highest reputation rankings are allowed to 
decide escalated cases.469  
 
 
462 See id. 
463 See supra Chapter 3, Table H, at Confideal 
464 See id. 
465 See id. 
466 See supra Chapter 3, Table H, at Juris. 
467 See id. 
468 See id. 
469 See id. 
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Finally, Kleros provides a crowdsourced online dispute resolution environment that 
focuses on incentivizing individual jurors.470 Individuals bid to become a juror using a 
platform-based coin/token, with those bidding the highest number of tokens having a 
higher chance of being selected.471 Individual jurors are then further incentivized to 
resolve disputes via consensus-based incentives, meaning that individuals vote and 
those who vote in the same manner as the majority receive rewards, while those who 
vote against the majority are penalized.472 
 
D. Online Dispute Resolution Summary Conclusion 
 
While Online Dispute Resolution lacks a clear definition, some patterns can be 
discerned that allow this review existing online dispute environments to be broadly 
divided into two categories: public systems annexed to the brick-and-mortar court 
systems, and private systems that in general adopt arbitration as a final stage in the 
resolution process. While this differentiation might seem unimportant, it is in fact 
fundamental to the conversation, as public ODR environments can be assumed to be 
governed by existing laws relating to any justice environment, while private systems 
are only regulated in the limited circumstances that any arbitration agreement and 
award are regulated. As such, the newest ODR private environments may present 
interesting dilemmas in terms of their commitment to the RoL.  
 
The chapter provided an overview of the better known online environments, the rules 
applicable to each and the institutional rules put in place to cover the independence and 
impartiality of the decision makers. Of course, some of the newest systems have moved 
beyond traditional models which position appointed human decision makers as the final 
authority, instead embracing the newest thinking and getting to a decision using online 
jury pools, incentives and the total automation of the entire contract performance and 
 
470 See supra Chapter 3, Table H, at Juris. The author has also provided consultation 
for the Kleros developers.  
471 See supra Chapter 3, Table H, at Juris. 
472 See id. See also Kleros website, FAQs, available at 
https://medium.com/kleros/kleros-frequently-asked-questions-about-peer-to-peer-
justice-5a921cb76abe (last visited Aug. 10, 2019). 
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dispute process. Time will tell if these providers are embracing RoL and a commitment 
to ensuring an impartial and independent decision maker, be it human or not. 
 
Because at the time of writing ODR was mimicking ADR environments, this chapter 
was written without demanding much understanding of technology, other than an 
understanding of the existing ODR providers that many are undoubtedly familiar with, 
such as eBay and Amazon. The newest issues that are arising in this area, by contrast, 
do demand that policy makers, and others, have a basic grasp of the technology and the 
design process that give rise to them. Chapter 4 seeks to provide just such a background, 
while Chapter 5 seeks to create best practices and suggests a potential model for 
deployment.  
 
Chapter 4: The Next Step — A Non-Human Actor as an 
Assistant to the Decision Maker in the Online Justice System 
 
Artificial Intelligence and the Law has existed as a research field since the early 
1980s.473 Programs such as IBM’s Watson serve as examples of the evolving use of AI 
for “question answering, information extraction, and argument mining from text. . .”474 
Despite incredible advances, the newest technology and algorithms still cannot yet 
perform legal reasoning.475 Now is the time to get ahead of the curve and consider the 
design principles that should underlie the AI-based judicial decision making model of 
the future. 
 
This chapter will explore the next steps in the evolution of online justice environments 
by considering what arbitration might look like with a non-human actor as an assistant 
or as a full contributor to the decision making process. The chapter will briefly explore 
relevant history of artificial intelligence and the law, and review traditional technology-
driven approaches to design, by explaining software models, machine learning, various 
types of model risk and approaches to the reduction of model risk. It will then describe 
examples of emergent systems, to assist in a fuller understanding of what technology 
 
473 See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 3. 
474 Id. 
475 See id. 
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can actually accomplish, and will conclude by providing a substantive analysis of two 
key aspects of model design: transparency and socio-technical aspects of use. The 
information in this chapter forms the foundation for the development of the best 
practices and a potential model presented in Chapter 5.  
  
A. The Basics of AI and the Law 
 
As automated data analysis replaces human supervision and intuition in decision 
making, there is a growing need to incorporate many of the concepts discussed in this 
thesis into algorithmic decision making frameworks. In particular, the concepts of 
dependency, partiality, bias, transparency and accountability will have to be built into 
new technologies. This discussion will begin by offering a basic orientation to how 
these concepts fit into algorithmic models.  
 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) is generally defined as the “capacity of a computer to 
perform operations analogous to learning and decision making in humans.”476 As such, 
AI is a computer-based learning and decision making operation. In 1956 at the 
Dartmouth Artificial Intelligence Conference, the technology was described as: "Every 
aspect of learning or any other feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely 
described that a machine can be made to simulate it."477 This sentence captures a variety 
of nuances that underlie the original AI “mission of endowing computers with human 
intelligence.”478 For example, as noted data scientist Fatemeh Zahedi writes: “AI 
focuses on how a person logically justifies actions and decisions, and attempts to give 
the machine a similar logical and reasoning capability.”479 Crucially, for our discussion, 
Zahedi explains: 
 
476 The definition of AI is a contentious one. See William Vorhies, What Exactly Is 
Artificial Intelligence And Why Is It Driving Me Crazy, DATA SCIENCE CENTRAL,  
(Jan. 23, 2018) (discussing the varied definitions).  
477 Martin Childs, John McCarthy: Computer Scientist Known As The Father Of AI, 
INDEPENDENT, (Nov. 2011). 
478 Fatemeh Zahedi, An Introduction to Neural Networks and a Comparison with 
Artificial Intelligence and Expert Systems, Interfaces, Vol. 21, No. 2, 25-38, (Mar. - 
Apr., 1991). 
479 Zahedi, Introduction to Neural Networks, supra note 445 at 34. In contrast to 
neural network researchers who “opted for simulating human intelligence by studying 
how the brain functions.” Id. at 34 
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AI has a macro scope, treating the brain as a black box. Its structure is 
closer to models of human decision making. In decision science and 
cognitive science, researchers focus on actions, underlying motives, and 
the formal process that links the actions to motives. The axiom of these 
sciences is logic, its consistency, and its completeness.480 
AI can be further subdivided based on the tasks that the mechanism is deployed to 
resolve. In general, current uses of AI can be subdivided into two broad areas, 
“Artificial Narrow Intelligence (Weak AI) which is AI that specializes in one area,”481 
and “Artificial General Intelligence (Strong AI or Human-Level AI) [referring to] a 
computer that is as smart as a human across the board, a machine that can perform any 
intellectual task that a human being can.”482 We have yet to successfully develop 
anything even close to true AGI, but in 2014 a survey of scientists asked when they 
believed we would “more likely than not to have reached AGI?”483 Their estimate: 
2040.484 
 
In the meantime automation, defined in our discussion in Chapter 1 as the “technique, 
method, or system of operating or controlling a process by highly automatic means, as 
by electronic devices, reducing human intervention to a minimum” is already widely 
used in many decision making processes. Paul Beswick, Global Head, Digital Labs at 
Oliver Wyman, explains: 
Many companies will look for the potential to automate their own 
internal processes and decisions, but you can also directly automate 
customer interactions, and the prize in terms of lower costs and an 
enhanced experience is often even greater. Rather than connecting with 
a broker, for example, who then shops for an insurance policy, a 
customer can input data and get a direct and immediate quote from a 
specific carrier. . . Instead of talking to a bank manager, potential 
borrowers can connect their business accounts to the bank, proving their 
financial position, and get immediate approval for loans up to, say, 
$50K, with only exceptions directed to a bank officer.485  
 
480 Zahedi, An Introduction to Neural Networks, supra note 445 at 35 
481 Tim Urban, The AI Revolution: How Far Away Are Our Robot Overlords?, 
GIZMODO (Feb. 9, 2015) available at  https://gizmodo.com/the-ai-revolution-how-far-
away-are-our-robot-overlords-1684199433 (last visited Aug. 4, 2019). 
482 Id. 
483 Id. 
484 Id.  
485 Oliver Wyman Digital Labs, Automated Decision Making: Manage By Exception 
And Reserve Brainpower For The Tough Call, Oliver Wyman Blog, (Aug, 2016).  
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Individuals will likely already have experienced basic automated decision making: 
when shopping for an insurance policy one can now enter data and get an immediate 
quote, in contrast to the prior system that required a phone call with an insurance broker; 
a bank can automate loan accreditation by using the automated system to verify income 
and financial position, the primary factors in determining the loan amount.  
 
Until recently, it was accurate to describe the “processing method in AI [as] inherently 
serial,”486 often best understood as “knowledge coded in in the form of IF–THEN 
rules.”487 This requires the knowledge to be “stored in an explicit manner in the form 
of production rules, frames, objects, or semantic nets.”488 All knowledge creation 
occurs outside the AI system,489 while the system deploys a deductive reasoning 
protocol to the knowledge it is fed to arrive at a conclusion.490 It is only recently that 
“modern” AI has really been able to move beyond this kind of logic-based deductive 
reasoning.491 The more sophisticated AI of today has the capacity known as “machine 
learning.” The core principle of machine learning is that machines take data inputs and 
develop adapted protocols, i.e. “learn,” for themselves. This, for example, “makes it 
possible to ask human language questions of broad data sets like MRI images and have 
[the AI] determine if that is cancer or not cancer.”492 
 
There are several different ways to “teach” AI, which we will examine in order to better 
understand its capacities and limitations. According to data scientist William Vorhies 
machine learning “is using a variety of supervised and unsupervised techniques to find, 
exploit, and optimize actions based on patterns we are able to find in the data.”493 
According to Greg Corrado from Google: 
Machine learning systems are made up of three major parts: (1) Model: 
the system that makes predictions or identifications; (2) Parameters: the 
signals or factors used by the model to form its decisions; and (3) 
 
486 Zahedi, An Introduction to Neural Networks, supra note 445 at 35. 
487 Id. 
488 Id. 
489 See id. 
490 See id. 
491 See Zahedi, An Introduction to Neural Networks, supra note 445 at 36. 
492 Vorhies, What Exactly is Artificial Intelligence, supra note 443. 
493 Id. 
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Learner: the system that adjusts the parameters — and in turn the model 
— by looking at differences in predictions versus actual outcome.494 
 




Computer models seek to break down a complex set of human tasks into discrete steps. 
According to noted authority Kevin Ashley: 
The models specify how a problem is input and the type of [legal] result 
to output. In between, the model builders have constructed a 
computational mechanism to apply domain knowledge to perform the 
steps and transform the inputs to outputs.495 
It is important to note the italicized wording: “model builders,” that is the humans who 
develop the model from steps to interpretations to parameters.  
 
In general, a model builder does not just copy a schematic, but rather is guided by rules 
of action.496 They begin from a set of principles, asking questions and developing 
requirements specific to the process at hand.497 The various issues explored in this 
thesis constitute principles that would necessarily generate rules of action for model 
design: the use of a neutral decision maker, the use of legal formalism or legal realism, 
the importance placed on independence and impartiality.498 Moreover, a model builder 
would need to determine the parameters that define clear cases of each, as well as the 
nature of outliers.499  
 
From these guiding principles the model builder derives parameters, assumptions, 
constraints and boundaries as an initial set of design considerations.500 Parameters are 
 
494 Danny Sullivan, How Machine Learning Works, As Explained By Google, supra 
note 1. 
495 See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 4 (emphasis added).  
496 See id. 
497 See id. 
498 See Chapter 1, supra at sections  
499 See id. Each of these discussions will be used in Chapter 5 to create a set of principles 
that will guide the model builders when constructing the decision maker in online 
justice environment. See infra Chapter 5, Section A. 
500 See Ashley, supra note 135 at 4-8. 
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an attempt to break down the principles into a systematic set of rules.501 Often, to create 
these rules, the model builder must make some assumptions. An assumption, to a model 
builder, is basically a truth, that was taken as the truth — for the purposes of this model, 
absent any further evidence.502 For example, Jon Kleinberg, during his keynote at the 
ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency entitled Fairness, 
Rankings, and Behavioral Bias, raised the question of the evaluation of the Rooney 
Rule.503 The Rooney Rule is a well-known National Football League policy that 
“requires league teams to interview ethnic-minority candidates for head coaching and 
senior football operation jobs.” When discussing the real world application of the rule, 
Kleinberg noted the that in many instances of examining the impact on affirmative 
action in the NFL, the mathematical model builder “assumed” a single group of 
applicants.504 The assumption, while not really universally true (any single group could 
easily be divided into sub-groups), was taken as the truth for the purposes of the 
evaluation.505 Of course, if evidence arises that alternatives to the assumption not only 
exist but are likely impactful, the model is adjusted. Moreover, some assumptions are 
industry-specific, based on collective understandings,506 these types of assumptions 
may become endemic to all models in a given sector.507 
 
In explaining the basics of model building, we can look to existing models for 
development and lessons. For example, the finance industry has used a model-based 
approach to institutional risk, and their models have already been subjected to 
regulation.508 For regulatory purposes, a model in the financial sector is defined as “a 
quantitative method, system, or approach that applies statistical, economic, financial, 
or mathematical theories, techniques, and assumptions to process input data into 
 
501 See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 4. 
502 See id. 
503 See Jon Kleinberg, Fairness, Rankings, and Behavioral Bias, Key Note Speaker, 
ACM FAT*2019, available at https://fatconference.org/2019/livestream_capitol.html 
(last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
504 See id.  
505 See id. 
506 See id. 
507 See id. 
508 See Seph Mard, What’s Model Risk and Why Does It Matter, DataRobot (Jan. 
2018)(explaining model risk). 
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quantitative estimates.”509 Data Robot author Seph Mard uses the following schematic 
to represent this model building: 
 
Schematic 1: Financial Institution Model 
 
 
      Taken from Mard, What’s Model Risk510 
 
The model builder has used a set of principles (not captured in the schematic) to make 
decisions about the appropriate model to be deployed.511 To accomplish this particular 
task — that is to measure financial institutional stability — the model builder will use 
a set of financial assumptions and pre-determined financial scenarios.512  
 
The schematic progresses to show the “transformative” processes that occur — in this 
financial model that is the application of a set of statistical, financial, mathematical 
and/or economic formulas.513 These parameters (in this case, calculations) “transform” 
the inputs represented in schematic box one into the outputs represented in schematic 
box three.514 And of course, as a final note — the outcomes are then monitored so that 
adjustments can be made to the model — this “learning” process will be discussed in 
detail below.  
 
In terms of legal decision making models, the field is so new that the community of 
developers have yet to arrive at standardized assumptions. In April of 2018 the 
 
509 Id. 
510 See Mard, What’s Model Risk, supra note 468. 
511 See id. 
512 See id. 
513 See id. 
514 See id. 
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European Research Council awarded Vrije Universiteit Brussel Research-Professor 
Mireille Hildebrandt a foundational research grant to come up with a new legal 
hermeneutics to create “a framework for lawyers to approach computational law 
architectures intelligently; to understand limitations and implications, and be able to 
ask the right questions to assess technologies that are increasingly being put to work 
assessing us.”515 Although the area is not necessarily new, detailed research in this area 
is just beginning — and more research, commentary and development will undoubtedly 
be coming in the near future. However, it is too early to truly anticipate any advanced 
legal decision making models. 
 
2. Learning  
 
Ronald van Loon of Data Science Central describes three types of learning: supervised, 
unsupervised and reinforcement.516 In terms of supervised learning, which might be 
more familiar to a wider audience as the  Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin phrase concept 
learning,  which is “the search for and listing of attributes that can be used to distinguish 
exemplars from non-exemplars of various categories.”517 In many ways, supervised 
machine learning seeks to do the exact same thing, with a computer process. In 
supervised learning, the desired output is already known.518 As such, “all that a system 
needs to do is to work out the steps or process needed to reach from the input to the 
output.”519 In this type of learning, “All of the input, the output, the algorithm, and the 
scenario are being provided by humans.”520 
 
 
515 Natasha Lomas, What Do AI And Blockchain Mean For The Rule Of Law?, 
TECHCRUNCH (April 2018). In fact, we are still in the very early stages, thus it is 
difficult to “address such questions as how to represent what a legal rule means. . . 
how to distinguish ‘hard’ from ‘easy’ legal issues, and the roles that cases and values 
play in interpreting legal rules.” Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 
4.  
516 Ronald van Loon, Machine Learning Explained: Understanding Supervised, 
Unsupervised, and Reinforcement Learning, DATA SCIENCE CENTRAL (Jan. 16, 2018). 
517 J.S. Bruner, J.J. Goodnow, & G.A. Austin, A STUDY OF THINKING, Science 
Editions (1967). 
518 See id. 
519 Ronald van Loon, Machine Learning Explained, supra note 476.  
520 Id.  
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As I described in my paper, Building a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the Market, and 
the Need to Prevent the Engraining of Bias:521 the SAS Institute notes supervised 
learning:  
Supervised learning algorithms are trained using labeled examples, 
such as an input where the desired output is known. For example, a 
piece of equipment could have data points labeled either “F” (failed) 
or “R” (runs). The learning algorithm receives a set of inputs along 
with the corresponding correct outputs, and the algorithm learns by 
comparing its actual output with correct outputs to find errors. It then 
modifies the model accordingly. Through methods like classification, 
regression, prediction and gradient boosting, supervised learning uses 
patterns to predict the values of the label on additional unlabeled 
data.522 
As summarized by Michele Sebag, supervised learning occurs by “training a classifier 
from examples labelled by the expert in order to automatically label further 
examples.”523 Supervised learning accounts for approximately seventy percent of 
machine learning applications.524 It is commonly used in applications where historical 
data predicts likely future events.525 For example, it can anticipate when credit card 
transactions are likely to be fraudulent or which insurance customer is likely to file a 
claim.526  
In contrast: 
Unsupervised learning is used against data that has no historical labels. 
The system is not told the "right answer." The algorithm must figure 
out what is being shown. The goal is to explore the data and find some 
structure within.527  
 
521 See Anjanette H. Raymond, Emma Arrington Stone Young, and Scott J. 
Shackelford, Building a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to 
Prevent the Engraining of Bias, 15 NORTHWESTERN. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 215, 
221-2, (2018). 
522 Machine Learning, What it is and Why it Matters, SAS INSTITUTE, available at 
http://www.sas.com/en_us/insights/analytics/machine-learning.html  (last visited Aug. 
10, 2019).  
523 Michele Sebag, A Tour Of Machine Learning: An AI Perspective, AI 
Communications 27, 11–23 (2014). 
524 See id. 
525 See id. 
526 See id. 
527 Machine Learning, What it is and Why it Matters, supra note 481. 
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During the process of unsupervised learning, the system does not have concrete data 
sets; in fact, the outcomes to most of the problems are largely unknown. As science 
fiction as it may sound: 
unsupervised learning has the ability to interpret and find solutions to a 
limitless amount of data, through the input data and the binary logic 
mechanism present in all computer systems. The system has no 
reference data at all.528 
Unsupervised learning, (exploratory data analysis), is less advanced as a field than 
supervised learning.529  
 
Following a very different path, reinforcement learning is built upon the concept that 
the optimal behavior or action is reinforced by a positive reward.530  
Depending on the complexity of the problem, reinforcement learning 
algorithms can keep adapting to the environment over time if necessary 
in order to maximize the reward in the long-term.531 
In reinforced learning training models, rewards and consequences are established first, 
and as the algorithm attempts to accomplish a prescribed task, it executes different 
paths. The algorithm learns when it receives a reward or punishment.532 The system 
then tries again to achieve the outcome and again learns from success or failure.533 
Unfortunately, reinforced learning is time consuming and requires a lot of data, hence, 
it is most often used in areas such as gameplay and robotics.534  
 
The type of learning that will be deployed is a key consideration when evaluating 
potential technologies, as this is one of the mechanisms that will drive system evolution 
and thus introduce new issues that may not have been foreseen in the original design.535 
For example, supervised learning indicates that the designers have an intended outcome 
in mind at the time of creation; the data set is deployed so as to build the process 
 
528 Ronald van Loon, Machine Learning Explained, supra note 476. 
529 See Sebag, A Tour Of Machine Learning, supra note 482 at 17. 
530 Bernard Marr, Artificial Intelligence: What Is Reinforcement Learning - A Simple 
Explanation & Practical Examples, FORBES, (Sept, 2018). 
531 Id. 
532 See id. 
533 See id. 
534 See id. 
535 See id. 
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necessary to produce the desired outcome. Both the outcome and the data set can be 
infused with unintended and implied bias, by designers or others. And, while some bias 
can be reduced (as we will see below), other forms of bias are difficult to design around. 
This is especially true of unintentional bias.  
 
Unsupervised learning, where the outcome is unknown at the time of design, offers 
incredibly powerful potential, but comes with its own issues. In these cases the 
designers have a data set. They deploy a process upon the data set to discover patterns 
and clusters. These discoveries are then used to create rules as the system learns. While 
this may seem an ideal way to arrive at unbiased conclusions, this type of deployment 
is incredibly dependent on “good” data. Unsurprisingly, data from the justice system 
contains all of the biases, discrimination and elisions that have historically 
characterized law and justice.536 Keep in mind, there is nothing necessarily wrong with 
unsupervised learning as such. In fact, often the environment can highlight and make 
concrete the very clusters and patterns of bias that social scientists have long known to 
exist in the justice system, but that practitioners rarely actively identify. However, it is 
imperative that designers be aware of the potential for unsupervised learning to amplify 
and re-embed forms of bias that most would agree we should be seeking to reduce or 
eliminate. Understanding the type and nature of machine learning at play is 
fundamental to any discussion of technology in a justice environment.  
 
3. Model Risk 
 
Also important for consideration is an emerging area of model development: model 
risk. Model risk is “the potential for adverse consequences from decisions based on 
incorrect or misused model outputs and reports.”537 Model risk is a robust area of 
consideration for model developers, especially in the areas of bias and discrimination, 
which in the model development lexicon are often thought of in terms of a measure of 
 
536 See e.g., Samuel R. Sommers, Satia A. Marotta, Racial Disparities in Legal 
Outcomes: On Policing, Charging Decisions, and Criminal Trial Proceedings,  
POLICY INSIGHTS FROM THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES, Vol. 1(1), 103-111 
(2014)(including an in-depth review of the historical aspects and the corresponding 
research).  
537 See Mard, What’s Model Risk, supra note 468. 
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fairness. Hence, it is important to understand some basics in relation to model risk as it 
arises in areas of key consideration for model selection and monitoring. The next 
section will turn to the concepts of input risk, model risk, outcomes and complexity. 
The section following will further break down and address some specific issues related 
to model abstraction: the Framing Trap, the Portability Trap, the Formalism Trap, the 
Ripple Effect Trap and the Solutionism Trap. It will conclude with suggestions for 
reducing some types of model risk.  
 
a. Model Risk: Biased Inputs 
 
First, model risk can arise from both incorrect (or incomplete) inputs and outputs.538 It 
should not be surprising that models built upon data that is incomplete, incorrect, or has 
been organized without attention to appropriate, well-defined standards, can (and likely 
will) produce outcomes that are less than accurate.539 Beyond the narrow question of 
accuracy in the initial data set lie issues of omission, false and misleading 
representation, and implicit bias.540 These are issues that arise not from model selection 
nor the model builder’s own bias, but instead from the use of historical data as the 
training data.541 It is also important to understand that, due to the nature of machine 
learning, outputs become inputs, and so errors and biases in the initial training data do 
not necessarily remain limited and easily isolated.542 If the data used for training is 
biased by the discrimination already taking place in the world it represents, this bias 
gets reproduced in the outputs and the evolving protocols of the algorithm.543  
 
Policing technology deployments can be used as a first point of consideration as the 
early deployments of technology have revealed troubling trends in technology design 
when the algorithm relies upon data gathered and used within a prediction model.  In 
the United States, police departments have historically focused disproportionately on 
 
538 See Mard, What’s Model Risk, supra note 468. 
539 See infra Chapter 4, Section and Chapter 5, Section C(3). See also Carolyn Healey, 
Garbage In, Garbage Out – How Bad Data Hurts Your Business, Service Objects 
Website, (Oct. 9, 2018). 
540 See Mard, What’s Model Risk, supra note 468. 
541 See id. 
542 See id. 
543 See id. 
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communities of color, their data over-represents crime by minorities and under-
represents crime by whites. Whether designers intend it or are simply unaware of 
implicit bias in their data set, the result is the same: The decision making algorithm 
inherits and perpetuates the inequalities of the society in which it was created.544 This 
relates back to the nature of supervised machine learning, which:  
works by recognizing patterns of relations in big data sets. But to do 
this, the algorithm has to be trained by feeding it massive amounts of 
historical training data. Using this data, the algorithm constructs a 
model of the world that is then used to infer similar patterns in new sets 
of data.545 
Because algorithms are always trained on historical data, it is virtually impossible to 
find a “clean” dataset on which an algorithm can be trained to be “bias-free.”546 The 
historical biases in the justice system have been studied extensively, and found to be 
systemic, pervasive and long-lasting. 
 
Because these algorithms are in many ways, the first attempts to create prediction 
models in justice environments, many scholars look to these as key places to begin 
discussion.  Many argue the absence of bias free prediction models in environments 
where these models have been used for some time, should give everyone pause of wider 
deployments in the justice environment. These are frequently cited as individual's argue 
against the use of technology and prediction as a decision maker.547   
 
Some commentators argue that measures may be taken to reduce the issue of data bias:  
 
544 See Henrik Chulu, Let Us End Algorithmic Discrimination, MEDIUM, Tech 
Festival, (Aug. 3, 2018)(discussing the issues and potential approaches to reducing 
the discriminatory aspects of algorithms). 
545 See id. 
546 Lokke Moerel, Algorithms Can Reduce Discrimination, But Only With Proper 
Data, Privacy Perspectives, International Association of Privacy Professionals 
(2019). 
547 See, e.g., Neil Sahota, Will A.I. Put Lawyers Out Of Business? Forbes (Feb. 9, 
2019) (reviewing areas of appropriate technology and AI uses while rejecting the use 
of AI as a decision maker): John Morison, and Adam Harkens, Re-Engineering 
Justice? Robot Judges, Computerised Courts and (Semi) Automated Legal Decision-
Making, Legal Studies Volume 39, Issue 4, pp. 618-635 (Dec. 2019) (discussing the 
role of data, processing and building automated decision making) 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  145 
To solve this, group indicators such as race, gender, and religion are 
often removed from the training data. The idea is that if the algorithm 
cannot “see” these elements, the outcome will not be discriminatory.548 
This argument however, is based on a misunderstanding of how algorithms work. “The 
algorithm will soon find derived indicators — proxies — to explain this bias.”549 For 
example, eliminating race as a measured attribute fails to be a solution, as the system 
can combine several other measured data, such as location, community demographics, 
and participation in community groups as proxies for race.550 Thus, simple elimination 
of attributes is not recommended as the complexity of the world in which we live is 
reflected in a multitude of attributes. Instead, the only solution is to first make biases 
transparent in the training data.551 Creating such a robust set of training data requires a 
lot of work and preplanning. Group indicators have to be collected, usually at the initial 
time of data collection, so the data can be assessed for biases, and the “algorithm must 
be trained against selecting these factors, by means of ‘adversarial training.’”552 The 
process is difficult to perfect. 
 
Fortunately, designers are working on reducing biases in data sets and learning 
environments; in fact, it is a hot topic in engineering and system design. In this author’s 
opinion, policy makers can and must insist that design explicitly commit to recognizing 
and reducing the impacts of biased data sets in machine learning environments. The 
best solutions will likely require policy maker involvement, but the efforts of engineers 
and systems designers will be absolutely fundamental.  
 
 
548 Moerel, supra note 497. 
549 Id. 
550 See id. 
551 See id. 
552 Id. In general, adversarial training is a technique used in model building to train 
systems to identify those that do not belong.  When model builder train a system, they 
feed ‘good’ data into the machine so it learns.  But, what happens when ‘bad’ data is 
feed in, the machine can just accept anything its fed. So, it has to learn to exclude 
things, which is adversarial training. Its easiest to understand, (in my opinion) in the 
training done with photos and how the machine identifies people, (or cats, or dogs) 
and labels them correctly.  See Adar Kahiri, Adversarial Training: Creating Real 
Pictures of Fake People With Machine Learning, MEDIUM, Towards Data Science, 
(Dec. 29, 2018). 
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b. Model Risk: The Challenge of Social Complexity  
 
Even setting aside concerns about input data, model risk originates in the existing 
complexities of society, which can be extremely tricky to represent in the terms 
required for an algorithm to function. Benthall and Haynes explain: 
there is a substantive difference between systems that result in 
controversial or unfair outcomes due to the racial bias of their designers 
and those that do so because they are reflecting a society that is 
organized by racial categories.553 
This of course, raises the question: can any model ever properly resolve the 
complexities of society? Benthall and Haynes sharply outline the dilemma: 
Machines that attempt to correct unfairness through explicit use of racial 
classification do so at the risk of reifying racial categories that are 
inherently unfair. Machine learning systems that allocate resources in 
ways that are blind to race will reproduce racial inequality in society.554 
Race represented as a single factor, whether embedded within a model or eliminated as 
an acceptable data category, will always fail to reflect the complexity of race within 
society. Hence, having an understanding of social complexity is an essential element of 
creating valid models. 
 
Modeling social complexity is an under-researched area in computational engineering, 
but one that is now gaining prominence. Selbst and others identify five errors that arise 
from the failure “to consider how social context is interlaced with technology in 
different forms,”555 and thus the remedies also require a deeper understanding of "the 
social to resolve problems.”556 The five errors the community identifies are: the 
Framing Trap, Portability Trap, Formalism Trap, Ripple Effect Trap, and Solutionism 
Trap. Each will now be examined in turn. 
 
 
553 Sebastian Benthall and Bruce D. Haynes, Racial Categories In Machine 
Learning, published in Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 
(FAT* ’19)(2019). 
554 Id. at sec. 4. 
555 See Andrew Selbst, Danah Boyd, Sorelle A. Friedler, Suresh Venkatasubramanian, 
Janet A. Vertesi, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical Systems, 59, published 
in Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* ’19), (2019). 
556 Selbst, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical System, supra 503 at 59. 
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i. The Framing Trap 
 
The Framing Trap, that is the “failure to model the entire system over which a social 
criterion, such as fairness, will be enforced”557 is a common area of focus for designers. 
The frame (or view) asks the designer to:  
Recognize, explicitly, that a machine learning model is part of a 
sociotechnical system, and that the other components of the system need 
to be modeled. By moving decisions made by humans and human 
institutions within the abstraction boundary, fairness of the system can 
again be analyzed as an end-to-end property of the sociotechnical 
frame.558 
In other words, framing the designer’s responsibility too narrowly in terms of computer 
code fails to capture the full function and impact of their work. Using a sociotechnical 
frame allows designers to examine not only the expected deliverable and other 
standards of  technology development, but also all the factors that come into play in 
deployment in a real-world setting. For example, in our instance, the design of a risk 
assessment protocol for the justice system must account for how judges use and 
respond to risk assessment scores. Researchers within the field sometimes call this part 
of the design “human–computer interaction.” Human–computer interaction researchers 
examine the design and use of computer technology, focusing on the interfaces between 
people (users) and computers.  
 
Recent research also allows us to take a close look at the manner in which prediction 
tools are currently being used in the decision making process of a court, in a very 
narrow category of risk assessments, which are commonly used in within the judicial 
decision process in the United States. As Green and Chen note: “risk assessments do 
not make definitive decisions — they inform judges, who are the final arbiters.”559 
Green and Chen’s findings ought to lead to adjustments within the model, when humans 
are asked to apply technology produced predictions, especially when those predictions 
are intended to influence decision making. For example, their study found several 
 
557 Id. at Section 2.1.  
558 Id. at 60. 
559 Ben Green and Yiling Chen, Disparate Interactions: An Algorithm-in- the-Loop 
Analysis of Fairness in Risk Assessments, 90, in submission Conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, and Transparency (FAT* ’19)(2019). 
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behaviors that called into question the fairness of the risk assessment.560 In fact, the 
participants were unable to effectively evaluate the accuracy of the predictions.561 And, 
more importantly, the “use of risk assessments led to higher risk predictions about black 
defendants and lower risk predictions about white defendants.”562  
 
While these findings pertain to a narrow set of circumstances, that being the use of risk 
predictions, the use of the predictions was in an area of the justice environment where 
the decisions had significant impact upon individuals. Green and Chen’s work on real-
world deployment leads to conclusions will be incredibly important within Chapter 5 
as the author builds a neutral decision maker model within a justice environment.  
 
It is also worth noting another field research study, which suggests that while some 
people may be reluctant to use AI systems that are presented as providing 
recommendations, when the information is instead presented as additional data to be 
used within an existing decision making process, people more willingly engage with 
the use of the AI system.563 Other studies have shown that judges do not consistently 
take the recommendations into account,564 automation bias is sometimes present,565 and 
judges deviate from recommendations in biased ways.566  
 
 
560 Id. at 98. 
561 Id. 
562 Id. 
563 See Cliff Kuang, An Ingenious Approach To Designing AI That Doctors Trust, 
Co.Design, (Jan. 17, 2018)(explaining the importance of considering presentation as 
an influencing choice).  
564 Angèle Christin, Algorithms In Practice: Comparing Web Journalism And 
Criminal Justice, BIG DATA & SOCIETY 4, 2 (2017). 
565 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological due process, WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW 
REVIEW, 85, 1249-1313 (2008). 
566 Recognizing and Eliminating Bias from Court Operations, SUPREME COURT 
STANDING COMMITTEE  ON FAIRNESS AND DIVERSITY (Florida) (2008) (“The report 
indicates that the overall perception of those with long-standing experience in the 
Florida court system is that, although there have been significant improvements in 
reducing discrimination, disparate treatment continues to occur.”) Id. at 1. 
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This body of research suggests that algorithm-in-the-loop aids must be considered and 
evaluated within the context of real world impacts and considered specifically within a 
sociotechnical context.567 
 
ii. The Portability Trap 
 
The Portability Trap occurs when designers fail to “understand how repurposing 
algorithmic solutions designed for one social context may be misleading, inaccurate, or 
otherwise do harm when applied to a different context.”568 The Portability Trap is one 
of the easier risks to mitigate against, yet it is often an overlooked aspect of risk within 
the technology community. It is often assumed that a well-designed model can be re-
purposed or simply undergo minor adjustments, and be used in an adjacent, yet distinct, 
environment or context.  
 
That is not to write that no algorithm can be appropriately re-purposed. It is instead to 
highlight the importance of asking questions about the similarities between contexts 
and applying a full sociotechnical framing treatment to a new deployment of an existing 
algorithm in order to determine its appropriateness. Of course, the issue becomes how 
model designers are to know the full context of a model that will be deployed in more 
than one context.  
 
In response to model risk arising from trained machine learning models being used in 
instances for which they are not well suited, the Mitchell, Wu, Zaldivar, Barnes, 
Vasserman, Hutchinson, Spitzer, Raji and Gebru report recommends that released 
models be accompanied by documentation detailing their performance 
characteristics.569 The authors make the following suggestions for relevant information 
to be captured in the model card: (1) model details, such as basic information about the 
 
567 Green, Disparate Interaction, supra note 507, at 90. 
568 Selbst, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical System, supra 503 at Section 
2.2. 
569 Margaret Mitchell, Simone Wu, Andrew Zaldivar, Parker Barnes, Lucy 
Vasserman, Ben Hutchinson, Elena Spitzer, Inioluwa Deborah Raji, Timnit Gebru, 
Model Cards for Model Reporting, published in Conference on Fairness, 
Accountability, and Transparency, (2019). 
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model, (person or organization developing model, model date and model type); 570 (2) 
information about training algorithms, parameters, fairness constraints or other applied 
approaches, and features; 571 (3) the intended use;572 (4) the evaluation data, such as, 
details on the training dataset used and the dataset(s) used to produce any other 
quantitative analysis reported on the card;573 and finally, (5) any ethical considerations 
or recommendations relevant to deployment.574 
 
The transparency of the information and the wide availability of such information 
could, in theory, improve the use of models and encourage those using models to 
consider intended use. In addition, in the United Kingdom, the Data Ethics Framework 
has captured a similar idea in a set of principles, guidance and a workbook to guide the 
design of appropriate data use in the public sector.575 
 
More importantly, the information being widely available can allow additional parties 
to critically evaluate the extended use of the model and to question inappropriate uses. 
The transparency allows those using the model to be aware of underlying assumptions 
that formed the model and to determine the acceptable tolerance for assumptions and 
parameters in the new use.  
 
iii. The Formalism Trap 
 
 
570 See id. at 222. 
571 See id. 
572 See id. 
573 See id. 
574 See id. 
575 United Kingdom, Department for Digital, Culture, Media & Sport, Government 
Efficiency, Transparency And Accountability (June 2018) available at 
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-ethics-framework (last viewed 
Aug. 10, 2019) Built upon the U.K. Cabinet Office, Data Science Ethical Framework, 
(withdrawn) (2016) available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/data-
science-ethical-framework (last viewed Aug. 10, 2019).  
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The Formalism Trap occurs when designers fail to “account for the full meaning of 
social concepts such as fairness, which can be procedural, contextual, and contestable, 
and cannot be resolved through mathematical formalisms.”576 
 
As we have seen,  some attributes of the real world are unavailable for use within 
models, for a variety of reasons, giving rise to work-arounds or proxies.  
Generally, any model that imputes the missing protected attribute value 
based on other, observed variables is known as a proxy model, and such 
a model that is based on predicting conditional class membership 
probabilities is known as a probabilistic proxy model.577 
 
Unfortunately, some phenomena appear deceptively easy to integrate into a model 
design this way, masking the challenge of fully appreciating the actual complexity of 
the concept. Ideally, a proxy should never be used in a manner that oversimplifies and 
misrepresents complex social conditions. Indeed, it is plausible that some complex 
social conditions should never be represented by a single attribute or proxy.   
 
However, poorly designed regulation can effectively demand the creation of proxy 
models, and when designers fail to fully understand the nature of the regulatory request, 
this can be incredibly problematic. Measuring outcomes of the “decision making 
system with respect to a protected class, such as gender or race, is challenging when 
class membership labels are unavailable,” 578 for example. Under U.S. Federal law, 
lenders must demonstrate that credit decisions comply with fair lending laws.579 
However, gathering information on membership in those protected classes runs afoul 
of other U.S. law. For instance, “credit card and auto loan companies must demonstrate 
that the way they extend credit is not racially discriminatory, yet are not allowed to ask 
 
576 Selbst, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical System, supra 503 at Section 
2.3. 
577 Jiahao Chen, Nathan Kallus, Xiaojie Mao, Geoffry Svacha, and Madeleine Udell. 
Fairness Under Unawareness: Assessing Disparity When Protected Class Is 
Unobserved, published in Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency 
(FAT* ’19), (2019). 
578 Id. 
579 Two different federal laws deal with discrimination in lending: the Fair Housing 
Act (FHAct) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA). These fair lending laws 
prohibit lenders from discriminating in credit transactions on the basis of race, color, 
national origin, religion, sex, and other specified. 
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applicants what race they are when they apply for credit.”580 This dilemma leaves the 
creation of a proxy for race as one of the companies’ only viable solutions. Yet race is 
a prime example of a complex concept that is harmful when over-simplified. 
 
iv. The Ripple Effect Trap 
 
The Ripple Effect Trap occurs when designers fail to “understand how the insertion of 
technology into an existing social system changes the behaviors and embedded values 
of the pre-existing system.”581 The ripple effect may be one of the biggest concerns in 
model design within the emerging technology-driven justice environment. As was 
surveyed in Chapter 3, very little technology has been deployed in the justice 
environment, and what has been so far has usually been deployed with an eye toward 
improving access to justice — thus the individual users are the focus of evaluation. 
More work needs to be done concerning how other human actors, such as decision 
makers, interact with the technology in the justice environment. 
 
There has been some limited research in this area: for example, in response to Kentucky 
mandating that risk assessments be used to inform all pretrial release decisions, 
Stevenson and a group of researchers set out to measure the impact of the introduction 
of technology-driven risk assessments on pretrial release.582 Stevenson found that while 
an initial impact may have occurred, shortly thereafter, the release rate returned to 
original numbers.583 In 2019, Green and Yen performed a study designed to review how 
risk assessments influence human decisions within criminal justice adjudication.584 
Since risk-based assessments and predictions have been used within the context of the 
U.S. criminal justice environment for some time now, researchers are beginning to ask 
how the use of these instruments is working within decision making process. For 
example, using an Amazon Mechanical Turk–based experiment, Green and Yen 
 
580 Chen, Fairness Under Unawareness, supra 525 at Section 1.1. 
581 Selbst, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical System, supra 503 at Section 
2.4. 
582 See Megan Stevenson, Assessing Risk Assessment in Action, MINNESOTA LAW 
REVIEW 103 (forthcoming). 
583 See id.  
584 See Green, Disparate Interaction, supra note 507, at 90. 
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measured how laypersons make predictions about risk, both with and without the aid 
of a computer-generated risk assessment.585 Using over 550 participants, they found 
that people underperform compared to the risk assessment tool, even when provided 
with its advice; 586 are unable to evaluate the performance of themselves or of the risk 
assessment tool;587 and that participant interactions with the risk assessment itself 
introduced new forms of bias into decision making.588 These early studies suggest more 
research needs to be done in this area to fully appreciate the impact of technology upon 
a decision maker. 
 
There is a growing research interest in how humans use technology-driven predictions, 
which can be broken down into two main areas: information filters and the way the 
prediction is incorporated into the decision making process.  
 
First, information filters have been the topic of decades of research across many 
disciplines and cultures.589 In general, the research suggests that information presumed 
to help people make fairer decisions can in fact fail, as individuals tend to filter 
information through their existing biases.590 For example, policies preventing 
employers from asking job applicants whether they have a criminal record (“ban the 
box”) have actually increased racial discrimination because employers rely more on 
pre-existing stereotypes591 and overestimate how many black applicants have criminal 
 
585 See Green, Disparate Interaction, supra note 507, at 90. 
586 See id.  
587 See id. 
588 See id. 
589 See e.g., Uri Hanani, Bracha Shapira, Peretz Shoval, Information Filtering: 
Overview Of Issues, Research And Systems, USER MODELING AND USER-ADAPTED 
INTERACTION, 11, 203–259 (2001)(creating a framework for considering issues within 
the growing area). 
590 See e.g., Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Filippo Menczer, Biases Make People 
Vulnerable to Misinformation Spread by Social Media, THE CONVERSATION, U.S. 
(June 21, 2018)(describing ground breaking research conducted at Indiana University 
to help fight impact of bias and silos).  
591 See Amanda Agan and Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Racial 
Discrimination: A Field Experiment, THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 133, 
1 191-235 (2017). 
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records.592 In another troubling instance, interpretations of police-worn body camera 
footage seem to be directly related to the interpreting individual’s prior attitudes about 
police.593 Specific to our interest is research conducted concerning decision makers, 
and again there is a growing interest in the area. It is well documented that judges harbor 
implicit biases. For example, in 1997 Trope and Thompson developed a study that 
explored the degree to which preexisting stereotypes determined the willingness of a 
judging subject to seek individuating information before making a decision.594 They 
found that  
when negatively stereotyped people are asked questions, they are asked 
fewer questions, and the questions are asked in a way that tends to elicit 
confirmation of the stereotype rather than information that would 
individuate the subject or challenge negative stereotyping. In sharp 
contrast, questions to positively stereotyped people are more symmetric 
and therefore likely to elicit responses that would either confirm or 
disconfirm a particular stereotype.595  
Trope and Thompson highlight: “In essence, our participants gave stereotyped targets 
relatively few opportunities to express their personal views on the issues at hand.”596  
 
As Professor Mills suggests:  
Trope and Thompson’s study suggests that a judges’ formula for 
approaching . . . cases involving people who are easily stereotyped, such 
as African-American women . . . may be influenced by their 
unconscious tendency to search only for a confirmation of the stereotype 
rather than for a more complete picture. . . 597 
 
592 See Jennifer L. Doleac and Benjamin Hansen, The Unintended Consequences of 
‘Ban the Box’: Statistical Discrimination and Employment Outcomes When Criminal 
Histories Are Hidden, (2018) available at 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2812811 (last visited Aug. 5, 
2019). 
593 See Roseanna Sommers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 
YALE LAW JOURNAL 125, 1304, 1309 (2016). 
594 See Linda G. Mills, A PENCHANT FOR PREJUDICE: UNRAVELING BIAS IN JUDICIAL 
DECISION-MAKING, 14 University of Michigan Press, (1999). 
595 Id. at 14, relying upon Yaacov Trope and Eric Thompson, Looking For The 
Truth In All The Wrong Places? Asymmetric  Search  Of  Individuating  
Information  About  Stereotyped  Group Members, .JOURNAL OF PERSONALITY 
AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 73, 229–241, 240 (1997).  
596 Id.  
597 Mills, Penchant for Prejudice, supra note 542 at 14. 
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The impact of this kind of bias is severe: at least one study has found that white judges 
give harsher sentences to black defendants than white ones, even when they have 
committed the same crime and received the same score from the formula used to set 
criminal punishments.598 Moreover, various research projects have found that judges 
often make initial intuitive judgments which they might, or might not, override with 
deliberation.599 Judges are influenced by irrelevant numerical anchors,600 the way 
outcomes are framed,601 and even irrelevant emotional cues.602 
 
Such instances of bias are not limited to courtrooms. In fact, at least one study has found 
somewhat similar patterns in the decision making of arbitrators.603 The authors of the 
study comment: 
In this first-ever psychological experiment involving international 
arbitration, we found that arbitrators often made intuitive and 
impressionistic decisions rather than the fully rational and deliberative 
decisions that might be normatively desirable. This finding, though 
 
598 See Josh Salman, Emily Le Coz, and Elizabeth Johnson, Florida’s Broken 
Sentencing System, SARASOTA HERALD-TRIBUNE (2016).   
599 See generally, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking 
on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L.REV.1 (2007); Chris 
Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, The “Hidden Judiciary”: An 
Empirical Examination of Executive Branch Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 1477 (2009). 
600 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich, & Chris Guthrie, Can Judges Make 
Reliable Numeric Judgments? Distorted Damages and Skewed Sentences, 90 INDIANA 
L.J. 695 (2015). 
601 See e.g., Birte Englich, Thomas Mussweiler and Fritz Strack, Playing Dice With 
Criminal Sentences: The Influence of Irrelevant Anchors on Experts’ Judicial 
Decision Making, PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN, 32:2, 188-200, 
(2016). 
602 See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Altering Attention 
in Adjudication, 60 UCLA L. REV.1586 (2013) (identifying how directing judicial 
attention shapes outcomes); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. 
Wistrich, Contrition in the Courtroom: Do Apologies Affect Adjudication?, 98 
CORNELL L.REV.1189 (2013) (finding apologies encourage judges to be more 
lenient); Andrew J. Wistrich, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Chris Guthrie, Heart Versus 
Head: Do Judges Follow the Law or Follow Their Feelings?, 93 TEXAS L. REV.855, 
862(2015) (finding that “judges’ feelings about litigants influence their judgments”). 
603 See Susan D. Franck and Anne van Aaken, and James Freda, and Chris Guthrie, 
Chris and Jeffrey Rachlinski, Inside the Arbitrator's Mind, EMORY LAW JOURNAL, 
Vol. 66, (2017)(attempting to frame the logic behind opinion driven decision 
making). 
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perhaps disappointing, is unsurprising. Arbitrators are people, and they 
make judgments and decisions the way other people do.604 
 
The biases and external, non-case-specific influences occur, regardless of if the 
decision maker is a human or a model build upon existing data sets.   
 
While the aforementioned examples suggest that humans often favor their own biased 
intuition over more objective factors, a second feature of the Ripple Effect Trap arises 
from granting too much credence to computational outputs. Humans often suffer from 
what has come to be known automation bias. Automation bias arises most commonly 
in two ways, omission errors, and commission errors. Omission errors occur when 
“people do not recognize when automated systems err.”605 Commission errors occur 
when “people follow automated systems without considering contradictory 
information.”606 Numerous studies have demonstrated the presence of automation bias 
in multiple environments. For example, automated systems can alter a person’s 
relationship to a task by creating what is commonly called a “moral buffer” distancing 
the individual from the impact of their decisions.607 Cummins posits that automated 
decision support tools can cause individuals to believe the automation is “in charge,” 
which in turn causes them to abandon their sense of responsibility.608 Moreover, people 
prefer to rely upon other peoples’ judgement, even in the face of accurate algorithms.609 
 
604 Franck, Inside the Arbitrator's Mind, supra note 551 at 1169. 
605 See Kathleen L. Mosier, Melisa Dunbar, Lori McDonnell, Linda J. Skitka, Mark 
Burdick, and Bonnie Rosenblatt, Automation Bias and Errors: Are Teams Better than 
Individuals?, in Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual 
Meeting 42, 3, 201-205 (1998). 
606 Id. at 201. 
607 Id.  
608 See Mary L. Cummings, Automation and Accountability in Decision Support 
System, THE JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY STUDIES, Vol 32(1) 23-30, 25 ( 2006).  
609 See Joa Sang Lim and Marcus O’Connor, Judgmental Adjustment of Initial 
Forecasts: Its Effectiveness and Biases, JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING 
8, 3, 149-168, 149, (1995). 
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In fact, in general individuals cannot consistently distinguish between reliable and 
unreliable predictions610 and many deviate incorrectly from algorithmic forecasts.611  
 
Clearly, existing research is available to guide designers when considering the manner 
in which a decision maker will be impacted by deployment of technology, especially 
algorithmic prediction technology. Existing research has already lead to questions 
about the use of technology, specifically risk predictors, in the decision making portion 
of the justice environment. More research is needed to fully assess potential negative 
impacts in justice environments. Thus, designers must consider the user of the 
technology, the manner of use, the design and the method of delivery of the prediction 
or recommendation.  
 
v. The Solutionism Trap 
 
The Solutionism Trap occurs when designers fail to “recognize the possibility that the 
best solution to a problem may not involve technology.”612 The Solutionism Trap is 
one that few are ready to consider in the entrepreneurial technology-driven world in 
which we current live. It is however, time to give real thought to the ultimate usefulness 
of technology that is built upon historically biased data, and/or upon a poorly designed 
model that seeks to capture complex societal problems in an oversimplified set of 
attributes, or with several other significant problems that have been reviewed in this 
chapter. While the author is not yet ready to insist that algorithms should not be used 
in the justice environment at all, the crucial question is: if it is to be used, how can the 
system as a whole be designed to mitigate risk and avert negative impact on the 
system’s users and those whose fate may determine by its outputs? A neutral decision 
maker can in fact use technology as an aid to make decisions, if the system recognizes 
and accounts for the concerns elaborated above. However, a watchful eye must be kept 
 
610 See Paul Goodwin and Robert Fildes, Judgmental Forecasts of Time Series 
Affected by Special Events: Does Providing a Statistical Forecast Improve Accuracy? 
JOURNAL OF BEHAVIORAL DECISION MAKING Vol. 12(1), 37-53, 37 (1999). 
611 See Berkeley J. Dietvorst, Joseph P. Simmons, and Cade Massey, Overcoming 
Algorithm Aversion: People Will Use Imperfect Algorithms If They Can (Even 
Slightly) Modify Them, MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, Vol. 64,(3) (2016). 
612 Selbst, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical System, supra 503 at Section 
2.5. 
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on the deployment and, ultimately, model designers and justice environment monitors 
must be ready to jettison the use of technology if it is found that it cannot be deployed 
without negative impact.  
 
Ultimately, adherence to the rule of law clearly demands consideration being given to 
the use of technology within the decision maker portion of the technology-driven 
justice environment. As we update the justice system, rather than aiming to replace 
human decision making with technology, we should aim to use technology in order to 
reduce burden, guide, assist, and educate human decision makers.  
 
B. Technology Based Decision Makers 
In the recent boom in technology-based decision making,613 three distinct approaches 
to the use of technology have emerged: (1) expert systems, (2) argument retrieval, and 
(3) cognitive computing.614 Each will be discussed in turn. 
 
1. Expert Systems 
 
 
613 This should be distinguished from some of the more well established, lower order 
processes that have been occurring for some time now. As Tim Pullan, CEO and 
Founder of legal AI and risk analysis company, ThoughtRiver notes: 
 
AI-driven clause search in M&A and lease review is now an established 
process for many law firms. It may soon become a de facto minimum 
professional service requirement to deploy AI in certain types of work. 
But in many cases this technology deployment is really just a way of 
lawyers producing the same thing for less. . . new technology . . . has 
the capability to help lawyers produce more insightful analysis of a type 
never before served up as advice in the legal industry. 
 
Author, ThoughtRiver: Legal AI + The Big Changes Ahead For 2018, ARTIFICIAL 
LAWYER, (Jan. 18, 2018). 
 
614 See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 8 and 11.  
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Expert systems deal with a narrow area of law and are designed with enough nuance 
and heuristic615 knowledge to ask the user pertinent questions about the problem and 
then customize an appropriate answer.  
 
As noted by Davis in 1984: 
To build expert systems is to attempt to capture rare or important 
expertise and embody it in computer programs. It is done by talking to 
the people who have that expertise. In one sense building expert systems 
is a form of intellectual cloning. Expert system builders, the knowledge 
engineers, find out from experts what they know and how they use their 
knowledge to solve problems. Once this debriefing is done, the expert 
system builders incorporate the knowledge and expertise in computer 
programs, making the knowledge and expertise easily replicated, 
readily distributed, and essentially immortal.616 
 
Expert systems have been part of the growing AI movement for many years now — 
and in many industries. In the legal sector, the growth occurred primarily in the 
1980s,617 at which time it was rejected by many noted scholars.618 However, recent 
advances in several areas of technology619 have allowed somewhat of a resurgence of 
legal expert systems.620  
 
615 Heuristics, in this instance, is thought of as ‘rules of thumb,’ frequently used by 
skilled practitioners use to in applying specific rules to the facts at hand. See Ashley, 
AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 4.  
616 Randall Davis, Amplifying Expertise With Expert Systems, p. 18, in Winston P.H., 
& Prendergast K.A., (eds), THE AI BUSINESS: COMMERCIAL USES OF ARTIFICIAL 
INTELLIGENCE, MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass (1984). 
617 See Philip Leith, The Rise And Fall Of The Legal Expert System, EUROPEAN 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY, Vol 1, Issue 1, 2010. 
618 See e.g. id. 
619 For example, text analytics. See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 
135 at 4-6.  
620 The firms announcing the growing use of AI is difficult to keep up with in terms of 
numbers. For example, in just a short period in 2017 the firms Chapman Tripp, New 
Zealand’s largest full-service commercial law firm. See Author, Top Kiwi Firm, 
Chapman Tripp, Picks Luminance’s Legal AI Tech, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Nov. 20, 
2017); Addelshaw Goddard. See Author, Addleshaw Goddard Innovation Head: 
Baking In Legal AI, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Nov. 20, 2017); U.S. law firm, Latham & 
Watkins, see Author, Latham & Watkins Picks Kira Systems For Legal AI Review 
Work, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Nov. 28, 2017); Slaughter and May. See Author, Legal 
AI Co. Luminance Gets $10m Funding, Brings in Ex-MI5 Boss, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, 
(Nov. 29, 2017); White Shoe, Davis Polk & Wardwell, Latham & Watkins. See 
Author, The Legal AI ‘Barbarians’ Have Already Taken the Gates, ARTIFICIAL 
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Expert systems can perform case analysis and prediction by using “natural language 
processing (NLP) to filter key data from litigation documents and then leverage this 
information into actionable and searchable insights for users.”621 For example, in 
November of 2017 Berkeley Bridge announced a “downloadable platform that allows 
lawyers to build their own rules-based, expert systems with minimal need for outside 
input.”622 Several firms have already begun trials with this system.623 Global law firm 
Linklaters was an integral part of the creation of the newest player in the market — 
Eigen Technologies.624 Eigen describes itself as a technology company on the forefront 
of AI-based legal review services,625 but this phrasing does not do justice to the full 
scope of their activities. Eigen is a technology suite that, they assert, can offer more 
than mere compliance-based document review,“[allowing] a company, law firm, or 
bank to gain visibility of its data core, or contract stack, to read its own DNA. . .” Dr. 
Lewis Z. Liu, CEO and Co-Founder, notes: 
(Dr. Liu) wants Eigen to appeal to the C-suite of execs in financial 
service businesses and their top lawyers, who want to know the answers 
to key questions, such as: “What is the risk exposure of all these OTC 
derivatives? What are we really legally liable for according to this vast 
mass of futures contracts?”626  
Assuming the hopes of Dr. Liu are realized, calling Eigen an expert system in the old 
sense may not fully capture its power. While we may be years away from an expert 
 
LAWYER (2017); Clyde & Co. See Author, Global Firm Clyde & Co Forms Legal 
Data Lab with UCL, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Dec. 12, 2017); TLT. See Author, UK 
Law Firm, TLT, Takes Stake in U.S. Legal AI Co. LegalSifter, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, 
(Dec. 13, 2017)); Holland & Knight. See Author, Legal AI Co. Luminance Bags 
Holland & Knight in U.S. Firm Win, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Dec. 18, 2017).  
621 Author, California Legal AI Co. Gavelytics Aims to Be Case Prediction Local 
Hero, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Nov. 17, 2017). 
622 Author, Berkeley Bridge Offers DIY Expert System Platform to Lawyers, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER (Nov. 1, 2017). 
623 For example, U.S. law firm Cadwalader Wickersham & Taft and Dutch law firm, 
Stibbe. See id. 
624 Author, Legal AI’s Dark Horse, Eigen Technologies, Comes Into The Light, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Nov. 3, 2017). 
625 See id. 
626 See id. 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  161 
system that is truly able to “solve” the user’s legal problems, these new products on the 
market are much more complex than the text-based decision trees of the 1980s.627  
 
2. Computational Models of Legal Reasoning 
 
Where expert systems generally seek to solve complex problems in a particular domain, 
the newest technology seeks to extract semantic information from legal texts and use it 
to help humans solve legal problems.628 For example, Casetext, a litigation analysis 
platform, now includes a legal research tool that uses natural language processing.629 
Casetext has launched a feature called “Black Letter Law” which enables users to 
“quickly identify axiomatic statements of law.”630  
 
In addition, Casetext has launched a feature called “Holdings” which is asserted to have 
captured the “largest searchable collection of concise case summaries ever 
assembled.”631 Interestingly, to create the Holdings feature, Casetext used a process 
they have called “judicial language processing”632 which is designed to exploit 
“patterns within the U.S. case law corpus to excerpt summaries directly from judicial 
opinions.”633 While case search capabilities have existed for some time,634 AI-driven 
case law systems are relatively new. Interestingly, the Casetext team claims that both 
law firms and judges have expressed interest in their product.635 Assuming this is true, 
AI case systems are already influencing judicial decision making. 
 
627 Eigen Technologies is not alone in using such technology. For example, Mexican 
legal tech firm, Laboralisto, is building a case management platform for employment 
disputes that will eventually provide case prediction capabilities. See Author, 
Mexico’s Laboralisto Paves Way To Labour Law Predictive Capability, ARTIFICIAL 
LAWYER, (Nov. 13, 2017) While legal AI case prediction start-up, Gavelytics, has 
created a predictive platforms that focuses solely on and California. Author, 
California Legal AI Co. Gavelytics Aims to Be Case Prediction Local Hero, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Nov. 17, 2017). 
628 See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 11. 
629 See Author, Artificial Lawyer Interview: Jake Heller, CEO, Casetext, ARTIFICIAL 
LAWYER, (Jan. 17, 2018). 
630 Id.  
631 Id.  
632 See id.  
633 Id.  
634 Consider Westlaw and LexisNexis to name but two. 
635 See Author, Interview: Jake Heller, supra note 577. 
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3. Analytics, Feedback and Rankings  
 
One of the newer deployments of AI in the justice environment involves creating 
constructive feedback loops. We can see an example of this in the realm of Online 
Dispute Resolution specifically. The process works as follows: ODR platforms gather 
data as they are used, including data points on interfaces, operations and users. This 
data can now be channeled into feedback to create a system that better reflects the needs 
of the population that the system serves. For example, the British Columbia ODR 
system, called the Civil Resolution Tribunal, produces monthly data analytics and has 
a feedback system integrated into the platform.636  
 
Feedback loops can also be important to arbitration decision makers as well as the 
institutions that provide their appointments. For example, outcomes could be monitored 
and could be used to provide specific, granular data to the decision maker, pointing out 
particular times when attention is lacking, or when decisions tend to be more harsh. 
These are biases that are well researched in the existing brick-and-mortar justice 
system, as described previously. In these instances feedback loops could help individual 
decision makers become more aware of patterns in their own decision making and the 
events that may be impacting their decision making process. 
 
One of the newest systems, the “Arbitrator Intelligence Questionnaire” is a “feedback 
questionnaire designed to facilitate systematic collection of information about 
arbitrator case management and decision making.”637 AIQ is designed to cover a wider 
range of decision makers than the CRT system, specifically covering arbitrators in the 
international commercial arena. Since the international commercial arbitration 
environment is based on party selection of arbitrators, systems such as this can be 
 
636 The Civil Resolution Tribunal uses various mechanisms to release information, 
their monthly Participant Satisfaction Survey as well as their CRT Statistics Snapshot, 
can both be found on their website. See Civil Resolution Tribunal, Blog, CRT 
Website,  available at https://civilresolutionbc.ca/blog/ (last visited Aug. 12, 2019).  
637 See Arbitrator Intelligence, AIQ webpage, information available at 
https://www.arbitratorintelligence.org/about-us (last visited Aug. 12, 2019).  
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immensely helpful in creating a transparent decision making environment, even when 
the process itself is shielded in confidentiality.  
 
The AIQ describes its goal as follows: 
AI’s core mission is to promote fairness, transparency, accountability 
and diversity in arbitrator appointments. By making systematically 
gathered data about arbitrator decision making more equally available, 
the AIQ will help level the playing field in arbitrator selection and make 
the entire process more transparent. Meanwhile, more information about 
arbitrators will provide market-based accountability for arbitrators and 
allow newer and more diverse arbitrators a meaningful opportunity to 
build their reputations based on actual performance.638 
 
 
While feedback loops that solicit user comment are often viewed as positive, there is 
research in other areas in which this type of feedback has been found to be less than 
helpful or accurate. In fact, several online systems that rely upon feedback and 
transparent comments from users have been manipulated in ways that undermined the 
effectiveness of the feedback loop. For example, the online marketplace Amazon has 
been consistently criticized for the prevalence of people gaming its review system, 
despite the efforts undertaken by Amazon to curtail the problem.639 And, of course, the 
existence of gender bias in feedback-based reviews, such as job performance, is well 
researched as a major detriment to women.640 Other biases in performance-based 
reviews are also well researched.641 One can surely imagine these same biases occurring 
in justice-based performance reviews as well. Efforts ought to be undertaken to combat 
the replication of such identified biases in new systems.  
 
C. Rule of Law Considerations in Light of Ubiquitous Technology 
 
 
638 See id.   
639 See Emma Woollacott, Amazon's Fake Review Problem Is Now Worse Than Ever, 
Study Suggests, FORBES, (Sept. 9, 2017)(discussing the findings of recent surveys 
revealing widespread misleading, untrue and downright fake reviews.) 
640 See Paola Cecchi-Dimeglio, How Gender Bias Corrupts Performance Reviews, 
and What to Do About It, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW, (April 12, 2017). 
641 See Steffen Maier, 4 Unconscious Biases That Distort Performance Reviews, 
ENTREPRENEUR, (Sept. 22, 2016)(discussing performance reviews style, outline, and 
language that distorts review outcomes). 
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As artificial intelligence augments or even replaces human decision making, legislators 
and policymakers must account for the risks that AI poses to human rights principles 
and the Rule of Law (RoL). As examined in Chapter 1, the Rule of Law principles 
demand the law to be clear, publicly visible or known, and applicable to all people, 
including lawmakers themselves.642 The section that follows returns to the RoL 
principles established within Chapter 1 in an effort to extend consideration into the 
deployment of technology and AI in the justice eco-system, especially as it relates to 
the decision maker. The section begins by exploring due process within the technology-
infused justice eco-system. It then moves to consider the role of society “in the loop”; 
issues arising when code replaces the common law of precedent; the inclusion of 
powerful quasi-governmental actors without accountability within the justice eco-
system; and finally a review of RoL in terms of decision making processes that include 
a human in the loop. 
 
 
1. Rule of Law: Due Process and Technology 
 
The introduction of technology into a justice eco-system, especially AI deployed as part 
of the decision making process, will have consequences for the justice system being 
viewed as compliant with the RoL which may extend to issues of due process and basic 
human rights.  For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v. Eric L. 
Loomis,643 ruled that a judge’s use of closed-source recidivism assessment software in 
sentencing does not necessarily breach the constitutional right to due process,644 so long 
as the judge does not rely on the score exclusively and receives written warnings about 
the software and the scoring.645 The Wisconsin Supreme Court did set out limits on the 
use of proprietary scores in future sentencing decisions.646 First, risk scores “may not 
be considered as the determinative factor in deciding whether the offender can be 
 
642 See Chapter 1(B). 
643 Wisconsin v. Eric L. Loomis, 881 N.W.2d 749 (Wis. 2016). The U.S. Supreme 
Court denied judicial review of the decision in June 2017. 
644 Loomis’s attorneys asserted it was it was unfair to rely on a score whose accuracy 
cannot be assessed, interrogated, and challenged and as such, their clients due process 
rights had been violated. See id. 
645 See Loomis, 881 N.W.2d at 749. 
646 See id.   
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supervised safely and effectively in the community.”647 Second, to avoid the denial of 
due process, the following warning must be given to sentencing judges:  
(1) the proprietary nature of COMPAS has been invoked to prevent 
disclosure of information relating to how factors are weighed or how 
risk scores are to be determined;648 (2) risk assessment compares 
defendants to a national sample, but no cross-validation study for a 
Wisconsin population has yet been completed; (3) some studies of 
COMPAS risk assessment scores have raised questions about whether 
they disproportionately classify minority offenders as having a higher 
risk of recidivism; and (4) risk assessment tools must be constantly 
monitored and re-normed for accuracy due to changing populations and 
subpopulations.649 
The Court argued that the warning would “enable courts to better assess the accuracy 
of the assessment and the appropriate weight to be given to the risk score.”650 While 
these limitations are noteworthy, they likely fail to fully appreciate the impact of 
automation bias in technology deployments. As explained above, “automation bias,” 
that is the “use of automation as a heuristic replacement for vigilant information seeking 
and processing,”651 is a well-researched concern in the socio-technological ethics. In 
situations such as described above, there is little doubt that automation bias effectively 
“turns a computerized suggestion into a final, authoritative decision.”652 As such, 
system design must identify automation bias as a risk and consider the mitigation 
appropriate under the circumstances. Because this is a justice eco-system, mitigation 
must be appropriate in light of the significance of the impact of automation bias on the 
individuals within the system. Mere notice is never enough.  
 
The model proposed in this thesis will directly take on this issue and attempt to mitigate 
potential negative impact by calling for a human in the decision making loop, 
monitoring of the user, monitoring of the outcomes, training for the user,653 and 
 




651 Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, U OF MARYLAND LEGAL 
STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER No. 2007-26; WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, 
Vol. 85, pp. 1249-1313, (2007).  
652 Id. 
653 Studies have shown that individuals who receive such training are more likely to 
scrutinize an automated system's suggestions. See id. 
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auditing for patterns that indicate a failure to use the technology correctly,654 such as 
attention lapses and unreasonably quick decision making. 
 
2.Rule of Law: Consensus and Society-in-the-Loop 
 
As highlighted by the Law Society of England and Wales in its report entitled: The Use 
Of Algorithms In The Justice System In England And Wales (as summarized by the Law 
Gazette) “We need to build a consensus rooted in the rule of law, which preserves 
human rights and equality, to deliver a trusted and reliable justice system now and for 
the future.”655 Consensus rooted in the rule of law demands examination of several 
aspects of technology as a decision maker in a justice-based eco-system.  
 
First, one must imagine current technology design as primarily designed without 
consensus. In fact most technology, especially AI, is designed without consultation of 
interested parties, or local communities and constituents. The Rule of Law demands 
attention to the requirements of constitutional democracy656 which is “democracy of, 
by, and for the people, such that all citizens, rather than favored individuals or groups, 
have the right to politically participate.”657 One can argue that at the current time, 
designers and technology industry financers are a narrow group wielding broad and 
powerful influence over technology design and deployment decisions. Moreover, those 
same entities are able to hide behind intellectual property rights to obscure important 
portions of the design. Thus, although machine learning systems adapt and hopefully 
improve over time, the original influences are difficult to determine and their effects 
may be longer lasting then society anticipates.  
 
 
654 See Danielle Keats Citron, Big Data Should Be Regulated by ‘Technological Due 
Process’, NEW YORK TIMES (July 2016).  
655 Michael Cross, Justice Algorithms 'Need Urgent Oversight', LAW SOCIETY 
GAZETTE (June 4, 2019) (speaking about The Law Society, Algorithm Use In The 
Criminal Justice System, June (2019)).  
656 When decision systems are introduced into public contexts such as criminal 
justice, it is important they are subject to the scrutiny expected in a democratic 
society. See Law Society, Algorithm Use In The Criminal Justice System, (June 2019) 
at Section 5.4.3.2. 
657 Id. 
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Similarly, to date there have been very few consensus-building events around the 
deployment of algorithmic systems. There is little to no consultation of the panoply of 
stakeholders impacted or interested in the deployments. Fortunately, some academics 
and others are beginning to focus attention on the need to be more inclusive in designing 
and deploying new technology. For example, MIT Media Lab author Rahwan has put 
forward the idea of “society-in-the-loop artificial intelligence,” which embeds the 
judgment of society as a whole in the development and use of AI systems,658 and the 
Law Society, Technology and the Law Policy Commission makes similar calls for 
action.659  
 
As described in Chapter 3, ODR can be designed by a multitude of entities and can be 
deployed in either a public or private provider environment. Public deployments of 
ODR exist within the existing justice eco-system and as such are required to be 
compliant with the same standards as brick-and-mortar courts. In contrast, private 
providers are outside the traditional brick-and-mortar system and are governed by 
contract and consent to arbitration, bound by fewer standards and protections. Society-
in-the-Loop is a concept that becomes perplexing to apply to the ODR context the more 
that design and deployment is privately sourced. Citizens have rights and the ability to 
participate in the election process, which gives them some voice in deployments 
managed by publicly elected officials, whereas private providers are not required to be 
concerned with citizens as such, and are expected to focus their consideration on more 
narrow client groups. In these situations it is important that government undertake the 
role of protecting citizens in the face of consent-driven contractual agreements, holding 
those that design and deploy, even from the private sector, to a standard that includes 
society in the loop.  
 
3. Rule of Law: Code Replaces the Common Law of Precedent 
 
 
658 See Iyad Rahwan, Society-in-the-Loop Programming the Algorithmic Social 
Contract, MIT Media Law (Aug. 12, 2016). 
659 See Law Society, supra note 603 at page 23 citing Veale M, Van Kleek M, and 
Binns R, ‘Fairness and Accountability Design Needs for Algorithmic Support in 
High-Stakes Public Sector Decision-Making’ in Proceedings of the ACM Conference 
on Human Factors in Computing Systems, CHI 2018 , 7-8, (ACM Press 2018). 
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Within the Law Society Report authors noted a particularly relevant observation made 
by Barrister Jacob Turner: 
It is of course true that morals shift and ethics change but laws can be 
updated to fit new morals. When it became socially acceptable in wider 
with regards to ethics for AI. With regards to the technical 
implementation of these, this is why we need to set-up the governance 
structures, including and involving experts who are able to track the 
changing laws and the changing rules and apply them with regards to 
the technology as it stands, at any given point, but this is an ongoing, 
dynamic process.660 
 
As we have discussed machine learning is dynamic, but its initial algorithms, especially 
those designed with prediction as the design focus, are built upon past data. Prediction 
algorithms:  
run the risk of stagnation, holding the evolution of justice anchored in 
the past rather than free to evolve. In computing, this is known as 
“concept drift”, and is a challenge to understand and cope with in high-
stakes environments.661 
 
Concept drift is a risk that needs to be assessed and addressed in the mitigation plan. It 
may be the case, however, that concept drift presents yet another reason to be skeptical 
of the deployment of algorithms in the justice eco-system. Certainly more research must 
be done in this area.  
 
4. Rule of Law: Powerful Quasi-Governmental Actors without Accountability 
 
Following on from the need to include society in the loop, a commitment to democracy 
and citizen engagement demands a mechanism of accountability. On July 2, 2019 the 
Technology and the Law Policy Commission found “a lack of explicit standards, best 
practice, and openness or transparency about the use of algorithmic systems in criminal 
justice across England and Wales.”662 While these might seem to be considerations that 
like outside the scope of AI standards, they are important as these systems are being 
used by governmental and quasi-governmental authorities, and accountability is a 
cornerstone of any justice eco-system participant. The absence of standards is a global 
issue, as will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5.  
 
660 Law Society, supra note 603 at Section 5.4.4.2 page 23. 
661 Id. 
662 Law Society, supra note 603 at Summary page 4. 
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Fortunately, a few entities are taking on the issue and some consensus on basic 
necessary standards is beginning to emerge. For example, the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology has published a report stating that “stakeholders in the 
development of this plan expressed broad agreement that societal and ethical 
considerations must factor into AI standards, . . .”663 While the report notes that it is not 
“clear how that should be done”664 nor is there yet “sufficient scientific and technical 
basis to develop those standards,”665 it does note two areas of consensus amongst those 
stakeholders surveyed:  
(1) The degree to which ethical considerations might be incorporated 
into standards should be tied tightly to the degree of risk to humans, and  
(2) Privacy considerations should be included in any standards 
governing the collection, processing, sharing, storage, and disposal of 
personal information.666 
 
The proposal that risk to humans be used as the measure of requisite ethical scrutiny, 
of course, calls for both risk and scrutiny to be further defined. As the NIST Call for 
Public Comment proceeds, its commitment to consideration of societal and ethical 
standards as part of technological design governance is a major step in the right 
direction. More needs to be done: unfortunately the report fails in sketching these broad 
commitments to even hint at considerations of responsibility, an issue the author hopes 
to see further clarified.  
 
Responsibility and liability should be established for those that build and deploy 
technology as justice eco-system providers. As prescribed by The Law Society report 
“duties and statutory oversight and scrutiny bodies … would provide key safeguards to 
the integrity of criminal justice in the digital age.”667 Merely allowing entities to seek 
recourse for failure to provide a deliverable under the build contract terms is not 
enough. Instead, individuals and groups must be given a right of recourse when they 
 
663 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), U.S. Leadership In AI: A 
Plan For Federal Engagement In Developing Technical Standards And Related 
Tools, DRAFT FOR PUBLIC COMMENT, line 265 (July 2, 2019). 
664 Id. at line 266. 
665 Id. at line 267. 
666 Id. at line 268-71. 
667 Law Society, supra note 603 at Summary page 5. 
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have been injured or negatively impacted by the deployment of AI. The recourse cannot 
be based on the narrow traditional demonstrations of an economic or discriminatory 
harm, because AI systems are typically opaque and often fail to demonstrate 
recognizable impact upon individuals and groups until long after the deployment 
occurs. Thus, legal recourse must be available based on a new and expanded 
understanding of harm. Both accountability and clear chains of responsibility demand 
transparency in AI design, deployment and monitoring, including clear explanations 
for how AI systems may impact all stakeholders. 
 
The Canadian government in February of 2019 passed a federal directive entitled 
Directive on Automated Decision-Making668 which puts in place a tool that can 
“accurately measure the impact an automated process may have on the citizens it was 
created to serve.”669 The Algorithmic Impact Assessment requires companies to 
complete an online survey about the platform they have developed, answering 
questions such as “Does the system enable override of human decisions?” and “Is there 
a process in place to document how data quality issues were resolved during the design 
process?” The company then receives an impact level rating. The impact level of the 
AI platform is ranked one through four, with higher ranking demanding a high level of 
mitigation. For example,  
If an automated decision process receives an impact assessment of level 
four, it will require two independent peer reviews, a public plain 
language notice, a human intervention failsafe, and re-occurring training 
courses for the system.670 
 
It is believed this is the first of its kind671 tool which provides a high level of 
accountability for those who deploy AI systems. Although limited to those entities that 
are contracted by/for the government, it is a first step toward preventing entities who 
 
668 See Government of Canada, Directive on Automated Decision-Making, (effective 
April 1, 2019). 
669 Max Greenwood, Canada’s New Federal Directive Makes Ethical AI a National 
Issue, TECH VIBES (March 9, 2019). 
670 Id. 
671 Before its full adoption, it was in use by Mexico and Portugal and the U.K. may 
seek to as implement the tool. See Greenwood, Canada’s New Federal Directive, 
supra note 616. 
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create technology with deep impacts to escape accountability behind a veil of 
intellectual property rights and design and dash creations.  
 
The model that in Chapter 5 takes a very similar approach to accountability, asking 
those that design and those that deploy technology to be held responsible for their 
creations within the justice eco-system. Moreover, for any deployment occurring in the 
justice eco-system, the author assumes significant potential impact (a four in the 
parlance of the Algorithmic Impact Assessment) and as such, the author has 
incorporated the implementations recommended, including training, meaningful 
human intervention and transparency. Peer review has not been recommended, per se, 
bit auditing throughout the process has been recommended in order to tackle the same 
issue.  
 
It should be noted, the author does not agree with the government taking on the role of 
impact assessment designer. This is primarily because tools such as this may allow 
entities to respond to the questions, receive an impact score with the corresponding 
mitigations required, and then shield itself from negative impacts that are yet to be 
captured in the scoring.  Gaps in scoring adjustments seem inevitable. Moreover, the 
government as the impact assessment designer will likely move scoring and mitigations 
into a political and not a constituent based conversation. Additionally, one can imagine 
entities designing platforms based on achieving a favorable score, without real focus 
on the intent of the impact assessment. Thus, the author takes the position that the 
development of industry driven best practices, and robust auditing by both government 
and industry, is the best design practice with ultimate accountability residing with those 
that design and deploy the technology.  
 
5. Rule of Law: Human-in-the-Decision-Making-Loop  
 
The author reviewed and struggled mightily efforts to embrace a “robot judge,”672 that 
is, a purely AI-based decision maker, and ultimately rejected this possibility in favor of 
a hard human-in-the-loop requirement. As Steven’s articulates:  
 
672 The process of consideration has been long. See Raymond, Technology, Ethics 
And Access To Justice, supra note 58. 
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Legislators and policymakers should carefully but swiftly define 
“artificially intelligent” technology in order to account for any human 
rights abuses facilitated by such technologies. This is because AI 
systems can challenge human agency either by standing in for us or 
nudging us, as well as ultimately disrupt the rule of law by forming a 
part of a given regulatory framework—but with such opacity that the 
logic of the engineer or machine cannot be challenged.673 
 
The model proposed by this thesis recognizes these limitations, seeks to create a 
framework and model that is built to identify, reduce, and mitigate against negative 
impacts upon humans. Ultimately the current limitations of AI research and technology 
and the lack of confidence in those who seek to build and deploy the technology serve 
as a significant barrier to deploying technology without a human in the loop. The author 
hopes that, one day, those who design and research AI can demonstrate that this lack 
of trust is misplaced. For today, however, the potential negative consequences are too 
great to embrace a justice environment without human decision making. 
 
This does not need to be considered a defeat or cause to reject technology within the 
justice eco-system altogether; instead it should be viewed as an opportunity to use 
technology to improve the justice environment. As was explored in Chapter 3, ODR is 
evolving — some of the best in the field are taking justice directly into underserved 
communities, are improving access to justice, and are beginning to conduct research to 
further advance the field. None of these systems embrace the absence of a human, but 
these ODR systems do deploy technology in ever expanding ways. And, prediction of 
justice outcomes is a growing area of research. For example, in 2016 researchers at 
University College London and the universities of Sheffield and Pennsylvania were 
able to design AI which correctly predicted verdicts to an accuracy of 79%, from 
hundreds of cases heard at the European Court of Human Rights.674 Of course, as 
described earlier in this chapter, prediction systems replacing human decision makers 
is likely a ways off, but technology that notices patterns and assists in screening and 
decision making is growing in use across the global justice eco-system.  
 
 
673 Yuan Stevens, The Promises and Perils of Artificial Intelligence: Why Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law Matter, MEDIUM (Sept. 5, 2017). 
674 See Jane Wakefield, AI Predicts Outcome Of Human Rights Cases, BBC, (Oct. 23, 
2016). 
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D. Regulations of Artificial Intelligence  
 
Although regulation of artificial intelligence is a very new endeavor, the United 
Kingdom,675 France,676 Australia,677 and the United States678 all have recently drafted 
or passed legislation to hold tech companies accountable for their algorithms. It should 
be noted that in many instances the regulation is narrowly crafted mainly to make tech 
companies responsible for monitoring content for violent or anti-Semitic speech. 
However, the United States has taken an arguably more broad regulatory approach in 
the new bill, called the Algorithmic Accountability Act,679 which would require tech 
companies to audit not only content but their machine-learning systems for bias and 
discrimination and to take corrective action in a timely manner if such issues were 
identified.680 The Bill is in direct response to several high-profile news stories from 
2018 and ‘19 that have revealed the far-reaching damage algorithmic bias can do in 
various contexts.681 This Bill and several more that are likely to be introduced in the 
coming months in the U.S. are intentionally expansive in order to encompass different 
AI products and data processes across a variety of domains and to account for the 
migratory nature of technologies that are often used for drastically different purposes 
across multiple industries. As such, the full impact of these new regulations will be 
difficult to gauge in the short term.682 The U.S. Congress is trying to rework the 
traditional regulatory framework to accommodate this new reality683 and this will 
undoubtedly lead to various AI-based systems coming under new regulation. The 
 
675 See James Ball, The UK’s Online Laws Could Be The Future Of The Internet—
And That’s Got People Worried, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, (April 9, 2019). 
676 See, Lester Feder and Zorro Maplestone, France Has Recruited Facebook To Help 
Solve Its Anti-Semitism Problem, BUZZFEED NEWS, (March 11, 2019). 
677 See Author, Australia’s New Law Threatens Jail If Social-Media Firms Don’t 
Remove Violent Content, The Download, MIT TECHNOLOGY REVIEW, (April 4, 2019). 
678 See U.S. Senate, Algorithmic Accountability Act, 116 Congress, Session 1, (2019). 
679 See id. 
680 See id. The Act would also require those companies to audit all processes beyond 
machine learning involving sensitive data for privacy and security risks. Interestingly, 
the bill would place regulatory power in the hands of the U.S. Federal Trade 
Commission which is the agency in charge of consumer protections and antitrust 
regulation in the United States. See id. 
681 Staff Author, Algorithmic Accountability Act, The Algorithm, MIT TECH REVIEW, 
(April 12, 2019) . 
682 See id. 
683 See id. 
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newest regulation across the globe is sending a clear message to tech designers: you 
will no longer be allowed to unleash technology-driven systems on the world without 
monitoring, adjusting and using impact assessments as part of your design. 
 
In addition to regulation, many organizations have launched initiatives to establish 
ethical principles focusing on socially beneficial AI. The proliferation of these efforts 
is so great that research is now being undertaken to consider if they can be synthesized 
into a unified framework. In July of 2019, Floridi and Cowls argued such a unified 
framework has in fact emerged.684 In their article A Unified Framework of Five 
Principles for AI in Society,685 they identify these principles as: Beneficence: promoting 
well-being, preserving dignity, and sustaining the planet;686 Non-maleficence: privacy, 
security and “capability caution”;687 Autonomy: the power to decide;688 Justice: 
promoting prosperity, preserving solidarity, avoiding unfairness;689 Explicability: 
enabling the other principles through intelligibility and accountability.690 
 
Of interest in the context of the thesis are several important takeaways from the 
framework. First, the Floridi and Cowls framework introduces a “decide-to-delegate” 
model, recommending that:  
humans should retain the power to decide which decisions to take: 
exercising the freedom to choose where necessary, and ceding it in cases 
 
684 They developed the framework through an examination of well respected, broad 
stakeholder engagement, efforts crafted within the last three years. They are: Future 
of Life Institute, Asilomar AI Principles, (2017); The Montreal Declaration for 
Responsible AI; Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing Human Well-
being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, IEEE’; IEEE,  p6 (2017): European 
Commission’s European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, 
Statement on Artificial Intelligence, Robotics and ‘Autonomous’ Systems, pp. 16-20, 
(March 2018); UK House of Lords Artificial Intelligence Committee’s report, AI in 
the UK: Ready, Willing And Able?, §417; The Tenets of the Partnership on AI, 
(2018). 
685 Luciano Floridi and Josh Cowls, A Unified Framework of Five Principles for AI in 
Society, HARVARD DATA SCIENCE REVIEW, Vol. 1, (2019). 
686 Id. at 3.1.  
687 Id. at 3.2. 
688 Id. at 3.3. 
689 Id. at 3.4. 
690 Floridi, A Unified Framework, supra note 632, at 3.5. 
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where overriding reasons, such as efficacy, may outweigh the loss of 
control over decision-making.691 
This is also in line with the “society in the loop” principle where society should be an 
integral part of the decision of when to use AI and what norms and standards should be 
captured within the deployment.  
 
Second, as explained in the Montreal Declaration, “the development of AI should 
promote justice and seek to eliminate all types of discrimination.”692 This is both a 
noble goal and a necessary minimum standard. A guiding principle of this thesis is that 
technology deployments should be done in a manner that improves society. In this 
author’s opinion too much AI and technology seeks to merely replicate prior 
discriminatory practices, cloaking them behind a veil of “accurate prediction.” We must 
demand better of technology, especially AI.  
 
Finally, as Floridi and Cowls note when commenting on the principle of explicability:  
“explicability,” incorporating both the epistemological sense of 
“intelligibility” (as an answer to the question “how does it work?”) and 
in the ethical sense of “accountability” (as an answer to the question 
“who is responsible for the way it works?”), is the crucial missing piece 
of the AI ethics jigsaw. 
 
Incorporating both intelligibility and accountability is essential in the creation 
of an alternative justice environment that will rely heavily upon technology, 
especially AI. As will be discussed in Chapter 5, it is an essential consideration 
within the model as the trustworthiness of an alternative to justice must be 
essential and it is an expectation under the RoL.  
 
E. Law and AI Chapter Conclusions 
 
As we conclude this chapter, having reviewed their many possible fallacies, it is 
incredibly important to note that predictive AI systems can be remarkably accurate 
compared to human predictors. For example, in October of 2017 U.K.-based legal tech 
 
691 Id. at 3.3. 
692 Floridi, A Unified Framework, supra note 632, at 3.4 citing The Montreal 
Declaration for Responsible AI; Ethically Aligned Design: A Vision for Prioritizing 
Human Well-being with Autonomous and Intelligent Systems, IEEE, p.6, (2017). 
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start-up CaseCrunch challenged lawyers to see who could predict with greater accuracy 
the outcome of a number of financial product claims.693 The outcome: 
CaseCrunch’s predictive algorithms and modelling of legal issues came 
out on top, scoring almost 87% accuracy in terms of predicting the 
success or failure of a claim. The English lawyers who were beaten got 
overall an accuracy level of around 62%.694 
That is not to write that all predictive AI systems are more accurate than their human 
counterparts. As we briefly explored above, several of the more commonly used 
recidivism prediction tools are actually poor predictors of recidivism.695 It is much more 
accurate to say that in pursuing the potential value of prediction, we must take note 
both of the potential of AI and of the cautionary tales that provide a realistic picture of 
the capabilities, limitations and sociotechnical context of technology.  
 
The author’s key argument is that adequately complex models based on appropriate 
framing, and ongoing rigorous evaluations of impact must be made essential aspects of 
all design. Without extreme care, the risks of algorithmic discrimination are high, and 
the potential consequences are grave. Regardless of where bias, dependency or 
partiality arise, their impact will become more and more insidious in a technology-
driven environment, and could lead to further loss of trust in our judiciary. As Chulu 
asserts: 
Living in a democratic society, we expect public institutions to be fair, 
transparent, and accountable. We expect decisions that affect our lives 
to bound by the rule of law, making it possible to demand explanation, 
and appeal and redress of those that are based on faulty premises.696 
Rule of law and trusted judicial agency are essential to any “alternative” to the justice 
system. There simply can be no legitimate argument against such a commitment. The 
outstanding question is what regulation can best ensure a commitment to rule of law in 
these alternative systems. The next chapter seeks to flesh out those aspects of the 
 
693 See Author, AI Beats Human Lawyers in CaseCrunch Prediction Showdown + 
Data Updates, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (Oct. 28, 2017). 
694 Id. 
695 See Ed Yong, A Popular Algorithm Is No Better at Predicting Crimes Than 
Random People, THE ATLANTIC, (Jan. 17, 2018). 
696 Chulu, Let Us End Algorithmic Discrimination, supra note 495. 
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Chapter 5: Design Guidance for the Reduction of Partiality, 
Dependence, and Bias in an Online Justice Decision Maker  
 
This chapter will combine all of the essential topics so far explored into 
recommendations for a complex model of decision making within an online justice 
environment. As the thesis is primarily concerned with the decision maker, the focus 
has been on independence, impartiality and absence of bias within the decision making 
process, and specifically in terms of the decision maker. This chapter brings those 
discrete topics together to propose a single, forward-looking model for decision making 
in ODR.  
 
The use of a model, any model, can be fraught with risk, even if done correctly. And in 
the case of justice environments, the risks are significant: individuals and/or business 
may lose large sums of money, personal liberty, or suffer significant long-term negative 
consequences; furthermore, a secondary effect of underappreciated risk is that it can 
lead to society to lose trust in the justice system. Thus, managing model risk will form 
the backbone of this chapter’s analysis and recommendations.  
 
The chapter will begin by identifying, explaining and supporting eight main rules of 
action that must guide all of the design choices that go into the complex decision 
making model. The chapter will then take key terminology, such as decision maker and 
automation, which have been used in context throughout the thesis, and provide them 
with specific operative definitions in the context of the model proposed. Having 
established both the basic principles and technical components that will constitute it, 
the thesis will then present a unified model of online justice that focuses on providing 
assurance of compliance with the Rule of Law. Finally, the chapter concludes with 
some additional items of design guidance aimed at addressing concerns that may arise 
relating to aspects of the model other than our primary focus, the decision making 
process. 
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*Modeling for this Project:  Limitations and Necessary Adjustments 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, modeling – that is the process of breaking down a complex 
task into discrete steps has limitations.  This is especially true when one of the complex 
tasks is decision making.  In crafting the model, below, the model builder is guided by 
a set of specific rules of action. Yet, in creating these rules of action, especially in a 
setting such as this, the model building is significantly limited in terms of perspective, 
experience and personal bias.  For example, it is important to recall, as described in 
Chapter 4 social complexity is a major issue in model building and this is especially 
true in justice environment.  The model below, is limited due to the nature of the thesis, 
and therefore likely suffers at the hands the fairness trap.697 In this situation, the model 
is focused on a specific narrow aspect of a much larger system. And while this may, in 
general, be appropriate in some settings, in a complex justice environment it is a 
potential issue. To address this issue the model designer has attempted to be clear that 
this model does not intend to capture the social complexity of the entire justice 
environment. Nor, does the model attempt to capture all decision making. Instead, the 
model builds upon – and specifically uses- existing rules, parameters, and bounds to 
replicate existing systems.  The choice to replicate, with adjustments and additions, of 
an existing system, is however, also a bias as it presupposes the existing systems are 
worthy of replication.698 
However, the model also embraces many of the aspects of social complexity as model 
limitations that must be considered and reflected in the design. For example, the 
solutionism trap, that is where technology is assumed to be the best solution,699 is 
specifically rejected as the model uses technology in well- defined areas and rejects the 
use of technology when the technology fails to full capture social and legal complexity. 
In fact, the model inserts a human when complex decision making is needed to resolve 
a dispute. As explored in Chapter 4, current algorithm driven systems, even expert 
 
697 See Chapter 4, supra at A(3)(b)(i). 
698 Note, this is not the portability trap, where an algorithm is repurposed.  
699 See Chapter 4, supra at A(3)(b)(v). 
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systems,700 have yet to fully capture the complexity of complex, nuanced, legal 
prediction.701 Currently, there is no outcome predictive system that can model legal 
reasoning in complex legal decision making that is widely released and verified as 
accurate. 702 Moreover, the data these systems are built upon is often less than robust, 
complete and/or bias free.703  As such, the model sets out specific Rules of Action that 
set limits and provide guidance to the model deign. For example, Rule of Action 6, 
proscribes a human in the decision-making loop.704While, the definitions create limits, 
such as the definition of a dispute (the limits to when a human will be sued) and Chapter 
5, section 3(b) adjusts the decision making model to account for the risk that arises for 
bringing a human into the decision making loop.705  
 
Finally, the Ripple Effect, that is the failure to understand how the insertion of 
technology into a system will change the system706 has been accommodated in the 
model, however, as an early model it is clear more research will need to be done to fully 
identify how the deployment of technology, in the way proscribed in Chapter 5 will 
impact the complex justice environment.  Within the current model, the human decision 
maker insertion and the impact of the technology will hopefully be discovered through 
robust auditing and by the reduction of conflict in the appointment process. First, the 
system, of both appointments, human interaction with the system, and outcomes are all 
part of monitoring and auditing.707 The model is designed to discover issues and to 
mitigate against these issues through the use of an institution of authority.708 The 
authority has the ability to take corrective action and to provide feedback, both to design 
 
700 See Chapter 4, supra at B(1-3). 
701 See Chapter 4, supra at A(3)(b)(v). 
702 See Chapter 4, supra at B(2). 
703 See Chapter 4, supra at A(3). 
704 See Chapter 5, infra at A(6). 
705 See Chapter 5, infra at C(3)(b)(i). 
706 See Chapter 4, supra at A(3)(b)(iv). 
707 See Chapter 5, infra at C(3)(1)(3). 
708 See Chapter 5, infra at C(3)(b)(1). 
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and to the human in the loop.709 In addition, the impact of the technology deployment 
in the entirety of the system, including the impact upon the users of the system and 
those who receive outcomes, is also discovered and monitored, through the use of 
ongoing impact assessment710 and user risk arising from the human interacting with 
technology itself.711  Impact assessment are specifically designed tools that are often 
used in technology environments to note and adjust systems to mitigate negative 
impacts,712 such as unintended consequences that might arise from unintended 
disclosures or similar events.  
Undoubtedly, there is one key point of potential risk that arises from model design such 
as this, the risk that system is embedded into a system and the model fantastically fails. 
Unfortunately, other than recognizing such risk exists, and insisting that robust 
research, testing, and monitoring of the system occurs, this risk is a reality of 
technology design.  The entire system is designed with best practices in mind, 
monitoring,713 auditing,714 and outcome driven surveys.715  But systems fail and one 
must concede the only way to prevent widescale negative impacts is to catch those 
negative impacts as early and as quickly as possible through a well-designed process 
of monitoring and mitigating to reduce negative impacts.716  
 
 
A. Rules of Action 
 
Rules of Action are the rules that govern a design undertaking. Rules are taken as true, 
until proven otherwise.717 This section will set out the eight main rules of action the 
 
709 See id. 
710 See Chapter 5, infra at C(4). 
711 See Chapter 5, infra at C(3)(iii). 
712 See id. 
713 See Chapter 5, infra at A(5). 
714 See id. 
715 See id. 
716 See Chapter 5, infra at B(6). 
717 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(1). 
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author proposes ought to govern the design of a decision making model in a justice 
environment.  
 
Both these rules and the resulting model are designed with the following goals in mind. 
(1) Design Objective: To produce a machine learning–based model that assists 
individuals in making decisions relating to the resolution of identified legal conflicts. 
(2) Business Use: To design a model that can be deployed in both public and private 
alternative justice environments as an assistant to the decision maker. (3) Thesis Focus: 
To ensure a model in which decision makers are both impartial and independent, 
without exception, even if adherence to this rule of law principle conflicts with the 
efficiencies of the overall ODR system. (4) Risk Management: to mitigate risks 
associated with potential dependence, partiality and bias. Based upon these objectives, 
the following sub sections set out the rules of action, both expanding upon topics and 
resolving concerns raised in prior chapters.  
 
1. The Rule of Law (RoL) MUST be protected within the online justice environment.  
 
As previously discussed in Chapter 1, the RoL embodies several protections that are 
considered essential within any justice environment. The absence of RoL principles 
implies, prima facie, negative impacts upon the people inside the justice environment. 
Moreover, when the RoL is absent, the trust of the users of the justice environment will 
erode.718 Thus, ANY justice environment that fails to fulfill the expectation of 
adherence to the RoL is problematic to the institution of justice as a whole.  
 
In this specific case, it is important to recall several aspects of the thesis. First, this 
ODR system being designed is envisioning a private dispute resolution mechanism, 
with arbitration as a final stage of the process.  The inclusion of such this specific type 
of ODR system sets the stage for several key aspects to be carried through the rules and 
the model. With private arbitration as the key component, voluntary, consent of the 
parties, and choice between providers and institutions is key to considerations of 
authority, design, and monitoring. As described in Chapter 2, arbitration and arbitration 
 
718 See supra Chapter 1, Section A, C, and D. 
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institutions are considered, by the global legal community as appropriate dispute 
resolution providers and as appropriate authorities of such services. The providers, 
under the authority existing within the arbitration community and supported by the 
global legal community as part of the very fabric of ODR.  It is these institutions tasked 
with maintaining and protecting the trust placed in them.  
 
2. An Independent And Impartial Decision Maker Is An Essential RoL Principle, 
Such That No Departure From The Principle Should Be Allowed 
 
As demonstrated in Chapter 1, the RoL is a highly regarded, widely recognized set of 
principles which embody the expectations of what a justice system should entail. The 
absence or failure of a single principle may be, and often is, sufficient to raise doubts 
about the entire system’s adherence to the RoL.719 One of the essential attributes of the 
RoL is that judicial decisions are made within an independent judiciary by impartial 
and independent decision makers.720 The absence of this attribute constitutes a systemic 
failure of RoL. And, while there are various important concerns in the world of justice 
that demand to be balanced against each other, these fundamental principles are so 
significant that there can be no balancing of interests. It is not possible to balance a 
quicker or less costly process against an independent and impartial tribunal; the absence 
of an impartial tribunal not only negatively impacts but categorically undermines the 
entire endeavor. An impartial and independent decision maker is a non-negotiable 
aspect of any justice environment, even a private online one. 
 
3. It Is The Method Of Ensuring The Independence And Impartiality Of The Decision 
Maker That Is Open For Greater Debate 
 
The exact method of successfully providing the various attributes of the RoL is, 
however, a matter of legitimate debate. For example, while an independent judiciary 
and an independent and impartial decision maker are essential attributes, the features 
that make up the standard measure for independence and impartiality are less than 
universal. Prior chapters, such as Chapters 2 and 3, have attempted to explore and find 
 
719 See supra Chapter 1, Section B. 
720 See supra Chapter 1, Section C, and D. 
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commonality amongst the various systems.721 And while some commonality does exist, 
grey areas remain. Thus, the model must work to ensure the mitigation of risk 
associated with those gray areas.  
 
Returning to Chapter 3’s presentation of data on actual challenges made to the 
impartiality and independence of arbitrators,722 the following summary graph is 
revealing: 
 
Reason for Challenge Count  
Ties to Legal Practice 17 
Prior Arbitration Work 5 
Other Professional Ties 9 
Social Ties 6 
Multiple Arbitrators 5 
 
With the exception of multiple arbitrators, the significant majority of these cases turned 
on one party believing the decision maker’s impartiality to be compromised by the 
presence of a prior or current relationship. As such, current cases and existing 
arbitration rules demonstrate that parties expect the justice environment to eliminate 
dependent relationships. These cases suggest that partiality is presumed if dependence 
exists. 
 
However, in Chapter 1, the author explained and supported the assertion that 
independence and impartiality are deserving of separate guarantee.723 As such, a system 
ought to go beyond current expectations and be designed to ensure both the 
independence and impartiality of the decision maker, as both are required to be 
compliant with the RoL. Moreover, as arbitral institutions are an essential part of the 
ODR design envisioned later in the Chapter, it is these institutions that are tasked with 
ensuring compliance with these expectations. And as arbitration institutions, their 
outcomes are part of the check and balance system of limited review of outcomes 
 
721 See supra Chapter 2, Section A, and B; Chapter 3, Section B. 
722 See supra Chapter 2, Section D. 
723 See supra Chapter 1, Section A. 
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afforded all awards at the time of enforcement.724  As such, local courts serve to ensure 
arbitration institutions meet the appropriate standard. 725 
 
Later sections will begin to frame this issue in practical terms. In general, it is this 
author’s contention that AI-driven online systems will and should use data analytics to 
monitor and improve all aspects of the system, including the behavior of the human 
decision maker. As such, technology can and should be used to reduce partiality in a 
number of ways.  
 
Conflicting out decision makers based upon prior relationships could be a reasonable 
proxy for reduction of dependency, and is a task that can be greatly abetted by use of 
AI.726 Moreover, auditing of the parties and the decision makers use of the system, 
including written communications, and auditing of outcomes are operations that 
technology can perform with great positive impact. If, for example, an algorithm can 
identify patterns that were otherwise indiscernible to the decision maker or their 
governing institution, this information from the algorithm presents the decision maker 
with an opportunity to become aware of potential issues. At this point they may ask 
themselves whether those patterns legitimately reflect the circumstances of the cases 
they are assigned, or if they reveal potential partiality issues. This would create a 
constructive feedback loop between algorithmic and human intelligence. 
 
4. It is the Model Design that Mitigates Dependence and Bias 
 
As explained in Chapter 4, bias can emerge within algorithms and their outputs as well 
as within humans. Algorithmic bias originates, (1) from biases pre-existing in the 
training data,727 (2) from limitations built into the processes and terms of the algorithm 
itself,728 and (3) as emergent biases that result from human interactions with the 
 
724 See supra Chapter 2 (A). 
725 See supra Chapter 2 (A). 
726 A task that also should fall to the responsibility of the appointing institution as it is 
the arbitration institution that registers individuals to become part of the roster of 
arbitrators and it is the institution that creates conflict rules, enforces conflict rules 
and ultimately determines if a conflict exists.  
727 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(3). 
728 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(3). 
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technology.729 Model design must consider all three of these areas to reduce bias in the 
entirety of the system. In our specific instance, that includes the reduction of bias in the 
entire system as well as reduction of dependence and partiality in the human decision 
maker. The following sections will specifically speak to bias in the non-human aspects 
of the decision making process, while also seeking to reduce dependence and partiality 
in the human decision maker. For example, dependence will be reduced through 
requiring human decision makers to comply with a carefully crafted arbitration 
institution conflict declaration protocol and through a random selection process. 
Partiality will be reduced by arbitration institutions programmatically monitoring the 
outcomes and deploying machine learning to discover patterns. In addition, the author 
seeks to address bias in the process of decision making by embracing a strong 
preference for human-centered design, which demands the system itself be monitored 
for emergent bias by the appointing institution. For example, the arbitration institution 
technology will be able to present multiple models of prediction and suggestions that 
allow the human decision maker to select from various potential outcomes. The pattern 
of final selections will also be monitored by the arbitration institution technology, so 
the system can react to emergent bias within the human portion of the model. Ensuring 
these steps are enshrined within the model from the beginning allows auditors to 
discover emergent issues and ensures the biases are addressed from inception, thereby 
ensuring a commitment to the reduction of partiality and dependence, an essential 
commitment to the RoL.  
 
5. The Reduction of Negatively Impactful Bias is the Current “Best Practice” 
Standard  
 
While dependence can likely be greatly reduced through a well-designed nomination, 
selection and conflict process, bias and impartiality present greater difficulty. As such, 
special focus must be given to impartiality and bias beyond the measures listed in Rule 
of Action 4. 
 
 
729 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(3). 
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Impartiality, as defined in Chapter 1, is a “state of mind or attitude of the tribunal in 
relation to the issues and the parties in a particular case.”730 As Mill explains, it is an 
obligation of justice and an essential concept with the RoL to ensure that the decision 
maker is “exclusively influenced by the considerations which it is supposed ought to 
influence the particular case at hand.”731 One can thus argue that the state of mind of 
the decision maker is an important consideration. Yet, the state of mind is obviously a 
very difficult attribute to measure; in fact it is likely impossible to measure, as implicit 
bias and hidden agendas are rarely admitted. Transparency and technology may provide 
a way to reveal some of the decision maker’s state of mind through monitoring 
behavior, as described above.732  
 
The question quickly becomes, however, not merely how to measure but exactly what 
to allow and what to prohibit. For example, it is easy to argue that outcomes of all 
decisions must be transparent and to achieve this objective by publishing outcomes. It 
is however, more difficult to determine what will be considered bias or partiality. The 
author contends that the standard must be no “negatively impactful bias.” Negatively 
impactful bias/partiality occurs when considerations that should not influence the 
decision become involved in the decision making process in some way. For example, 
gender may be an important consideration as part of the decision process when 
discussing disparity in pay amongst genders; yet it has nothing to do with decisions 
relating to a car accident. So, if this particular attribute has appeared in the decision 
making process on a car case and has potentially influenced the outcome, it should be 
considered to be impactful. And, the system should work to eliminate the consideration 
and the impact.  
 
This may provide us with our first solid example of beneficial technological auditing, 
which could be done within arbitration institution technology. Consider an auditing 
algorithm that discovers patterns in outcomes in situations where men are the victim of 
 
730 See supra Chapter 1, Section D. 
731 Mill, UTILITARIANISM, supra note 97. 
732 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(3). 
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violence by a female. Based on this discovery, human decision makers733 could choose 
to adjust the system parameters so that certain types of information (gender) are not 
provided to the decision maker in certain cases (car accidents). Alternatively, the 
algorithm might discover patterns in the decisions made by a particular individual. In 
this instance the system may be designed to provide additional information to the 
individual to assist them in recognizing and overcoming the pattern.  
 
While these examples may seem far-fetched, in fact systems already do behave in this 
way. As my co-authors and I explained in The Angel on Your Shoulder: Prompting 
Employees to Do the Right Thing Through the Use of Wearables734 employers already 
widely use devices and the monitoring of behavior to measure employment targets and 
employee behaviors. In fact, many have created nudges to increase employee 
compliance with directives about everything from attentiveness to healthy behavior.735 
Transparency and auditing can and should be important aspects of ensuring that 
negatively impactful bias and partiality are reduced.  
 
6. There Must Be A Human Within The Final Step of the Technology-Driven 
Decision Making Model  
 
As was previously explored in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4, current deployments of AI and 
machine learning cannot fully capture legal reasoning and/or discretion in decision 
making.736 It is therefore the author’s contention that as of the writing of this thesis, 
there must be a human in the decision making process to act as the final decision maker. 
This section will break down the arguments leading to this determination, explore its 
consequences for the overall model, and finally will explore possible solutions for the 
necessity of using human judgment.  
 
 
733 As designers of the institution and within the expectations auditing of the 
technology to improve the system. 
734 See Timothy Fort, Anjanette Raymond, and Scott Shackelford, The Angel on Your 
Shoulder: Prompting Employees to Do the Right Thing Through the Use of 
Wearables, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY, 14(2) (2016). 
735 See id. 
736 See supra Chapter 1, Section 4; Chapter 4, Section B. 
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a. Rejecting the Application of an Individual Jurisprudential School 
 
As should be recalled from  Chapter 1, legal formalists consider law to be “rationally” 
determinate, i.e., the class of legitimate legal reasons available for a judge to offer in 
support of his decision justifies one and only one outcome, either in all cases or in some 
significant range of cases; and (2) adjudication is thus “autonomous” from other kinds 
of reasoning, that is, the judge can reach the required decision without recourse to non-
legal normative considerations of morality or political philosophy.737 As such, the use 
of a formalist school of jurisprudence as the foundation of model design will likely lead 
model developers, in conjunction with legal experts, to distill the law down to a 
concrete set of rules, sub-rules and exceptions, with outcomes measured against a 
metric designed to lead to a consistent outcomes. Discretion, in its most basic sense, 
would be rejected; instead objective, measurable, consistent outcomes would be the 
hallmark of a successful justice technology.  
 
Should ODR design elect to use a legal formalism approach to design, the technology-
based decision makers will be programed within a rule-based structure. The rules, 
drawn from a variety of published legal codes, will remain static. The system will be 
tested to ensure that the outcome remains consistent — and consistency across similar 
situations will be paramount to success. Like the solution to a simple math problem, 
the outcome will be fully determined once all the relevant rules have been engaged. 
 
In contrast, legal realists would expect the system model to embrace “an unsentimental 
and honest account of what judges really do.”738 In this type of system, designers may 
elect to work backwards — examining existing cases to discover patterns and 
correlations that can be used to create rules that reflect the existing judicial system. 
These discovered rules would likely be layered on top of the law in a way that would 
help mimic the decision making process of human justices.  
 
Of course, discussion of the law and rules, when considered within jurisprudence, is 
often much too simplistic, primarily because of the highly variable and intricately 
 
737 See supra Chapter 1, Section E(1). 
738 See supra Chapter 1, Section E(2). 
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nuanced micro-judgments that occur throughout the decision making process. Consider 
the case of Winfield v. City of New York,739 in which United States Magistrate Judge 
Katharine H. Parker was faced with a dispute concerning e-discovery, mainly a 
challenge to the predictive coding driving the search engine.740 The heart of the dispute 
focused on the active machine learning process that required an algorithm to identify 
“relevant” documents.741 Active machine learning is built on input from subject matter 
experts (SME), that is, persons who understand the area of interest being explored. If 
the SME misdefines an essential term, in this case relevance, then so will the AI. The 
argument advanced by the plaintiffs was that improperly coded documents in the 
training dataset resulted in a multitude of miscoded documents in the algorithm’s 
output.742 The result, it was argued, was that many documents had been erroneously 
identified as irrelevant743 and thus were not produced.744  
 
It is important to note that in the Winfield case the judge had issued several rulings 
relating to relevance745 — and yet, the rule used to drive e-discovery proved 
problematic. At this stage in the discussion, the specifics of the Winfield ruling are of 
little concern; what is important to note is that this is a debate about the threshold at 
which human discretion becomes necessary. Certain essential and widely used terms 
within the justice system, such as relevance, are incredibly difficult to define, and in 
practice the nuances are often decided within the parameters of a specific case, relying 
on human interpretation and judicial discretion.  
 
In addition, when designing technology to predict outcomes or assist humans in basic 
analysis, it is important to note that issues can arise within the context of 
“interpretation” of statutory language. Despite the existence of what appears on the face 
to be very specific language, interpretation is an essential consideration when analyzing 
legal text. The nuisance of interpretation leads to problems within the technology-
 
739 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194413 (SDNY, Nov. 27, 2017). 
740 See Winfield, U.S. Dist., at para. *1. 
741 See id. at para. *4. 
742 See id. at para. *2. 
743 See id.  
744 See id. 
745 See Winfield, U.S. Dist., at para. *2. 
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driven system. Applying specific language presents difficulties throughout the justice 
system, this can be demonstrated by the U.S. Supreme Court case of Digital Realty 
Trust v Paul Somers.746 In the case, the justices ruled unanimously that employees are 
not protected from retaliation if they “blow the whistle” on alleged corporate misdeeds 
without going to the Securities and Exchange Commission.747 The ruling was based 
upon the plain language of the Dodd-Frank law, which limited those eligible for 
whistle-blower protections to “any individual who provides . . . information relating to 
a violation of the securities laws to the Commission . . .”748 Despite the plain language, 
and the reading falling clearly within Dodd-Frank’s purpose and design749 two lower 
federal courts and the SEC themselves had misapplied the statute.750 As can be inferred 
from this specific case, even highly specific, plain language statues are often subject to 
widely different and incredibly variant interpretations. Introducing technology into the 
decision making process does not eliminate the issue, it merely hides the interpretation 
difficulties behind a veil of code.  
 
Technology in the justice system must bring about a convergence of hard and fast rules 
with appropriately bounded discretion, which can alternatively be defined as non-
negatively impactful bias. As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor describes:  
But there are situations in which some experiences are important in the 
process of judging because the law asks us to use those experiences.751 
 
 
746 Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 583 U.S. ___ (2018). 
747 See Digital Realty Trust, 583 U.S at 2. 
748 See Digital Realty Trust, 583 U.S at 2 relying upon 15 U. S. C. §78u– 6(a)(6). 
749 The core objective of Dodd-Frank’s whistleblower program is to aid the 
Commission’s enforcement efforts by “motivat[ing] people who know of securities 
law violations to tell the SEC.” S. Rep. No. 111–176, p. 38 (emphasis added) cited in 
Digital Realty Trust, Inc. v. Somers, 83 U. S. (2018). 
750 See Richard Wolf, Supreme Court Deals Blow To Wall Street Whistle-Blowers 
With Unanimous Ruling, USA TODAY (Feb. 21, 2018). 
751 Sotomayor, Confirmation Hearings, at 71, 120 (statement of J. Sonia Sotomayor) 
contained in WASHINGTON POST TRANSCRIPT, Sen. Jeff Sessions Holds a Hearing on 
the Nomination of Judge Sonia Sotomayor to Be an Associate Justice of the U.S. 
Supreme Court, CQ TRANSCRIPTIONS, (Tuesday, July 14, 2009) available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/07/14/AR2009071401155.html?noredirect=on (last visited 
Aug. 5, 2019). 
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Thus, we as a society, and specifically the designers of models for technologically-
enhanced justice, must be able to distinguish between concepts that are eligible to be 
represented as rules and areas where discretion is essential. We must build both of these 
aspects into the technology-assisted justice system. In making this argument, the author 
supports a hybrid jurisprudence, which is certainly far from an uncontested ideal. Such 
models have come under fire for years, as highlighted by jurist John Selden in a well-
trodden notation: 
'Tis all one as if they should make the standard for the measure we call 
a foot, a Chancellor's foot; what an uncertain measure would this be? 
One Chancellor has a long foot, another a short foot, a third an 
indifferent foot: 'tis the same thing in a Chancellor's conscience.752 
This criticism, however, fails to distinguish subjectivity from discretion. And this 
distinction is in fact precisely where properly deployed technology might be able to 
help. Technology allows for the creation of specific rules that bound the permissible 
level and particular application of discretion, limiting the potential for random, 
unpredictable, or footwear-based judicial vagaries. For example, the system could be 
designed to ask for input from a human, yet to limit the input to a specific list of choices, 
or could ask the human to record an explanation of the choice made. In this way, 
discretion could be permissible, in a specific set of circumstances, yet would be 
bounded by the choices presented. As discussed in Chapter 1, Lord Bingham strongly 
advocated for bounded discretion,753 and if done correctly the system could ensure this 
essential RoL principle is part of the design process.754 
 
b. Rejection of the “Robot” Decision Maker 
In 2001, a speech given by then Supreme Court nominee Sonia Sotomayor at the 
University of California, Berkeley drew sharp focus upon a longstanding belief that 
impartiality demands a neutral and detached decision maker and, more particularly, one 
 
752 John Selden, Table Talk, quoted in M. B. Evans and R. I. Jack (eds), Sources of 
English Legal and Constitutional History, BUTTERWORTHS, Sydney, 223-224, (1984). 
753 See Bingham, supra note 56. See discussion Chapter 1, Section A. 
754 One can argue, this particular aspect of model design will be left to the model 
designer, i.e. the person tasked with creation by the arbitration institution. It is an 
open question, however, how this would be- or if it should be- an expectation for the 
enforcement of the outcome of the process. 
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who is in no way guided by emotion.755 Nominee Sotomayor states: “I would hope that 
a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences would more often than not 
reach a better conclusion than a white male who has not lived that life.”756 This talking 
point raised its head during the confirmation hearings in which Nominee Sotomayor 
was asked by Sen. Jeff Sessions (R-AL) about whether judges should allow their 
“prejudices” to “impact their decision making.”757 
Sotomayor addressed this controversy: 
Never their prejudices. I was talking about the very important goal of 
the justice system is to ensure that the personal biases and prejudices of 
a judge do not influence the outcome of a case. What I was talking about 
was the obligation of judges to examine what they’re feeling as they’re 
adjudicating a case and to ensure that it’s not influencing the outcome. 
Life experiences have to influence you. We’re not robots to listen to 
evidence and not have feelings. We have to recognize those feelings and 
put them aside. … But there are situations in which some experiences 
are important in the process of judging because the law asks us to use 
those experiences.758 
She went on to add: 
I think the system is strengthened when judges don’t presume they’re 
impartial, but when judges test themselves to identify when their 
emotions are driving a result, or their experiences are driving a result, 
and the law is not.759 
 
Nominee Sotomayor’s statement flew in the face of the classical liberal view that 
depicts judges as simply dispassionate dispensers of objective rules.760 The ideal of the 
emotionless, “dispassionate” judge has a very long pedigree. More than three centuries 
ago, Thomas Hobbes wrote in Leviathan that the ideal judge is “divested of all fear, 
anger, hatred, love and compassion.”761 As previously discussed, within this classical 
view, the judge disinterestedly “declared” a law that existed external to and 
 
755 See Sotomayor, Confirmation Hearings, supra note 672 at 71. 
756 Id. 
757 See id.  
758 Id. 
759 Id. 
760 See supra Chapter 1, Section D, and Section E(1).  
761 Thomas Hobbes, LEVIATHAN 203 (A.R. Waller ed., 1904) (1651). 
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independently of him, for law was a science of rules, and judgment was the deductive 
enterprise of subsuming particular facts under general norms.762  
 
However, Justice Sotomayor was not the first to reject the classical view of law as rules 
rather than of men. Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson once wrote, “dispassionate 
judges” are “mythical beings,” like “Santa Claus or Uncle Sam or Easter bunnies.”763 
In 1921 Justice Benjamin Cardozo recognized that “[d]eep below consciousness are 
other forces, the likes and the dislikes, the predilections and the prejudices, the complex 
of instincts and emotions and habits and convictions, which make the man, whether he 
be litigant or judge.”764 Justice William Brennan also rejected the classical view and 
instead acknowledged the important role that qualities other than reason must play in 
the judicial process. “In ignoring these qualities, the judiciary has deprived itself of the 
nourishment essential to a healthy and vital rationality.”765 In 2006, then nominee and 
now Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito offered a specific example when he said 
“when I get a case about discrimination, I have to think about people in my own family 
who suffered discrimination because of their ethnic background or because of religion 
or because of gender.”766  
 
The technology assisted decision making process here proposed supports and enhances 
the judicial self-reflection championed by Justice Sotomayor and others. It will be 
designed to monitor patterns and provide judges with a reflection that encourages them 
to be mindful of the borders between experience, passion and impartiality. It will 
provide bounds within which judicial discretion is permissible, and indeed, this author 
contends, necessary.  
 
762 See supra Chapter 1, Section D, and Section E(1). 
763 United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 93-94 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
764 Benjamin N. Cardozo, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 167-68 (1921) 
765 William  J.  Brennan,  Jr.,  Reason,  Passion  and  the  “Progress  of  the  Law, 10  
CARDOZO  L.  REV.  3,  9  (1988)  (arguing  that  by  ignoring  “the  range  of  
emotional  and  intuitive  responses  to  a  given  set  of  facts  or  arguments  .  .  .  the  
judiciary  had  deprived  itself  of  the  nourishment  essential  to  a  healthy  and  vital  
rationality.”). Id.  
766 Emily Bazelon, Mysterious Justice, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, referencing his 
testimony in his confirmation hearings, (March 18, 2011)(commenting on his lone 
dissent in the free-speech suit Albert Snyder brought against the Westboro Baptist 
Church for picketing the funeral of his son, a soldier who was killed in Iraq.) Id.   
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c. The Emotionally Intelligent Decision Maker 
 
Having determined that a purely technological, rule-focused neutral decision maker is 
ultimately not capable of performing the full range of judicial duties, we now turn to 
clarifying what the components that lie outside of the technological sphere comprise. 
This section will begin to frame a theory of the “emotionally intelligent” decision 
maker.  
 
Professor Maroney provides a launching point for the argument: 
 
Within law, we have inherited some hefty cultural baggage, weighted 
down with the belief that a good judge is emotionless. This article has 
unpacked that baggage and suggested that it is that belief, not emotion, 
that should be put aside. We need a new ideal: that of the emotionally 
intelligent judge. The emotionally intelligent judge is self-aware and is 
able to think coherently about her emotions and to be in control of their 
expression. She is willing to seek the opinions and support of others and 
approaches the emotional challenges of the job with openness and 
flexibility.767 
  
It is time we reject the historic concepts of a detached decision maker, an unobtainable 
ideal that only serves to cloak the impact of bias, prejudice and partiality in judicial 
decision making, converting them into supposed objectivity and so embedding bias into 
the system. Instead, we need decision makers well trained to be self-aware of their own 
potential leanings. It is the ideal of “self-awareness” that we must ensure is embedded 
into the decision makers within the online justice system.  
With the use of technology it may be possible to go a step father — requiring the 
arbitrator to be aware of their own thought processes, but also aiding them in that 
responsibility with a system that can signal the potential introduction of bias.  
 
It bears revisiting an important utterance from U.S. Supreme Court Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor who argues: 
I think the system is strengthened when judges don’t presume they’re 
impartial, but when judges test themselves to identify when their 
 
767 Terry A. Maroney, The Emotionally Intelligent Judge: A New (and Realistic) 
Ideal, 49 COURT REVIEW 100 (2013); VANDERBILT PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH PAPER 
No. 15-33 (2013). 
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emotions are driving a result, or their experiences are driving a result, 
and the law is not.768 
 
Ultimately, there are times when a human must be able to intervene in an AI decision 
making process to exercise discretion in areas where concepts are too nuanced for the 
rigid rules of the system to fully capture, and there are times when the human should 
be guided by feedback from the AI decision making program to recognize partiality 
and steer back toward the clear bright lines of the rules. There are of course, immediate 
concerns about the introduction of a new source of potential bias when a human is 
introduced into the decision making process. As such, at all times the AI decision 
making process and the intervening human decision maker should be monitored for the 
introduction of bias. Thus, the intervening human decision maker should also be 
monitored by those deploying the assistive technology to ensure that the AI outputs are 
used as guidance and not a shortcut to arriving at conclusions/decisions. 
 
The current version of the guidelines regarding algorithmic decision making and the 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) accords with our view that humans are in 
fact required to intervene in AI decision making.769 However, it goes much too far in 
requiring that a human reviewing an algorithmic decision consider “all the available 
input and output data” (emphasis added).770 This renders a major benefit of the 
technology, its processing power, moot, and is likely no less unrealistic than the 
expectation of pure disinterest. Instead, higher-level auditing can control for bias in the 
data, the process, the outcome and the impact of the decisions. As argued by the Center 
for Data Innovation: 
They (humans) can look at the algorithm’s aggregate behavior 
to check for evidence of bias: for example, by checking whether 
particular outcomes correlate to any protected characteristics 
(such as ethnicity, religion, or sexuality), and if so, by finding 
the data points related to those characteristics that lead to those 
outcomes, deciding whether they are fair, and if not, adjusting 
the algorithm accordingly. If necessary, a human auditor can 
 
768 See Sotomayor, Confirmation Hearings, supra note 672 at 71. 
769 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 
April 2016, On The Protection Of Natural Persons With Regard To The Processing 
Of Personal Data And On The Free Movement Of Such Data, at Art. 22, (repealing 
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation))(2016). 
770 Id.  
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also consider the most important or sensitive data involved in an 
individual case, which will vary depending on the nature of the 
decision—but aggregate auditing will likely remain a far more 
effective way of identifying bias.771 
 
Auditing will identify problematic algorithmic behavior and humans will determine 
how to respond. Auditing of outcomes, especially those identified as highly impactful, 
for negative impact is especially necessary. Thus, regulation specific to the 
identification of algorithmic problems and the human response to the problems is a 
necessary step in the governance process. 
 
 
7. Accountability is Essential as ODR is part of the Justice Eco-System 
 
This thesis has presented accountability as a guiding aspect of the creation of an ODR 
environment that seeks to be compliant with RoL principles.772 This is a concern in 
several keys areas: mainly the accountability of those that deploy the technology and 
accountability of those that use technology as a tool to assist in the decision making 
process. Both aspects of accountability are essential to the overall ODR eco-system. 
 
Accountability as it relates to the design and deployment of technology is a topic of 
growing interest in the AI community. Although few regulations currently place such 
a burden on designers or those that deploy technology, it is hopefully the case that more 
legal accountability will occur in the near future.  
 
Despite the lack of regulation, there is an emerging set of best practices, reports and 
guidelines on the use of AI. For example, the Partnership on AI released a Report on 
Algorithmic Risk Assessment Tools in the U.S. Criminal Justice System in which the 
partnership examines the scope of the data-driven problem in the use of prediction-
based AI in the U.S. justice environment and makes specific recommendations.773 The 
 
771 Center For Data Innovation, Comments To The Article 29 Working Party(WP29) 
On Its Guidelines Regarding Algorithmic Decision-Making And The General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), at 3, (Nov. 2017). 
772 See supra Chapter 5, Section A(7).  
773 Partnership on AI, Report on Algorithmic Risk Assessment Tools in the U.S. 
Criminal Justice System, Partnership on AI Publication  (2019). 
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Berkman Klein Center has released a series of topical papers focusing on the Ethics 
and Governance of AI774 and has quickly emerged as a leader when it comes to 
considerations of the impact, governance, ethics and accountability of these 
technologies, terminology that will become increasingly familiar as the capture moves 
ahead. 
 
Government has taken notice as well, for example, the European Commission recently 
released a Draft Ethics Guidelines For Trustworthy AI775 which focuses on two 
components:  
(1) it should respect fundamental rights, applicable regulation and core 
principles and values, ensuring an “ethical purpose” and (2) it should be 
technically robust and reliable since, even with good intentions, a lack 
of technological mastery can cause unintentional harm.776 
 
And, the UK Information Commissioner's Office has created the AI Auditing 
Framework777 and the most recently the Law Society of England and Wales undertook 
the task of exploring and reporting upon Algorithms in the Criminal Justice System. 
Within the report they note: 
When decision systems are introduced into public contexts such as 
criminal justice, it is important they are subject to the scrutiny expected 
in a democratic society. Algorithmic systems have been criticized on 
this front, as when developed in secretive circumstances or outsourced 
to private entities, they can be construed as rule making not subject to 
appropriate procedural safeguards or societal oversight.778 
The report clearly supports several aspects of this thesis’ assertions. Although it is 
limited to criminal justice, the same concerns are directly applicable to the role of the 
 
774 The Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University, Ethics 
and Governance of AI, (2017) available at   https://cyber.harvard.edu/topics/ethics-
and-governance-ai (last viewed Aug. 13, 2019). 
775 European Commission’s High-Level Expert Group on Artificial Intelligence (AI 
HLEG), Draft Ethics Guidelines For Trustworthy AI, E.C. Publication, (2018). 
776 Id. at i. 
777 U.K. Information Commissioners Office, AI Auditing Framework, ICO 
publication, (2018)( A formal consultation will be published towards the end of 
2019.). 
778 The Law Society of England and Wales, Algorithms in the Criminal Justice 
System, supra note 602, at Section 5.4.3.2 at page 22. 
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decision maker within any justice environment. The report goes on to highlight a 
finding consistent with the author’s assertion:  
Few provisions currently support civil society organisations or forms of 
collective oversight of algorithmic systems directly, leaving a 
significant accountability gap in need of remedy.(emphasis added)779 
 
As noted, despite the growing body of guidance, policy makers have yet to enact an 
enforcement mechanism intended to ensure a specific level of accountability. 
Consequences for failing to live up to the expectations of society must be part of any 
ODR model that seeks to stand within the justice eco-system. As such, those who 
deploy technology must ensure that the designers  are committed to following the best 
practices that are already established in the AI governance area.780 For example, 
dependence, partiality and bias in models must be measured and mitigated and the 
outcomes should be presented in a manner that is easily understandable, does not 
conflate multiple outcomes, and includes confidence estimates. These best practices are 
embedded throughout the rest of the chapter. 
 
And, those who actually deploy the technology must take responsibility for the post-
deployment evaluation, monitoring and auditing of the technology.781 For example, 
transparency of designs, architectures and training data must be open to all (e.g., via 
model cards), including to internal and external auditing, research, review and criticism. 
 
In addition, the individual human decision maker must be accountable for his 
interactions with the technology and be receptive to the feedback mechanisms built into 
the system.782 While systems can (and should) be designed with an eye toward assisting 
the human user, that should not alleviate the accountability of the end user, in this case 
the decision maker. The human decision maker should be expected to attend trainings 
 
779 Id. 
780 In this instance, the arbitration institutions. 
781 In this instance, arbitration institutions are the primary focus of consideration as 
they build and deploy current technology, at least to date. 
782 Feedback should be part of the design and as such, is the responsibility of the 
entity deploying the system, the arbitration institution. However, the individual 
arbitrator should be held to a standard as well. One could imagine, in the future, 
specific rules of Digital Arbitrator Ethics designed by and enforced through the 
appointment process of arbitration institutions.  
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on the nature and limitations of the particular technology. And, auditing- done by the 
arbitration institution- should not merely include auditing of the technology based 
process and outcomes, but should also include monitoring and auditing of the human 
within the system. Monitoring and auditing of behavior and outcomes can provide an 
opportunity for learning and correction via feedback to the decision maker. The system 
can provide feedback when it notices a pattern, describe the pattern, and in some 
circumstances demand the human correct behavior or provide an explanation for 
rejecting the feedback. The feedback can escalate into a consequence-driven system 
should patterns not be appropriately explained by the decision maker.783 As will be 
described later, examples of this type of monitoring can include flagging time spent on 
documents or other warning signs that the individual is not appropriately engaging with 
the presented material.  
 
The brick-and-mortar system would likely benefit from such monitoring. For example, 
consider the recent U.S. Supreme Court case of Flowers v. Mississippi784 in which a 
black man was repeatedly denied his right to a “criminal trial free of racial 
discrimination in the jury selection process.”785 Mr. Flowers had been tried six times, 
each time with the same district attorney using his preemptory challenges to remove 
potential black jurors. In fact, the district attorney denied participation of 41 of the 42 
black candidates.786 There is widespread criticism surrounding this discriminatory 
behavior and commentators are dismayed that this case needed to reach the U.S. 
Supreme Court. Inserting technology into the process could mean that such patterns of 
clear discrimination are addressed earlier. 
 
It is important to keep in mind, however, in the case of a brick-and-mortar justice 
environment, checks and balances are already in place, including the right of appeal. In 
an arbitration system, by contrast, appeals are not permitted787  and the outcome is final 
 
783 Enforcement, via the institution, is essential as the entity approving appointment of 
the individual arbitrator, the institution has both authority and the ability to 
consequent (and create incentives) for individual to be compliant with expectations.  
784 588 U. S. ____ (2019) No. 17–9572. (Decided June 21, 2019).  
785 Id. at Justice Kavanaugh, for the majority. 
786 Id. at Justice Thomas, dissent. 
787 See supra Chapter 2, Introduction. 
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and binding.788 The commitment to a trustworthy, RoL-compliant alternative justice 
environment demands transparency, monitoring and auditing of outcomes. 789The best 
use of technology would be to allow patterns to be discovered and revealed to an 
individual. In these instances, when discriminatory patterns persist, we must seek to 
use technology to begin to create a more just justice environment.  
 
Finally, there is one check and balance that does apply within the ODR eco-system 
specifically: the balance between the institution that produces the outcome (the 
arbitration institution) and the institutions that enforce the outcomes, namely the justice 
system itself. As explained in Chapter 2, this thesis envisions arbitration as the final 
step in the ODR process, meaning the RoL is protected via the courts as the authority 
enforcing the outcome.790 As such, policymakers must ensure that the technology, the 
human decision maker and the ODR eco-system as a whole is meeting best practices 
standards. They accomplish this through appropriate regulation created within the court 
system in the enforcing jurisdiction. An AI based system should be held to a standard 
that meets best practices and complies with RoL, including public policy. Policy 
makers can ensure this occurs by creating regulation for the enforcement of AI-based 
arbitration awards 
 
8. Best Practices Demand a Wider Conversation about ALL of these Issues 
 
A survey conducted by Ari Kaplan Advisors has found that U.S. lawyers have 
significant knowledge gaps around legal tech and tend to see the subject through the 
prism of security and the need to understand e-discovery, rather than focus on more 
strategic tech issues.791  
 
In a similar vein, technical literacy is lacking in many areas. For example, Lipton finds 
most troubling, that the rise of social media has allowed self-proclaimed “AI 
influencers” who do nothing more than paraphrase Elon Musk on their Medium blogs 
 
788 See id. 
789 See supra Chapter 4, Section C. 
790 See supra Chapter 2, Section Introduction. 
791 Author, U.S. Survey Finds Big Legal Tech Knowledge Gap Among Lawyers, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, (July 20, 2018). 
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to cash in on this hype with low-quality, TED-style puff pieces.792 “Making real 
progress in AI requires a public discourse that is sober and informed.”793 “. . . Right 
now, the discourse is so completely unhinged it’s impossible to tell what’s important 
and what’s not.”794 “There are policymakers earnestly having meetings to discuss the 
rights of robots when they should be talking about discrimination in algorithmic 
decision making. But this issue is terrestrial and sober, so not many people take an 
interest.”795 The time is now to begin wider conversations about algorithmic decision 
making, especially in areas that have strong impact upon us as a society. The absence 
of these conversations will lead to RoL issues within the ODR community and the legal 
system as a whole.  
 
B. Defining the Key Terminology  
 
Model design depends on well-defined terminology that is specific to the model and 
the area of deployment. Thus, in order to specify a model, we must narrowly define 
several essential terms for the sections that follow. 
 
For example, as was examined and explained in Chapters 2 and 3:  
[I]t is a fundamental and universally accepted arbitration principle of 
international arbitration that arbitrators have to be impartial and 
independent of the parties and must remain so during the proceedings.796 
 
While impartial and independent might be considered universally understood terms, 
for current purposes they must be considered specifically within an online environment, 
online, partially automated, platform-based environment involved in the nomination, 
selection, and confirmation of human decision makers. Existing criteria and boundaries 
must be reconsidered. The following sections will create the independence and 
impartiality parameters appropriate for the online environment.  
 
 
792 Oscar Schwartz, The Discourse Is Unhinged': How The Media Gets AI Alarmingly 




796 Lew, COMPARATIVE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, supra note 140 
at 256. 
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1. Decision Maker 
 
The use of the term “decision maker” up to this point has been intentionally unspecified 
as it was necessary to allow for the exploration of key issues without ascribing any 
additional details to the conversation. For example, in the context of arbitration and the 
judicial system, the terms arbitrator and judge are presumptively envisioning a human 
actor. However, as we develop definitions and rules for the online environment it is 
now time to clarify the definition of the term decision maker as a system component 
that includes more than a human actor.  
 
In the context of arbitration, of course, there are instances when the decision maker is 
in fact a human actor and the presence of a human within the decision making loop is 
an important aspect of the online justice decision making model. It is also important, 
however, to understand that decisions can be made by the technology itself. Ethan 
Katsh has long called the technology the “Fourth Party” in the resolution process. As 
defined by Professor Katsh “the metaphor of ‘the fourth party’ emerged out of a 
recognition that software could play a role that might replace a mediator in simple cases 
and, more commonly, would assist and collaborate with the neutral third party. . .”797  
 
In the context of this thesis, the term decision maker has three possible meanings: (a) a 
human decision maker who uses technology to gather information, assist in party 
communication and perform similar activities; (b) a human decision maker 
substantively aided by technology, such as when the technology makes some early 
categorizations, classifications, suggestions and recommendations, in some cases even 
nudging parties during the negotiation stage, but the human is responsible for making 
the final arbitration determination; and (c) technology as the sole decision maker. As 




Because technology will become more embedded into the dispute resolution process 
and automation will undoubtedly increase, the definition of 'dispute' will become 
 
797 Katsh, Digital Justice, supra note 251, at 93. 
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essential in the overall dispute planning process.  Automation and/or technology will 
be able to resolve some issues;  issues that currently may be considered a dispute by 
many. For example, the Internet of Things (IoT) is widely deployed in supply chain 
transportation,798 because IoT devices are prevalent, issues such as appropriate 
temperature control and regulation and similar issues may now be resolved by 
reconciling information disparities amongst IoT sensors through more frequent, and 
more widespread information gathering.799 Issues such as this, that would previously 
require human interaction and dispute settlement, will now be reconciled in the 
technology.  If multiple sources of information reveal a temperature variance greater 
than allowed, no dispute occurs, the technology will simply notify the part of the 
temperature variance and the part will be able to take action.800  However, there will 
still be disputes in a technology driven world.  For example, when a party receives 
goods that have suffered exposure to the elements resulting in the grading of the goods 
needing to be lowered.  In this instance, the determination of the impact of the exposure 
will need to occur, most likely, outside of the technology environment. Such 
determination may require an expert to 'grade' the goods in their current, delivered 
condition.  Technology, in general will not be able to do this type of activity and as 
such, it will need to be done outside the technology environment.  Hence, disputes are 
more than activity done to merely reconcile information, a dispute is an issue that is a 
matter of disagreement, one that needs resolving through a process of human critical 
evaluation. 
 
3. Automated Decision Systems 
 
According to the United States Algorithmic Accountability Act an automated decision 
system is:  
a computational process, including one derived from machine learning, 
statistics, or other data processing or artificial intelligence techniques, that 
 
798 See Daniel Newman, How IoT Will Impact The Supply Chain, Forbes, (Jan. 9, 
2018). 
799 See id. 
800 See id. 
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makes a decision or facilitates human decision making, that impacts 
consumers.801 
This definition will be adopted in our design, with the exception of the limiting term 
“consumer” being given a broader definition to encompass any entity using the system 




As previously explored, in general the arbitration community considers dependence to 
arise from relationships between an arbitrator and one of the parties, or with someone 
closely connected with one of the parties.802 In a hybrid decision making system 
dependence is measured by exploring the financial, business, and personal relationships 
of any human decision maker and the platform (technology based), which should 
include the platform owners, stakeholders, and auditors, amongst others. When 
evaluating the appearance803 of dependency of the decision maker, the reasonable 
person804 standard should be used, such that the standard for independence in an online 
environment becomes: would the facts and circumstances surrounding the participation 
of this particular individual or platform lead a reasonable person to believe there is an 
appearance of a dependent financial, business, or personal relationship?  
 
Based on the definition of decision maker it is important to note, the decision maker 
can be either human or the technology. As such, dependence is measured by exploring 
the financial, business, and personal relationships of any human decision maker and 
the platform (technology based) decision maker, which should include the platform 





801 U.S. Algorithm Accountability Act of 2019, “S. 1108 — 116th Congress: 
Algorithmic Accountability Act of 2019 (Wyden Senate introduction text); H.R.2231 
— 116th Congress (2019-2020).  
802 See IBA, Ethics, supra note 184 at Cannon 3. 
803 See id. 
804 See id. 
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Partiality arises when an arbitrator favors one of the parties, or where he is prejudiced 
in relation to the subject-matter of the dispute.805 As with dependence, when evaluating 
the appearance806 of partiality of the decision maker, the reasonable person807 standard 
should be used. Partiality is relatively more difficult to identify and eliminate than 
dependence, however, creating an opportunity for technology-based improvement. 
 
Some common types of partiality overlap with dependency issues.808 For example, 
partiality can be presumed to exist when a decision maker is determining issues related 
to a family member. In these instances the decision maker is both dependent and 
presumed partial. It is instances of partiality that arise outside of dependency that are 
the more difficult to discover. Partiality is about a state of mind of the decision maker, 
and is often thought of as an emotion, predetermination, or the introduction of personal 
opinions that are not relevant to the determination of the issue at hand.809 Because of 
the inherit difficulty of discovering partiality in the mind of an individual, arbitration 
institutions protect against it in two main ways: (1) requiring self-disclosure by the 
individual decision maker, and (2) allowing for after-the-fact challenges by one or both 
of the parties to the dispute alleging the partiality of an arbitrator as demonstrated by 
his/her behavior during the process.810 
 
Both of these solutions can also be implemented in the online environment, and 
enhanced through the use of technology. In many ways, the term impartiality as used 
in the arbitration community to describe human decision makers can be considered 
equivalent to the term bias as used in the technology community.  
 
6. Bias  
 
Machine or algorithm bias is the effect of erroneous assumptions in machine learning 
processes. In technology research, partiality and dependence are aspects of bias. As 
 
805 IBA, Ethics, supra note 184 at Cannon 3. 
806 Id. 
807 Id. 
808 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and D; Chapter 2, Section A. 
809 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and D; Chapter 2, Section A; Chapter 5 Section 
B(4).  
810 See supra Chapter 2, Section B and Section C. 
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previously discussed in Chapter 4, machine/algorithm bias takes various forms.811 One 
of the most prominent examples involves the use of machine learning systems to make 
judgments about individual people or groups of people. Within this chapter, we will 
explore machine/algorithm bias which arises within the decision making process or 
production of an outcome. 
 
 
7. Negatively Impactful Bias/Dependence/Partiality 
 
Negatively impactful bias occurs when the outcome is altered by the inclusion of a 
defined bias and the outcome has a defined negative impact on one or both of the 
parties.812 Bias is considered to be problematic in the justice environment not merely 
when it exists but more narrowly when it leads to consideration of a factor or factors 
that are beyond the case and the factor or factors have an actual impact upon the 
outcome.813 For example, while the introduction of race or socioeconomic status into a 
decision making process is a bias, it is not necessarily negatively impactful in all 
situations. Race, gender, or economic status could all be weighted as a positive factor, 
for example when it is treated as a positively weighted “adversity score” in college 
admissions.814 As described in Chapter 4, because machine learning works from the 
already biased inputs it is given, similar biases can arise within a decision making 
process with or without AI.815 In AI-assisted decision making processes, there must 
also be a determination of whether the bias has produced a negative impact. 
 
C. Addressing Bias in Technology-Driven Decision Making Models 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, “models specify how a problem is input and the type of 
[legal] result to output.”816 In between, the model builders have constructed a 
computational mechanism to apply domain knowledge to perform the steps and 
 
811 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(3). 
812 See supra Chapter 5, Section B(5).  
813 See id. 
814 See Douglas Belkin, SAT to Give adversity Scores to Capture Social and 
Economic Background, WALL STREET JOURNAL, (May 16, 2019) 
815 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(3). 
816 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(1). 
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transform the inputs to outputs.817 Currently, as briefly discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, 
many different types of programs exist to model various legal processes.818 For 
example, programs have been designed: (1) to model legal reasoning based on legal 
statutes and cases, (2) to integrate reasoning with legal rules, cases and underlying 
values, and (3) to predict outcomes of legal disputes.819 And, of course, more models 
are being considered and tested every day. This section will consider general aspects of 
these types of models as relevant to the justice system, while the following section will 
present specific suggestions, in the form of best practices, for designing models of the 
neutral process and decision maker in the justice environment. 
 
It is important to note, while the thesis has contained information and considerations of 
very advanced technology, as Chapter 4 concludes, we are likely years away from a 
“robot” decision maker.820 Hence, the BEST PRACTICES that are presented at the end 
of each sub-section are based on currently existing possibilities. Moreover, these best 
practices will be general enough to capture many different technology deployments, 
not predicting any one technology as the future. The section that follows will put these 
best practices to work in a potential specific technology deployment designed to 
provide a neutral decision maker using arbitration as the final part of the ODR process.  
 
1. The Model 
 
The following sections and subsections will explain and then create BEST 
PRACTICES for (1) Model Selection, (2) Model Learning, (3) Weighting (if it were to 
occur), (4) Model Risk, and (5) Model Risk and Mitigation, including human actor 
mitigation.  
 
a. The Reality of Legal Models 
 
At this time, there are portions of the justice system that can be, in certain terms, 
successfully captured by the kind of models discussed in Chapter 3, Section 4.821 Yet, 
 
817 See Ashley, AI AND LEGAL ANALYTICS, supra note 135 at 4 (emphasis added).  
818 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(1). 
819 See supra Chapter 4, Section B. 
820 See supra Chapter 4, Section E. 
821 See supra Chapter 3, Section A and B; Chapter 4, Section A. 
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no existing model is able to combine all the components of a justice/arbitration process 
into a single stream of conclusions leading to a final determination. There are models 
that can predict outcomes, models that can use text analysis and other legal logic to 
answer simple legal enquiries, but no model (yet) which puts this all together to arrive 
at a legal conclusion.822 Moreover, prediction-based models are simply not in the 
category of a functional justice replacement at all. This is because prediction by 
definition uses data from a justice system long criticized for various types of systemic 
bias in order to “predict” outcomes that replicate those patterns, warts and all.823 
 
Keep in mind, there are systems currently being tested and deployed that seem to be 
incredibly good at prediction. In fact the creators of one such system boast “81% 
accuracy predicting whether claims relating to mortgage products will succeed (in the 
United Kingdom).”824 Yet, as with most “disruptive” technology, few of the 
weightings, factors, or other key attributes used to train, improve, or monitor the 
process are publicly available, nor indeed available to the very human decision makers 
who use them. For example, in the instance of the mortgage prediction model the 
machine learning platform does what it is expected to do, and it seems to do it with a 
decent level of accuracy.825 Nonetheless, to make a prediction it has to rely upon a data 
set, one that would undoubtedly contain biases that exist in the industry.826 Why would 
we as a society want to further engrain a widespread problem, especially when the 
 
822 See supra Chapter 4(B). 
823 See e.g., Laurel Eckhouse, Big Data May Be Reinforcing Racial Bias In The 
Criminal Justice System, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 10, 2017)(discussing the 
reinforcement); Jeff Guo, Researchers Have Discovered A New And Surprising 
Racial Bias In The Criminal Justice System, THE WASHINGTON POST, (Feb. 24, 2016) 
(even in the face of existing protections); David Lammy, The Racial Bias In Our 
Justice System Is Creating A Social Timebomb, THE GUARDIAN, (Sept. 8, 2017) 
(considering the impact upon society of the bias). 
824 Author, Meet Sibyl AI — The New Claims Prediction System, ARTIFICIAL LAWYER, 
(July 20, 2018).  
825 See e.g., Kehinde Andrews, UK Banks Have A Racial Discrimination Problem. 
It’s Time They Admitted It, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 13, 2017) (revealing wide spread 
bias in banking, including in instances of fraud) 
826 See id; Patrick Wintour, Nick Clegg To Accuse Banks Of Racism, THE GUARDIAN 
(Nov. 23, 2011) (discussing the outcomes of a banking study and the political 
impacts) And in the U.S.: See Camila Domonoske, Interactive Redlining Map Zooms 
In On America's History Of Discrimination, NPR (the Two Way)(Oct, 19, 
2016)(mapping redlining practices). 
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engraining will occur in a single, non-descript, black box? Thus, there is no machine 
learning model in current use that we should be comfortable deploying without a human 
in the decision making loop.  
 
Thus, in this instance, BEST PRACTICE would be (a) to continue to develop and test 
models within the justice environment, but to insist upon specific design protections, 
including that a human must make the final decision. (b) The model should be viewed 
by the human as suggestive and outcomes should be displayed in a manner that fully 
informs the human decision maker of the nature of the predictions being made and the 
accuracy/percentage certainty of the prediction. The manner in which this could be 
deployed will be described more fully below in Section C. 
 
b. Model Selection 
 
The selection of the appropriate model depends upon a number of factors, the most 
primary in this instance being the intended use of the particular model.827 And, it is in 
this decision that the difficulties of legal environment become readily apparent. For 
example, if the objective is to predict the outcome of a particular type of case, one 
would select a model designed to accomplish this objective, yet this does nothing to 
ensure accuracy or reliability of the outcome. Consequently, to make an appropriate 
selection of a model, the person making the selection should also understand how the 
model is designed;828 currently, this is frequently not the case.829 As previously 
discussed, Predictive Outcome Models are built upon a set of features.830 Features are 
essentially brackets designed to hold particular data points,831 for example the judge’s 
name, the legal firm representing a client, the type of case/issue, and various attributes 
of the persons in the case, such as gender, race, or prior criminal record.832 Machine 
learning can continue to add features into the model over time, and can adjust weighting 
within the model.833 For example, the computer program may notice a pattern of 
 
827 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(1). 
828 See id. 
829 See id. 
830 See id. 
831 See id. 
832 See id. 
833 See id. at Section A(2). 
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correlating data points such as black male, prior conviction for a violent offense, under 
the age of 25. These data points, considered as unit, could be weighted within the 
process834 so that individuals considered to be member of that unit are scored more 
likely to committed another violent offense. Or, the pattern may emerge835 that a 
particular judge, or a particular court, is more likely to hand down guilty convictions 
later in the afternoon on Thursdays, or immediately after lunch. In most instances, no 
individual would notice these patterns. Machine learning notices them, and 
incorporates them into the model as new features that are used to build its future 
predictions.836 Do note, such a model is performing exactly as expected — and may be 
ridiculously accurate in its predictions. Yet, that accuracy may be built upon features, 
unit identification, or weightings, that we as a society may not support. Thus, it is not 
merely enough to test the accuracy of the outcomes. The model selection, design, and 
outcomes MUST stand up to the scrutiny of the principles embedded within the RoL.  
 
How, then, to perform initial and ongoing evaluation of the selected model? As 
previously described in Chapter 4, there are five errors the technology community 
identifies: Framing Trap, Portability Trap, Formalism Trap, Ripple Effect Trap, and 
Solutionism Trap.837 Each requires consideration of the complexity of the environment 
and the human factor in the use. One idea that can be used to bridge some of the 
questions arising in model selection was also discussed in Chapter 4, that being model 
cards.838 As Mitchell, Wu, Zaldivar, Barnes, Vasserman, Hutchinson, Spitzer, Raji, and 
Gebru recommend, model cards that document, in a fashion legible to the end user, key 
aspects, design considerations and performance characteristics should be issued with 
every model.839 The author made the following minimal suggestions as to relevant 
information to be captured in the model card, for example: (1) model details, such as 
basic information about the model (person or organization developing model, model 
date and model type); 840 (2) information about training algorithms, parameters, fairness 
 
834 See supra Chapter 4, Section A 
835 See id. 
836 See id. at Section A(2). 
837 See id. at Section A(3). 
838 See Mitchell, Model Cards, supra note 517 at 22. 
839 See id. 
840 See id. 
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constraints or other applied approaches, and features; 841 (3) the intended use;842 (4) the 
evaluation data, such as details on the dataset(s) used for the quantitative analyses in 
the card and training data;843 and finally, (5) any ethical considerations or 
recommendations.844 Based on this set of specific and detailed information released, a 
model can be evaluated for purposes both of initial selection and long-term ability to 
achieve its purpose. Maybe more importantly, model cards would be a good first step 
in improving transparency and holding designers more accountable for the model 
choices they make. The U.S. Algorithm Accountability Act of 2019 requires “a detailed 
description of the automated decision making system, its design, its training data, and 
its purpose.”845 The Act, although new and yet to be passed, captures ideas described 
in this thesis, including transparency and accountability of automation and algorithms, 
essential considerations in an alternative justice environment.  
 
Thus, in this instance, BEST PRACTICE would be (a) transparency of model selection, 
model deployment, the features used to train the model (if any), the features discovered 
and added to the model after training, and the features currently used in the prediction, 
and (b) some level of accountability for the deployment of the automation/AI, 
especially if it is to occur in a justice environment.  
 
b. Model Learning 
 
An emerging area of research involves proxy discrimination. As described in Chapter 
4, proxies are attributes that stand in place of other attributes.846 In general, these are 
created via a learning process, when a particular attribute is unavailable in the data or 
restricted from use.847 In these situations proxies are created that functionally stand in 
the place of other attributes.848 The rejection of particular attributes or proxies often 
fails to fully eliminate discrimination as the machine learning algorithm merely 
 
841 See id. 
842 See id. 
843 See id. 
844 See Mitchell, Model Cards, supra note 517 at 22. 
845 Algorithmic Accountability Act, supra note 714 at Sec. 2 (2). 
846 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(2) and (3). 
847 See id. 
848 See id. 
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discovers a new proxy.849 Thus, fighting proxy discrimination requires more than 
merely rejecting the use of certain attributes and proxies. 
 
First, it is important to understand proxy discrimination within this model design. Proxy 
discrimination is a specific phenomenon that produces a disparate impact, and has been 
captured previously in the thesis by the term “negatively impactful bias”850 to avoid 
limiting the discussion to U.S. law and to encourage a broader conceptualization of the 
issue. However, proxy discrimination is a specific U.S. constitutional legal concept that 
has been prominent in recent months (early 2019), so the narrower conceptualization is 
important to consider. For proxy discrimination as defined in the U.S. to occur requires 
two conditions: (1) a facially-neutral attribute that is relevant to achieving the 
objectives of a given model must be correlated with membership in a protected class, 
and (2) the predictive power of this facially-neutral characteristic must be at least 
partially attributable to its correlation with a suspect classifier.851 While this thesis will 
not consider the full breadth of this U.S. specific test case, the technology-driven 
mechanisms of reducing the impact of proxy discrimination are important to consider 
as the thesis has consistently advanced the RoL expectation of a neutral decision maker, 
which demands taking measure of potential impactful bias.  
 
In this instance, Prince and Schwarcz argue “One of the only ways to truly squash proxy 
discrimination is to remove access to potential substitute variables.”852 This is because, 
as described in Chapter 4, machine learning algorithms that are denied access to 
particular features, such as ones arising in a protected class, will merely naturally find 
proxies for those features.853 Thus, proxy discrimination can only be reduced if the 
platform designers are aware of both protected variables and potential substitute 
 
849 See id. 
850 See Chapter 5(B)(5). 
851 See Anya Prince & Daniel Schwarcz, Proxy Discrimination In The Age Of 
Artificial Intelligence And Big Data, (SSRN August 5, 2019), IOWA LAW REVIEW, 
(Forthcoming); Darcy Steeg-Morris, Daniel Schwarcz & Joshua Teitelbaum, Do 
Credit Based Insurance Scores Proxy for Income in Predicting Policyholder Risk, 14 
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 397 (2017). 
852 Prince, Proxy Discrimination, supra note 736, at IIIB(1). 
853 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(2) and (3). 
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variables.854 Of course, such widespread removal of variables or features comes at a 
cost, as models will be less effective and more costly.855 Thus, only the most impactful 
algorithms should be subject to “restricted from use” lists. However, there is little doubt 
that any system proposed as an alternative to the courts must be considered as meeting 
this threshold of impact, and the RoL demands mitigations be taken to control 
discrimination.  
 
Thus, in this instance, BEST PRACTICE would be: To ensure transparency of the 
features used to train the model (including but not limited to features that are on the 
“restricted from use” list, the features discovered and added to the model after training, 
and the features currently used in the prediction should be readily accessible). AND, to 
ensure some level of accountability for model designers and institutions for 
implementing steps to reduce bias and discrimination (including but not limited to 
restricted-from-use lists).  
 
c. ADR/ODR Decision Model 
 
As explained in Chapter 3, ODR models envision a three-part process, (1) negotiation, 
(2) mediation, (3) arbitration.856 While the bulk of this thesis has focused on the human 
decision maker in the third stage, i.e. arbitration, it is the three-part process as a whole 
that must involve safeguards against the reduction of impartiality and dependence. As 
mentioned in Chapter 3, it is estimated that only 10 to 15% of any potential arbitration 
cases are actually finalized in arbitration,857 the final stage of the process. Thus, if the 
negotiation and mediation stages are designed correctly, the dispute will rarely need to 
proceed to arbitration. That is not to write that the final stage is not important; instead 
it should be considered highly important as it serves as a ultimate assurance of 
compliance with the RoL. 
 
 
854 See id.  
855 See id. 
856 See supra Chapter 3, Section A. 
857 See Colin Rule, eBay Resolution Center Up for Dutch Innovating Justice Awards - 
Needs Your Vote! MEDIATE.COM, (June 2011). 
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The model thus, should consider the design of stages one and two, negotiation and/or 
mediation. And, in this area, as shown in Chapter 3, some amazing AI-based work is 
already occurring without a human in the process.858 For example, Smartsettle ONE859 
is a form of blind bidding that incorporates eight patented algorithms. The bidding 
process uses a bidding bar which “enables the parties to make offers by moving a flag 
along a horizontal bar comprising a range of numbers from 0 to the amount claimed in 
the proceedings.”860 Each party has two flags, one green and one yellow, which 
represent the current offer and the range the party is willing to accept. While the other 
party only sees the green flag, the system deploys: 
various algorithms that enable the system to “learn” the tactics and priorities of 
the parties and, with that knowledge, assist the parties into an agreed settlement 
without at any time revealing their secret offers.861 
The technology assists the parties in coming to a settlement point through the 
deployment of a set of machine learning algorithms, with no human involvement.862 
And, while this description is based on assisting parties resolving a single issue, 
Smartsettle has also developed blind bidding systems for more complex, multi-issue 
disputes as well.863  
 
Technology such as this is not futuristic, it is now being deployed and used.864 As such, 
it can and should be deployed within the early stages of the ODR process. The 
placement of these technologies within the process will assist parties in understanding 
the true value and expected cost of the damages and provide the parties the opportunity 
to resolve issues without the need to enter a more adversarial process. However, if the 
 
858 See supra Chapter 3, Section A. 
859 Graham Ross, Smart Settlement: An Opportunity For Mediators, InfoLaw 
Newsletter  (March 2019) available at 
https://www.infolaw.co.uk/newsletter/2019/03/smart-settlement-opportunity-
mediators/ (last viewed Aug. 13, 2019). 
860 Id. 
861 Id. 
862 See id. 
863 Known as Smartsettle Infinity. See Ross, Smart Settlement, supra note 763. 
864 See supra Chapter 3, Table D, Table G, Table H. See also Ross, Smart Settlement, 
supra note 763. 
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mediation process fails, arbitration is the perfect final stage as explained in Chapter 
2.865  
 
The arbitration stage should be considered to include, the institutional structure in 
which decision makers are considered for inclusion in the dispute process, the 
conflict/non-appointment process, the appointment process, the process of challenging 
the appointment, and the auditing of the appointment process and the outcomes.866 Each 
will be discussed in greater detail within the risk mitigation section,867 taking the view 
that the overall design of this stage is an opportunity to mitigate risk associated with a 
biased process and/or a partial or dependent decision maker.  
 
2. Model Risk in the Decision Making Process 
 
As described in Chapter 4, model risk is “the potential for adverse consequences from 
decisions based on incorrect or misused model outputs and reports.”868 In general, 
model risk in situations involving decision making arises in two key areas:  
(1) A model may have been built as it was intended, but could have 
fundamental errors and produce inaccurate outputs when compared to 
its design objective and intended use; or, 
 
(2) A model may be used incorrectly or inappropriately, or its limitations 
or assumptions may not be fully understood.869 
In the particular instance of model risk as it relates to decision making, these two 
reasons can be alternately described as, (1) model risk associated the with process, and 
(2) model risk arising from incorrect use or lack of understanding. Each will briefly be 
explained, with the following sections setting out specific solutions.  
 
a. Model Risk Arising from Errors 
 
 
865 See supra Chapter 2, Section Introduction. 
866 See id. 
867 See infra Chapter 5, Section C. 
868 See supra Chapter 4, Section A(3).   
869 See id. 
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A model may be well designed overall, yet fundamental errors may have been captured 
in such a way as to produce inaccurate outputs.870 In these situations, technology built 
and deployed by the arbitration institutions can assist in monitoring decisions 
(outcomes) for patterns that suggest the presence of an error in the process.871 The 
benefit of this monitoring will emerge, however, only if all the algorithmic operations 
going into the decision making process are transparent and freely available. For 
example, technology can be used to weed out inappropriate selections for a human 
decision maker, through arbitration institutions managing conflict lists. This is a 
technology-assisted way to make the decision to exclude certain individuals from the 
institution consideration for the role of arbitrator. This decision of the arbitration 
institution, to exclude, is one that should be available for review as part of the error 
discovery process; that much can hardly merit questioning. What level of detail should 
be made available for audit, however, requires more thought. Some pieces of 
information will need to be removed, creating a balance crafted by the arbitration 
institution to protect both the principle of transparency and private information related 
to the candidates as individuals.  
 
Arbitrator selection, of course, is not the only decision that will need to be reviewed. 
ALL decisions throughout the process should be reviewed by the arbitration institutions 
and any patterns that are potentially attributable to the human in the decision loop 
should be fed back to the human to assist in improving their self-awareness of their own 
human cognitive bias.872 Supporting the emotionally intelligent decision maker873 is 
one of the best reasons to use technology — it presents the opportunity to find patterns 
and reveal those patterns to otherwise well-intentioned individuals.  
 
Any identified errors or risks discovered during the auditing process will require careful 
mitigation of the risk by the arbitration institutions which should always be done with 
a strict adherence to RoL. For example, it is possible to reduce algorithmic bias through 
 
870 See id. 
871 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(2). 
872 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(4). 
873 See supra Chapter 5, Section A(6)(c). 
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the use of proxies, as described above and discussed more fully in Chapter 4.874 
However, proxies must be carefully monitored so as to not introduce proxy-based 
bias.875 Sometimes the technology-driven solutions are not sufficient alone. Any 
mitigation must be done with the same adherence to best practices as the original 
design. And, in the case of the human decision maker failing to mitigate risk-associated 
cognitive errors once they have been identified, it may be the individual will need to be 
removed from the roster of decision makers by the arbitration institution.  
 
BEST PRACTICES in this area entail arbitration institutions:  (1) establishing a 
transparent process, including the presentation of information about the human decision 
makers, their conflicts, prior outcomes and party involvement in the appointment 
process; (2) the ability to audit all final determinations, including final award decisions. 
The auditing information should be used as both a measure to ensure appropriate 
process and as a mechanism to provide feedback to the human decision maker; (3) the 
ability to evaluate, identify and mitigate any identified risk, provided the manner of 
mitigation is in line with RoL and best practices; (4) the creation of a robust, multi-
discipline review team to audit the entire process and outcomes. 
 
b. Incorrect Use Or Lack Of Understanding 
 
A long line of research has shown that people follow technology with an almost blind 
belief in its ability to be “right” or “based in math and therefore presumptively absent 
of bias” and similar misperceptions.876 As discussed at length in Chapter 4, model 
designers must be aware of the ways in which technology will have effects upon the 
individuals using the technology, and even create feedback loops between human and 
technology.877 As such,  arbitration institution model designers must design a 
technology-driven system that allows for the individual in the system to understand the 
basic facts about the technology they interact with. We’ve already mentioned the 
importance of model cards;878 in addition, humans must recognize that many cases 
 
874 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(2).  
875 See supra Chapter 4, Section (2). 
876 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3 and corresponding notes.   
877 See id. 
878 See Mitchell, Model Cards, supra note 517 at 22. 
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require outcomes that are less than “complete” or do not appear as the final product of 
an equation.879 As in the current system used to predict weather, the decision makers 
must be presented with multiple sources of information, all clearly presenting outputs 
together with key details of the model that produced them. The human decision maker 
is then allowed and nudged to be attentive to the final selection from the various 
presentations given to him/her.  
 
BEST PRACTICES in this area, under the assumption that there will be a human in the 
decision making loop, are: (1) outcomes must be transparent; (2) evaluation and 
identification of issues within the process, including issues arising from incorrect use, 
must be identified and the discovery must be part of a feedback loop to the human 
decision maker, (3) the outcomes, predictions and/or assessments must be presented to 
the human decision maker in a manner that clearly explains the technological process 
is not intended to be a complete process, but rather to provide key information and 
assessments; (4) the outcomes, predictions and/or assessments must be accompanied 
by a model card including full details of the model and its capacity and design; the 
outcomes, predictions and/or assessments must be presented in a format that allows for 
the presentation of multiple model outcomes. 
 
3. Risk Mitigation In The Decision Making Eco-System 
 
In this thesis, risk mitigation is a process of developing options and actions to reduce 
impacts arising from model risk.880 In general, engineers needing to handle model risk 
turn to several common risk mitigation options, including: 
(1) Assume/Accept the risk by acknowledging the existence of a 
particular risk, and making a deliberate decision to accept it without 
engaging in special efforts to control it. (2) Avoid the risk by adjust 
program requirements or constraints to eliminate or reduce the risk. (3) 
Control by implementing actions to minimize the impact or likelihood 
of the risk. (4) Transfer by reassigning organizational accountability, 
 
879 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3. 
880 This should be contrasted with other areas definition of risk mitigations. For 
example, systems engineers define “risk mitigation planning is the process of 
developing options and actions to enhance opportunities and reduce threats to project 
objectives.” Project Management Institute, A Guide to the Project Management Body 
of Knowledge, (PMBOK Guide), Fourth Edition, ANSI/PMI 99-001-2008, pp. 273-
312 (2008). See also, supra Chapter 4, Section 3. 
  Raymond, Mitigating Bias  12/14/20 
  219 
responsibility, and authority to another stakeholder willing to accept the 
risk. And, finally (5) Watch/Monitor.881 
 
The design strategies allow engineers to manage risk and to consider the solution to the 
identified risk. For example, if model design engineers are aware that the machine 
learning component is being trained on data that is incomplete or reflective of  
discrimination, engineers can seek to mitigate against the negative impacts from that 
data.882 They have many options for mitigating the risk, some technology-driven, some 
located in the socio-technical design;883 the decision of which one to deploy should be 
guided by the stakeholder choices as they reflect upon the suggestions above.884 In the 
case of incomplete or skewed training data, the stakeholders may decide that the 
appropriate mitigation is to monitor the system, to determine if actual impact is 
occurring.885 Or they may decide the appropriate mitigation is to accept the risk from 
the use of incomplete or skewed data and to acknowledge that limitation when reporting 
outputs to human decision makers.886  
 
The author’s suggested model (below) is built with an eye toward identified risk and 
mitigation principles. As such, each of these strategies will be deployed in the decision 
making model to mitigate negative impacts to the fullest extent possible. It is important 
to note, first, that the author has focused on upholding the RoL, and second that the 
Rules of Action for this model were created with an understanding of the risk associated 
with data. In this particular instance, data that is incomplete, skewed and/or 
disproportionately impactful upon those captured in the justice data eco-system simply 
cannot be mitigated against in a manner that eliminates the negatively impactful effects. 
This incredibly large issue coupled with the inability of the model to capture context 
and discretion has led to the author insisting upon a human in the decision making loop. 
This is an example of an avoidance mitigation, that is eliminating the potential risk by 
 
881 MITREA Author, Implementation, and Progress Monitoring, MITRE's Systems 
Engineering Guide, available at https://www.mitre.org/publications/systems-
engineering-guide/acquisition-systems-engineering/risk-management/risk-mitigation-
planning-implementation-and-progress-monitoring (last viewed Aug. 13, 2019). 
882 See id. 
883 Selbst, Fairness and Abstraction in Sociotechnical System, supra 503 at 59. 
884 See MITREA, supra note 881. 
885 See id 
886 See id. 
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avoiding it. In the case of a decision maker in a justice environment, this is simply not 
open for any other mitigation, because the consequences to the commitment to the RoL 
are too great and the importance of creating a trustworthy system with a high level of 
integrity is too important to embrace any other option. As such, the model is built with 
a human in the decision making, with technology that can augment, assist and facilitate 
their process. But ultimately, the human makes the final decision. Of course, the human 
is also a source of risk. Yet, in an innovation upon the existing justice environment, the 
system is designed to deploy technology in a manner which reduces the impact of the 
human-in-the-loop bias. With these two important key points again emphasized, the 
remaining sections seek to address risk issues arising in the decision eco-system via a 
mitigation process.  
 
a. Managing Model Risk Arising within the Decision Process  
 
Model design has to be carried out in a manner which accurately accounts for traditional 
technology design biases.887 In the alternative justice environment the main issue is that 
the data that is presumptively to be used to build algorithms will come from the existing 
justice environment. The age-old axiom states “garbage in, garbage out.”888 Hence, as 
described in Chapter 4, model designers must recognize the limitations of their starting 
data sets.889 One potential solution to “bad data” or the lack of data is to create a 
knowledge commons focused on the law. Knowledge commons refers to cultural and 
intellectual resources, including data and information, that are created, shared, and 
passed to future generations through experiences, education, science and 
interactions.890 Through the use of a knowledge commons framework, data can be 
gathered, shared and sustained with a common best practices approach.891 Knowledge 
commons have been used in other, similar areas such as open educational resources, 
free digital media such as Wikipedia, and open scientific collections such as the Public 
 
887 See also, supra Chapter 4, Section 3. 
888 Carolyn Healey, Garbage In, Garbage Out – How Bad Data Hurts Your Business, 
Service Objects Website, (Oct. 9, 2018). 
889 See supra Chapter 4, Section 3. 
890 Michael Veale, Can People Trust the Automated Decisions Made by Algorithms?, 
Info Q, (June 21, 2018). 
891 See e.g. Brett M. Frischmann, Michael J. Madison, Katherine J. Strandburg, 
GOVERNING KNOWLEDGE COMMONS, Oxford University Press; (September 2, 2014) 
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Library of Science.892 Open frameworks such as these encourage open research 
environments focused on the processes of information research, gathering and 
production.893 Criticism can be leveled against these environments, but in the case of 
building a justice environment encouraging broader diversity and cultural coverage in 
data sets is a priority, so the potential benefits are expansive. Professional access to 
process data should be provided, with the objective of minimizing discriminatory 
effects.  
 
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 4,894 technology deployed in the justice 
environment should be held to certain standards of transparency and subjected to 
auditing of outcomes for potential RoL violations: 
Computer systems can be designed to prove to oversight 
authorities and the public that decisions were made under an 
announced set of rules consistently applied in each case, a 
condition we call procedural regularity.895 
 
As explained in Chapter 1, RoL demands that the rules are consistently applied and that 
outcomes are consistent across types of cases and/or issues.896 Arbitration institutions 
auditing of the system, or system oversight, provides such protections and assurances. 
No ODR system or decision maker should be allowed to operate outside the expectation 
of procedural regularity. Thus, BEST PRACTICES include: (a) outcomes must be 
transparent, (b) compliance with rules and process must be audited, and (c) case 
decisions must be measured against other outcomes to ensure a high level of 
predictability and the absence of bias in the system. And, as described in Chapter 1, 
this does not prohibit the inclusion of a human decision maker who exercises discretion; 
in fact as described in Chapter 1, it is important to understand that the exercise of 
discretion, while essential, is also bounded. Thus, the system should allow discretion, 
but should audit the process and produce transparent outcomes so discretion is part of 
the system within the correct bounds.  
 
892 See id. 
893 See id. 
894 See supra Chapter 4, Section C. 
895 Joshua A. Kroll, Joanna Huey, Solon Barocas, Edward W. Felten, Joel R. 
Reidenberg, David G. Robinson & Harlan Yu, Accountable Algorythyms, UNIVERSITY 
OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW, Vol. 165: 633, 637, (2017). 
896 See supra Chapter 1, Section A. 
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b. Managing Model Risk in the Decision Maker 
 
The decision making portion is the most important aspect of the model for the purposes 
of the thesis. This section attempts to address risk associated with the process of 
adjudicating a final decision. This will require arbitration institutions to create 
mitigation activity as it relates to the creation of the roster of decision makers, the 
appointment, the decision process itself, and the human interaction with the technology 
(i.e., socio-technical aspects). The large sections will explore and suggest appropriate 
design as it relates to: (1) the role of institutions and/or platform designer; (2) the roster 
of decision makers; (3) nomination and appointment of the human decision maker; (4) 
challenges to the appointment; (5) transparency of the appointment process and the 
humans in the process, including: (a) risk arising from the non-disclosure/rule 
compliance; (b) risk arising from implicit/hidden bias of the decision maker; (c) user 
risk; (d) risk not already considered arising from the introduction of discretion. It will 
conclude by introducing the concept of risk mitigation via the use of impact 
assessments. 
 
i. Managing Risk by the Introduction of a Human in the Decision Making Process 
 
The introduction of a human into the decision making process is an obvious potential 
risk as it reintroduces the partiality and dependence issues that technology was intended 
to reduce. However, as was discussed above and in Chapter 4, there is currently no 
historic data set from a justice environment that does not contain the historic biases and 
prejudices that are part of our complex history.897 Without such a data set, machine 
learning algorithms will be trained on historically biased data, creating a further 
engraining of historic prejudice, but covering it under a sea of trust in technology and 
math.898 As such, it is difficult for this author to support a machine learning based 
system as an advancement in the delivery of justice.899 Without a doubt, we can design 
a model that can accurately predict the outcomes of a narrow band of cases, such as 
 
897 See supra Chapter 4, Section A (2) and (3). 
898 See id. 
899 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(4). 
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failure to deliver a parcel.900 There is little doubt in the author’s mind that we could 
design a model that predicts outcomes based on the assignment of a case to a particular 
court or judge. These models do nothing more than predict the prejudice that already 
exists in the system, something this author is unwilling to embrace. In fact, as of June 
2019, France has passed a law making it illegal to build models based on the outcomes 
of particular judges, so-called judge analytics.901 While this may seem an extreme 
response, it is one that arises from the fear associated with further engraining historic 
prejudices that permeate the justice system. As such, the author desired to expect more 
from a newly created system and to deploy technology only if it can improve the 
existing system. In this case, it means we need a human in the decision making loop, 
but we must monitor the human and the outcomes to mitigate against partiality and 
bias. In this way, we deploy technology to do better.  
 
(1) The Role of Institutions and/or Platform Designer 
 
Institutions play an important part of risk mitigation in protecting the ODR process 
because they are in a position to create institutional rules, to insist upon a robust 
commitment to the essential aspects of RoL, and to monitor and enforce rules related 
to the nomination, conflict declarations and behavior of decision makers. While some 
commentators insist the ODR process can exist outside of institutions, the author 
believes that a commitment to RoL demands some type of central authority that protects 
both the process and guarantees unbiased delivery of justice.902 It is not essential that 
the authority mirror or be named like the institutions of traditional arbitration; rather 
the essential point is that some authority must be responsible for protecting the integrity 
of the alternative justice environment — and key to this is a commitment to the RoL.903 
 
Institutions, as well as platform creators/designers, must create and uphold rules of 
process and appointment.904 And all of the rules relating to process, appointment, 
 
900 In fact, smart contracts are capable of that very thing. 
901 Author, France Bans Judge Analytics, 5 Years In Prison For Rule Breakers, 
ARTIFICIAL LAWYER (June 4, 2019). 
902 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(3). 
903 See id. 
904 See id. 
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auditing, transparency and the like must be publicly available to everyone.905 
Individuals must be fully informed of process and rules in user-friendly language. Full 
disclosure allows parties to make determinations as to the appropriateness of a process 
and rules for their situation and issue. As discussed in Chapter 2, arbitration is built 
upon foundations of contract and voluntary consent,906 neither of which can be 
protected if institutions/platforms are allowed to create a black box environment.  
 
Enacting its commitment to ensuring neutral decision makers, the institution/platform 
designer must insist upon a system of required disclosures, conflict rules, mandatory 
training, and must insist on a strong enforcement mechanism that refuses appointment 
to anyone who is not compliant.907 Moreover, to assist in the reduction of certain types 
of bias that will be discussed in more detail later, the institution must also create rules 
that require a specific type of training for any decision maker that will use the system.908 
Training in the process and the technical aspects of the system, as well as understanding 
of the impact that technology-driven prediction systems can have on human decision 
makers, is essential.  
 
In addition, further consideration should be given to the creation of specific legal 
requirements for the institution/platform designer,909 including the possibility of strong 
penalties or individual liability for failure to comply with cyber security laws, 
disclosure laws, and the protection of RoL principles, such as the presence of a neutral 
decision maker.  
 
 
(2) The Roster of Decision Makers 
 
The creation by arbitration institutions of institutional rosters of those available for 
selection within the resolution process is also an important step in the reduction of 
partiality and dependence.910 As previously described, institutions should require 
 
905 See id. 
906 See supra Chapter 2, Section Introduction. 
907 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(3). 
908 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(4). 
909 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(3). 
910 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(4). 
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decision makers to create a public and a private disclosure page.911 The public page 
should contain any information that could create an appearance of bias relative to the 
types of cases that are heard by the platform.912 For example, being a co-owner in a 
large transport firm creates the appearance of bias if the platform handles transport-
related disputes, so it must be publicly disclosed. It might, however, be appropriate for 
other disclosures to remain private if they could only be relevant to partiality under a 
narrow and unlikely set of circumstances.913 For example, if I occasionally drive for 
Uber and the platform handles family disputes, my interest in the privacy of my 
information likely outweighs the requirement of transparency.  
 
A well-defined set of institutional rules that create clear disclosure requirements could 
reduce bias and thus the number of challenges to the participation of individual decision 
makers. Moreover, further reductions can be made when the public and the private 
disclosure lists are used in tandem to create an “excluded from participating in this 
decision” list. The list would be used to exclude individuals on said roster from 
participating in a particular decision.  
 
The technology can also accommodate a weighting system, such that individual factors 
and certain clusters of factors can be weighted more heavily. For example, a 2019 
ICSID case asked for a determination on the dependence of a decision maker.914 Using 
the applicable UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules the institution enumerated a four-part test 
to assess whether a connection between the arbitrator and one of the parties was likely 
to impact the arbitrator’s impartiality and independence.915 These factors are (1) the 
proximity of the connection, (2) the intensity of the interactions, (3) the arbitrator’s 
financial dependence on the party, and (4) the materiality of any benefits derived.916 
Technology could be used to identify such a cluster of factors, or any cluster of recorded 
activities or behaviors that reasonably lead to the conclusion that a financial 
dependency exists.  
 
911 See supra Chapter 5, Section A. 
912 Similar to disclosures in arbitration. See supra Chapter 2, Table C. 
913 See supra Chapter 2, Section B(1). 
914 See ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 (2019). 
915 See id. 
916 See id. 
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Once a “non-excluded” list is created, selection of the five decision makers presented 
to the parties could be done by random sample. The five randomly selected potential 
decision makers are presented to each of the parties; who in turn are asked to rank them, 
with access to the public disclosure list. This check and balance allows the parties to 
serve as a secondary mechanism to preclude the presence or appearance of bias.  
 
(3). Nomination and Appointment of the Human Decision Maker 
 
The portion of the model in which the decision maker is selected (from the roster of 
arbitration institutionally approved decision makers) can assist in greatly reducing 
dependence and partiality. The following schematic/workflow is a visualization of how 
the appointment process could occur within a smart contract, after a breach has 







Schematic 2: The Suggested full Process 
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Design created and schematic created by Raymond (2019) 
 
As can be seen, the workflow begins after negotiations have failed. In this instances, 
the parties progress into an online arbitration process, which envisions the use of a 
human decision maker. Key to this model is the appointment process.  
 
Schematic 3: Appointment 
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Design created and schematic created by Raymond (2019) 
 
As we covered in an earlier chapter, dependency is relatively easy to identify compared 
to partiality, but this is nonetheless an area where AI can provide improvements. In this 
instance, the arbitral institution will have a roster of human decision makers to select 
from. Having an institution supervise and create a roster of human decision makers 
ensures compliance with the RoL as the institution can ensure the decision makers have 
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the appropriate qualifications.917 Moreover, the institution can create rules of disclosure 
that also protect the RoL, as the decision maker should be ensured to be independent 
from the parties and from the potential outcome. 918 The institution should ensure this 
by creating public informational pages about each decision maker on the roster, in 
addition to maintaining a private database of more detailed information about decision 
makers that is not widely released but can be consulted when appropriate. The 
institution can then use an algorithm to do a comparison between the issues and parties 
in the dispute and all available decision makers. ANY decision maker with either a 
publicly revealed conflict or a private issue that gives rise to a conflict is conflicted out 
of participating. This process ensures that the RoL expectation of an independent 
decision maker is protected as fully as possible.  
 
Schematic 4: Disclosures 
 
Design created and schematic created by Raymond (2019) 
 
As previously described, after the institution generates the list of all human decision 
makers who have not been conflicted out, a new algorithm could make a random 
selection of decision makers and create a list of five options. Similarly to the process 
laid out in the AAA rules and the JAMS rules presented in Chapter 2,919 the parties 
 
917 See supra Chapter 1, Section C. 
918 See id. 
919 See supra Chapter 2, Section B. 
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would then receive the five selections and be asked to rank the potential decision 
makers based on personal preference. It is important to note, the human decision makers 
will have a public information/conflict declaration page, and the parties can (and 
should) make determinations based upon this information. This portion of the process 
can greatly reduce the impact of dependence.  
 
The reduction of potential partiality can also be impacted at this stage as well, as the  
arbitrator roster has both a public and a private portion. Within the private portion of 
the system could be the results of prior decisions made by the human decision makers, 
and key markers/features about each case.  
 




An algorithm could be used to conflict out individuals who display particular patterns 
of outcomes that suggest partiality. It is important to note, the author does NOT think 
this information should be released to the public or contained within the public 
disclosures. However, noting patterns in outcomes is an important step in assisting 
individuals to be emotionally intelligent decision makers. The ability to take on board 
feedback and consider whether personal bias is impacting decision making is an 
important attribute of an emotionally intelligent decision maker as described by Justice 
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Sotomayor. To encourage self-reflection, this level of feedback should be private, not 
used as an incentive or a punishment. Instead, the platform can encourage self-
reflection and can feedback suggestions in instances where similar self-reflection 
should be noted by the decision maker. The patterns should, also be monitored and 
recorded by the platform, as it is the platform’s obligation to adhere to the RoL, 
including the expectation of protecting parties from a partial or dependent decision 
maker.920 Moreover, there are other methods for publicly ranking decision maker 
behavior: as described in Chapters 2 and 3,921 systems are currently being created to 
“rank” arbitrators based on parties’ satisfaction with the arbitrator. This type 
information can and should be made public as it assists in the transparency of the 
process and the selection. 
 
Allowing the parties to obtain public information, such as qualifications, conflict 
declarations and satisfaction survey outcomes, is an additional step that evidences a 
strong commitment to several RoL principles, including the commitment to having 
safeguards in the appointment process.922  
 
The ranking of each party would then be used to create a final selection of the decision 
maker for the particular case. The process described in not necessarily new, per se. 
Rather, it combines several approaches to appointment described in Chapter 2923 and 
some of the newest technology deployments described in Chapter 3.924 It does ensure 
that the RoL principles relating to the decision maker that were emphasized in Chapter 
1, such as appropriate qualifications, independence, impartiality and protections from 
conflicts of interest,925 are enshrined within the ODR appointment process. 
 
 
(4). Challenges to the Appointment 
 
 
920 See supra Chapter 1, Sections C and D. 
921 See supra Chapter 2, Section A and Chapter 3, Section B. 
922 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and Section D. 
923 See supra Chapter 2, Section B. 
924 See supra Chapter 1, Section C. 
925 See supra Chapter 3, Section C. 
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Both parties must have the right to challenge the selection of any decision maker, and 
this is true regardless of the process of selection.926 While this may seem overly 
stringent or time-consuming, it is important to recall that the standard is “appearance 
of bias,” as presented in Chapter 1,927 and as such parties must be allowed to ask for 
decision makers to be eliminated from selection. However, a balance can be struck 
between the right of contestation and the efficiency of the process by setting bounds on 
the length of time for making a challenge and reasons allowed for a party to challenge. 
Remember, in this process parties begin by ranking potential decision makers, which 
should greatly limit the likelihood of a challenge. It is hard to imagine a scenario where 
a party ranks a decision maker last, but the selection still proceeds. As such, only new 
information, or an objection of the highest order based on the initial information, should 
allow a party to challenge an appointment. To limit procedural delays, the challenge 
process must take place in a predetermined delimited timeframe and not allowed to 
hold up the entire process. Moreover, the challenging party must specify the reason for 
the challenge, which must meet the standard of casting doubt “in the eyes of a 
reasonable person.”928 These conditions safeguard the essential principle that any 
appearance of partiality or dependence must be eliminated, without making the process 
easy to for either party to delay or derail.  
 
(5). Transparency of the Appointment Process and the Humans in the Process  
 
During the above described process, transparency is not handled in the manner 
discussed in Chapter 2, that being the presumptive “disclose everything,” but is instead 
limited to disclosures made for a specific purpose.929 For example, the institutional 
rules, the process, and key information about the institution, including the use of 
technology, should be fully disclosed and completely transparent. Of course, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, this is already the case in the majority of, if not all, arbitration 
institutions.930 Moreover, as discussed above at Chapter 4, transparency requires any 
automated or other technology that is involved within the decision making process to 
 
926 See supra Chapter 2, Section B. 
927 See supra Chapter 1, Section D. 
928 See supra Chapter 1, Section D. 
929 See supra Chapter 2, Section B(1). 
930 See id. 
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be fully described in a publicly available environment, via the use of model cards and 
other public disclosures. 931 
 
As it relates to the neutral decision maker, the balanced release of some information 
concerning the human decision maker is essential to maintaining the protections of the 
RoL.932 However, in this instance, because it is a human at the heart of the process, 
transparency must be balanced against the right of an individual to not have his/her 
whole life disclosed. For example, a potential arbitrator should not necessarily be 
prohibited from hearing issues involving cases that tangentially touch upon stock in her 
retirement portfolio. Requiring over-disclosure of personal information could deter 
qualified individuals from serving as decision makers, shrinking the pool, or be used to 
game the system by eliminating a large group of qualified decision makers on frivolous 
grounds. As such, as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2, the RoL is protected by publicly 
releasing information that is deemed to be more likely than not considered by a 
reasonable person to create an appearance of bias.933 However, information that may 
create the appearance of bias only in narrow and specific cases should be protected 
from full disclosure. These disclosures are then processed in two distinct ways, 
maximizing their value for identifying possible partiality or bias: (1) they inform the 
parties and therefore allow humans to level a reasonable objection, and (2) they feed 
into a conflict list managed by the institution that can identify possible problems 
through automation.  
 
In situations related to potential conflicts of interest, the system can remain compliant 
with the RoL, while still encouraging participation and preventing crafty challenges to 
the decision makers by greatly reducing the number of times the dilemma arises and by 
creating rules to reduce the impact on all concerned. The RoL demands transparency 
and disclosure of the mechanism of making the decision and the rules that will be used 
should be transparent.934 RoL demands the system work to reduce the impacts, which 
in this case can be done by a well-defined process, clear rules, ranking by the parties, 
 
931 See supra Chapter 4, Section C(3). 
932 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and Section D. 
933 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and Section D and Chapter 2, Section A. 
934 See supra Chapter 1, Section A. 
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and random final selection.935 The definitions, the conflict rules and the criteria used to 
make selection determinations should be disclosed and widely available on the platform 
and any corresponding websites.  
 
When a decision is made to exclude, the reasons for that decision should be made 
available, modified as necessary to prevent unnecessary disclosure of private details. 
This type of transparency allows both the rules and the outcomes to be reviewed.936 
Thus, when a decision maker is excluded from selection, both parties as well as 
researchers should be able to request a list of all (de-identified) individuals or platforms 
excluded from selection along with information surrounding the circumstances for the 
non-selection. However, to encourage potential decision makers to feel comfortable 
making the most capacious possible disclosure without fear, this report should not 
disclose the specific names of those prevented from participating, but should instead 
create a disclosure list based on the stated issue that caused the exclusion.  
 
And, of course, the final decision, the basic information about the parties, the length of 
the dispute, number of submissions, or documents and similar details should all be 
disclosed publicly, as should the name of the human decision maker and the final 
outcome. Transparency of outcome is the only true way the system should ever be 
trusted to be compliant with the RoL.937 Thus, there should be no burdensome 
requirements placed upon requesting such information, nor exceptions allowed.  
 
i. Risk Arising from the NON Disclosure/Rule Compliance 
 
It is assumed that the majority of individual decision makers and platform 
designers/owners will be rule compliant, especially as it relates to disclosures on 
questions of independence and impartiality. However, it is important to assume, and 
protect against, the possibility that a small minority of institutions, platforms designers 
and human decision makers will be non-compliant; thus monitoring and verification 
are essential.  
 
935 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and Section D. 
936 See supra Chapter 4, Section C. 
937 See supra Chapter 1, Section C and Section D. 
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Fortunately, this is one area where technology can be of great assistance. Technology 
is already being used in multiple settings to verify key pieces of information. For 
example, several well-known services are used to verify information contained in 
resumes using commonly available public data. In a similar fashion, in the justice 
environment, decision makers’ public and private profiles could be matched against 
information provided in other settings to verify the information disclosed. The 
institution could insist upon such verification as a term of joining the roster of available 
decision makers and could remove individuals from the roster should discrepancies be 
discovered. 
 
ii. Risk Arising from Implicit/Hidden Bias of the Decision Maker 
 
Despite all best efforts and risk reduction techniques, model designers must be aware 
that the introduction of a human into the decision making process may re-introduce bias 
that had been previously eliminated. As such, risk arising from human implicit bias 
must be monitored. In general, there are two mechanisms that could be deployed to 
reduce implicit/hidden human bias. As we have covered, the first is to be transparent 
and to publish all decisions, not just outcomes but all decisions along the way. The 
second is to monitor and audit all decisions for patterns of bias. To maximize self-
reflection, learning and the ability to correct partiality, the author recommends that the 
details of such audits be kept private when they implicate an individual decision maker, 
so that individual can be given an opportunity to learn from the feedback and adjust 
future behavior.  
 
There is a third potential use of technology, that being the use of technology designed 
specifically to measure human reactions and behaviors for signals of deceit and 
discomfort. I have previously written about this topic in The Angel on Your Shoulder: 
Prompting Employees to Do the Right Thing Through the Use of Wearables,938 in which 
we suggest that technology currently exists which could measure individuals’ heart 
rates and eye movements, use this data to identify times when the individual is engaged 
 
938  Fort, Raymond, and Shackelford, The Angel on Your Shoulder supra note 685, at 
139-170. 
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in deception or stressed by a moral dilemma, and could nudge people into becoming 
aware of their dilemma and suggest possible moral frameworks for resolving it.939 
Researchers are already using this process to detect deception in security clearance 
situations.940 By applying it in a user-directed context, it could instead be deployed to 
increase self-awareness and growth. While the author is not yet supportive of the use 
of such technology within this particular setting, further research could be done to 
consider if deployments such as this would be beneficial to the human decision maker 
within the justice environment.  
 
In addition, there is the possibility that bias will arise out of the human decision maker’s 
attitude toward the technology or faulty perceptions of the technology, the manner in 
which technology is deployed, the way in which information is displayed and all other 
kinds of bias that arise in human–technology interactions.941 One such concern would 
be that a human might fail to fully review recommendations in a meaningful and active 
manner.942 However, these are bias patterns that can be discovered, evaluated and 
mitigated through automated monitoring. In situations such as this, several of the 
already discussed mitigations, such as training and monitoring of human decision 
makers, is essential.  
 
iii. Managing User Risk  
 
Of course, the newest research is exploring in greater detail how technology impacts 
human experience. For example, it is reasonably clear that individuals are now 
interacting with their world in a different manner than in the past based upon the cell 
 
939 See id. 
940 See Marisa Taylor – McClatchy, FBI Turns Away Many Applicants Who Fail Lie-
Detector Tests, McClatchy Washington Bureau, (May 20, 2013). 
941 Known as automation-induced complacency and lack of interpretability. See 
Information Commissioners Office, Automated Decision Making: The Role Of 
Meaningful Human Reviews, AI Auditing Framework Blogspot, (2019) available at   
https://ai-auditingframework.blogspot.com/2019/04/automated-decision-making-role-
of.html (last visited Aug. 13, 2019). 
942 A concern that has been raised, within E.U. as “human input must be meaningful, 
and individuals must have the authority and competence to challenge the decision.” 
Moreover, “[t]o qualify as human involvement, the controller must ensure that any 
oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than just a token gesture.” Center For 
Data Innovation, Comments To The Article 29 Working Party, supra note 691 at 3.  
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phone in their pocket. For example, few individuals use a paper map and are now more 
likely to follow paths suggested by their technology. The ability of technology to nudge 
us to behave in certain ways, through advice, prediction and other means, is of growing 
concern in many areas.  
 
As previously detailed, Green and Yen performed a study designed to review how risk 
assessments influence human decisions within criminal justice adjudication943 and 
found that participants made decisions that were less accurate than the advice provided. 
Despite being presented with the technology-driven predictions,944 participants could 
not effectively evaluate the accuracy of their own or the risk assessment’s 
predictions,945 and participant interactions with the risk assessment tool introduced new 
forms of bias into decision making.946 This new form of bias is very concerning as the 
risk assessment itself was able to influence the behavior of the participants.947 In this 
way, the presence of technology may be altering the way individuals view the world 
and their interactions with the world. For example, Frischmann and Selinger in their 
book Re-Engineering Humanity argues “ we shape our tools, fall in love with them, and 
thereafter, our tools shape us.”948 Consequently, it is imperative to monitor the manner 
in which the humans within the environment are reacting, adjusting and internalizing 
the interactions, nudges, and outputs that arise from the system. 
 
Until more direct research can be done, all systems must be designed in a manner that 
clearly presents the full picture of the outcome produced. For example, if the machine 
is predicting that a given event has caused a given amount in damages, alongside that 
prediction the system must also present HOW it arrived at that decision (e.g., data used, 
weights given), and a “confidence” or accuracy score. The information displayed, the 
manner of display, the human interaction with the system and other key metrics should 
 
943 See Green, Disparate Interaction, supra note 507, at 90. 
944 See id.  
945 See id.  
946 See id. 
947 See id. 
948 Brett Frischmann and Evan Selinger, Re-Engineering Humanity, CAMBRIDGE 
UNIVERSITY PRESS, (2018) at 52, relying upon John Culkin, A Schoolman’s Guide to 
Marshall McLuhan, THE SATURDAY REVIEW (March 18,1967). 
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also be kept and analyzed to evaluate if the manner or content of this is in fact 
influencing decision making.  
 
In addition, there is growing evidence to suggest that as part of the outcome monitoring 
process individuals should be required to explain any departures they make from the 
technology’s recommendations. The requirement to explain departure from the 
technology should be used both to monitor the decision maker and the machine learning 
system for new forms of bias. As Green and Yen explain, “disparate interactions, 
whereby their use of risk assessments leads to higher risk predictions about black 
defendants and lower risk predictions about white defendants”949 is a phenomenon that 
occurs because of the introduction of a human in the decision making process. Ongoing 
research is needed to further understand how individuals process and interact with 
technology within a prediction-based environment, and, because of the high impact, 
this is especially true of the human decision maker within the ODR environment. 
Limited research exists in this very narrow area. Any system created for use in a justice 
environment should be required to participate in research on human–computer 
interaction issues.  
 
iv. Risk not already considered arising from the introduction of discretion  
 
As discussed in Chapter 1 and reviewed earlier in Chapter 5, discretion is an important 
aspect of the RoL and our justice environment.950 RoL, however, demands that 
discretion be bounded by rules for when it is allowed and how much discretion is 
permissible.951 Yet, as Green and Chen argue,  
Our results highlight a significant but often overlooked aspect of 
algorithmic decision-making aids: introducing risk assessments to the 
criminal justice system does not eliminate discretion to create 
“objective” judgments, as many have argued. . . Instead, risk 
assessments merely shift discretion to different places, which include 
the judge’s interpretation of the assessment and decision about how 
strongly to rely on it. 952 
 
949 Green, Disparate Interaction, supra note 507, at 90. 
950 See supra Chapter 1, Section A and Chapter 5, Section 2. 
951 See supra Chapter 1, Section A. 
952 Green, Disparate Interaction, supra note 507, at 96. 
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The introduction of a human into the decision making loop does not eliminate discretion 
to create an objective outcome; instead the human using technology likely shifts 
discretion into new areas.  
  
It follows that system design must allow discretion in well-defined areas, with bounded 
choices for its exercise. Monitoring and auditing of outcomes and interactions with the 
technology will hopefully reveal areas in which new processes must be deployed. For 
example, when choosing to depart from the technology’s recommendation, decision 
makers could be limited to a pre-proscribed list of allowable reasons. Moreover, while 
machine learning has the ability to update its own processes over time, the technology 
can be blocked from making automatic algorithmic adjustments in these key areas. In 
this way, rather than learning on its own, the technology includes the human decision 
maker and the system designer in its feedback loop.  
 
4. Risk Mitigation: Impact Assessments  
 
Impact assessments are nothing new; in fact they have been implemented in scientific 
and policy domains from environmental protection to privacy. They should be 
considered in the area of AI, especially in situations where the government is involved 
the deployment of the technology, as is the case in several contexts. AI impact 
assessments are already being developed in a wide variety of environments, including 
governments.  
 
As Special Advisor on Artificial Intelligence–Policy and Implementation Noel 
Corriveau explains,  
an impact assessment is a tool used for the analysis of possible 
consequences of an initiative with a view to provide recommendations 
as to how to deploy the initiative and under what conditions.953  
 
 
953 Noel Corriveau, The Government of Canada’s Algorithmic Impact Assessment: 
Towards Safer and More Responsible AI,  AI for Good Social GitHub publication, 
(2018) available at 
https://aiforsocialgood.github.io/2018/pdfs/track2/83_aisg_neurips2018.pdf (last 
viewed Aug. 14, 2019). 
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While the exact form and questions of the assessment vary across the various 
promulgated developers, most contain several key focus areas: (1) develop the 
description of the project: the goals that are pursued by using AI, the data that are used, 
the actors involved, such as the end users and other stakeholders; (2) formulate project 
goals, not only at the level of the end user, who experiences the consequences of the 
service, but also at the level of the organization offering the service and of the society; 
(3) discover, explore and consider the relevant ethical and legal frameworks to be 
mapped onto the framework of the application; (4) make strategic and operational 
choices that consider and carry out activities in relation to all stakeholders; (5) apply 
different ethical and legal considerations to define the permissible deployment of AI; 
(6) document the previous steps and justify all decisions taken; and finally, (8) monitor 
and evaluate the impact of AI.954  
 
The importance of the impact assessments cannot be overstated. Algorithms are being 
deployed in a multitude of environments, with both positive and negative 
consequences. In the case of algorithm deployment in a justice-based environment, the 
need to monitor, evaluate and analyze technology is especially important as negative 
impacts can be so great that RoL principles are affected. Impacts such as this not only 
harm individuals, but can be felt by the justice system as an institution. Impact 
assessment must become part of an ongoing commitment to the responsible deployment 
of technology, especially algorithms, in the justice environment.  
 
Despite the growing demand for increasing use of impact assessments, impacts are 
often still an afterthought in terms of design and deployment. Consider the very recent 
example, in which bias was discovered in a very specific set of decisions within the 
 
954 Summarized from Platform for the Information Society, Artificial Intelligence 
Impact Assessment, Platform for the Information Society Publication (2019) available 
at  https://ecp.nl/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Artificial-Intelligence-Impact-
Assessment-English.pdf (last viewed Aug. 14, 2019). This is not the only framework 
in use, for example AINow, Algorithmic Impact Assessments: A Practical Framework 
For Public Agency Accountability (2018). While others contain similar considerations 
in a broader discussion. See e.g., Information Commissioner's Office, AI Auditing 
Framework, Call for Input, supra note 697. 
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French judicial system.955 The response by the French government was to implement 
the Justice Reform Act which provides in Article 33:  
The identity data of magistrates and members of the judiciary cannot be 
reused with the purpose or effect of evaluating, analyzing, comparing or 
predicting their actual or alleged professional practices.956 
The response, originally widely criticized, is one example of growing concern about 
careless deployment of AI undertaken without due consideration of its possible impact. 
And, while this may seem (and likely is) an over-reaction to the use of judicial data in 
algorithmic processes, one needs to understand the reasoning behind the law. 
Commentator Michaël Benesty explains that the legislation was written in response to 
disturbing patterns discovered amongst the various judges making asylum decisions.957 
He further asserts that the main issue that arose was releasing the names of the particular 
judges.958 How did a deployment of technology that resulted in revealing bias not 
envision bias discovery as a potential outcome? In that situation, how can anyone 
imagine or justify releasing the names as an appropriate first step in correcting the issue 
discovered?  
 
The process proposed within this thesis is designed to monitor decisions but also 
intentionally designed to provide feedback without publicly shaming decision makers. 
The same intentional approach is taken with some personal data that may be gathered 
during the roster/conflict process. During early research into designing a prediction 
algorithm the author was involved in, I asked “what if what we assume is true is right, 
what if we discover a judge is in fact biased and we publish that determination, openly?” 
Ultimately the team changed course on the research, determining that our goal was to 
predict and to help demonstrate bias, which can be done without public shaming. And, 
in the process we decided to use the knowledge as a tool to create better decision makers 
— through awareness and education. This is (hopefully) a perfect example of 
examining deployments with impact assessments as a key component. It’s a decision I 
am proud of still today. Not fully thinking through the impact upon all parties and 
 
955 See Author, France Bans Judge Analytics, supra note 793. 
956 Id.  
957 Author, The Judge Statistical Data Ban – My Story – Michaël Benesty, ARTIFICIAL 
LAWYER, (June 7, 2019)  
958 Id.  
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groups in the system, including the individuals providing the data, is a fundamental 
flaw in the manner in which technology has been historically deployed. Releasing data, 
finding patterns, predicting behavior, these are all old technology being deployed in a 
highly surveilled, massively connected, ultra-high speed, digital world — we simply 
have to consider the impacts beyond our own deployments and deliverable promises. 
This is a new adventure for everyone.  
 
D. Design Guidance Conclusions  
 
This final chapter has provided eight rules of action: (1) the Rule of Law must be 
protected within the online justice environment; (2) an independent and impartial 
decision maker is an essential RoL principle, such that no departure from the principle 
should be allowed; (3) it is the method of ensuring the independence and impartiality 
of the decision maker that is open for greater debate; (4) it is the model design that 
mitigates dependence and bias; (5) the reduction of negatively impactful bias is the 
current “best practice” standard; (6) there must be a human within the final step of the 
technology driven decision making model, built upon the ideal of an emotionally 
intelligent decision maker; (7) accountability is essential as ODR is part of the justice 
eco-system institution; and finally, (8) best practices demand a wider conversation 
about all of these issues. 
 
The author recommends that the justice community continue to develop and test models 
within the justice environment, but to insist upon specific design protections, including 
that a human must make the final decision. The model should be viewed by the human 
as suggestive and outcomes should be displayed in a manner that fully informs the 
human decision maker of the nature of the predictions being made and the 
accuracy/percentage of certainty of the prediction. 
 
In the area of Model Selection, best practices would be to insist upon transparency of 
model selection, model deployment, the features used to train the model (if any), the 
features discovered and added to the model after training, and the features currently 
used in the prediction, and some level of accountability for the deployment of the 
automation/AI, especially if it is to occur in a justice environment.  
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In the area of Model Learning, best practice would be established by focusing on 
transparency of the features used to train the model. Those features that are on the 
“restricted from use” list, the features discovered and added to the model after training, 
and the features currently used in the prediction. Consideration should be given to 
restricting automated machine learning around complex and impactful concepts that 
are not easy to fully capture in algorithmic terms (e.g., race). And, again some level of 
accountability for implementing steps to reduce bias and discrimination, including (but 
not limited to) restricted-from-use lists.  
 
Model risk best practices entail establishing a transparent process, including the 
presentation of information about the human decision makers, their conflicts, prior 
outcomes, and party involvement in the appointment process and the ability to audit all 
final determinations, including final award decisions. The Auditing information should 
be used as both a measure to ensure appropriate process and as a mechanism to provide 
feedback to the human decision maker; with a built-in ability to evaluate, identify and 
mitigate risk — so long as the manner of mitigation is in line with RoL and best 
practices. Finally, the creation of a robust, multi-discipline review team to audit the 
entire process and outcomes. 
 
The risk of incorrect use or lack of understanding of the technology gives rise to best 
practices built around commitments to the outcomes being transparent; a robust 
evaluation and identification of issues within the process, including issues arising from 
incorrect use, must be part of a feedback loop to the human decision maker. Moreover, 
focus must be placed on the manner in which the human decision maker will interact 
with and be influenced by the technology; the outcomes, predictions and/or assessments 
must be presented to the human decision maker in a manner that clearly explains the 
technological process is not intended to be a complete process, but rather to provide 
key information and assessments, and that displays the potential for multiple outcomes. 
Outcomes, predictions and/or assessments accompanied by a model card, which must 
include full details of the model and its capacity and design. Decision makers must 
undergo thorough training on the technology they are to use, its risks, and appropriate 
ways to use it. 
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This chapter has proposed a model that may be used in the near future and one that 
could serve as an initial point of discussion for addressing risk-based issues and the 
intended mitigations to those risks. The author identified key solutions that could be 
deployed in the areas of: (1) the role of institutions and/or platform designer; (2) the 
roster of decision makers; (3) nomination and appointment of the human decision 
maker; (4) challenges to the appointment; (5) transparency of the appointment process 
and the humans in the process, including: (a) risk arising from the non-disclosure/rule 
compliance; (b) risk arising for implicit/hidden bias of the decision maker; (c) 
managing user risk; (d) risk not already considered arising from the introduction of 
discretion.  
 
VI. Thesis Conclusions 
 
As Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) begins to enter the wider market, it promises to 
substantively change the way arbitration works in the justice eco-system. The justice 
community must determine the fundamental values to be incorporated into the online 
justice environment so that it can address ethical and regulatory issues in the design of 
ODR. This thesis has engaged in an in-depth examination of the arbitration eco-system 
as a mechanism to ensure the Rule of Law in the emerging Online Justice Environment. 
Chapter 1 set out that a commitment to the RoL, including the principle of judicial 
independence and impartiality, demands that final decision makers in the ODR system 
must be both impartial and independent, without exception, even if the adherence to 
this rule of law principle conflicts with maximizing the efficiencies of the overall ODR 
system.  
 
To accomplish successfully meeting this commitment, the ODR system must be 
examined through the lens of risk identification and mitigation principles being 
deployed to reduce risk in technology-driven deployments. As it relates to the decision 
maker, this is especially true in instances where algorithms are deployed within the 
decision making process. In these instances, technology-driven bias must also be 
identified and mitigated against.  
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Chapter 3 sets out to examine the existing ODR platforms, institutional governance 
efforts, and industry practices to consider the presence of RoL commitments in both 
the ODR community and the academic commentary. It is in this chapter that differences 
are clearly emerging between those that seek ODR as an ancillary to the court systems 
(public) and those that attempt to craft ODR as a private mechanism tangentially 
attached via enforcement regimes to the exiting justice environment. The thesis takes a 
neutral perspective on the best approach to long term governance, instead focusing on 
the issue of the decision makers in the process, regardless of public or private built 
system.  
 
This thesis directly addresses the following questions that were posed in the 
introduction: What is the ideal relationship between technological design and 
fundamental principles of the rule of law? What are the essential features a judicial 
decision maker must embody in order to uphold the rule of law? As they establish 
guiding principles and best practices, model designers will need to consider the legally 
proscribed parameters and protections associated with the legal conceptualizations of 
the key terms independence and impartiality as well as the mechanisms needed to 
ensure a neutral decision maker. It is also important to ask what risk model should be 
used to evaluate the new systems being designed, and what mitigation can be deployed 
to reduce identified risks? 
 
To address these issues, the thesis argues for adherence to seven rules of action: (1) the 
rule of law (RoL) must be protected within the online justice environment; (2) an 
independent and impartial decision maker is an essential RoL principle, such that no 
departure from the principle should be allowed; (3) it is the method of ensuring the 
independence and impartiality of the decision maker that is open for greater debate; (4) 
it is the model design that mitigates dependence and bias; (5) the reduction of 
negatively impactful bias is the current “best practice” standard; (6) there must be a 
human within the final step of the technology-driven decision making model; (7) 
accountability is essential as ODR is part of the justice eco-system. Finally, best 
practices include (8) wider ongoing conversations about all of these issues. 
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Based on these Rules of Action, the author has proposed specific model design 
expectations necessary to ensure commitments to the RoL and the seven rules within 
the design of the ODR eco-system. First, the thesis calls for institutions to continue to 
develop and test models within the justice environment, but to insist upon specific 
design protections, including that a human must make the final decision. Designers 
must actively mitigate against human machine bias by ensuring the human in the loop 
is viewing results as suggestive, with outcomes displayed in a manner that fully informs 
the human decision maker of the nature of the predictions being made and the 
accuracy/percentage of certainty of the prediction. 
 
Concerning model selection and the manner of learning deployed, transparency and 
accountability are key. Transparency of model selection, model deployment, the 
features used to train the model (if any), the features discovered and added to the model 
after training, the features currently used in the prediction, and a level of accountability 
for the design and deployment of the automation/AI, are all essential points that merit 
transparency — especially if used in a justice environment.  
 
Risk arising from model design and deployment is one of the more challenging 
endeavors; transparency, auditing, feedback, mitigation and multi-stakeholder review 
are key within this area. Accordingly, the thesis calls for the establishment of a 
transparent process, including the presentation of information about the human decision 
makers, their conflicts, prior outcomes and party involvement in the appointment 
process with the ability to audit all final determinations, including final award 
decisions. The auditing information should be used as both a measure to ensure 
appropriate process and as a mechanism to provide feedback to the human decision 
maker, providing the decision maker the opportunity to evaluate, identify and mitigate 
any identified risk — so long as the manner of mitigation is in line with RoL and best 
practices. All of these processes must be done under the watchful eye of a robust, multi-
discipline review team to audit the entire process and outcomes. 
 
There is growing research about risk that arises when the human lacks understanding 
of the technology they are using or use it in incorrect ways. This risk can be partially 
mitigating by requiring that the outcomes, predictions and/or assessments must be 
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presented to the human decision maker in a manner that clearly explains the 
technological process is not intended to be a complete process but instead must be 
presented in a format that allows for the presentation of multiple model outcomes. Any 
issues or patterns identified in the system or the individual must be considered part of 
a feedback loop to the human decision maker, allowing the human to receive the 
feedback, reflect upon it and react as the human sees appropriate. As a final mitigation 
safeguard, the human in the loop must be considered part of the auditing process. Thus, 
outcomes must be transparent and must be considered part of an evaluative process in 
which issues within the process, including issues arising from incorrect use, are 
identified.  
 
The author identified keys solutions that could be deployed to reduce negatively 
impactful bias by focusing on several keys areas of design. First, as was explored in 
great detail in Chapter 2, the international arbitration community has considered the 
role of the institution within the alternative justice environment. Drawing from the 
lessons learned in this area, the thesis supports the continuing role of an institution, or 
similarly situated entity, as a mechanism to ensure decision makers can be evaluated 
under rules establishing parameters of independence and impartiality. Moreover, 
institutional rules can establish disclosure expectations and can serve as a gatekeeper 
for the dissemination of information surrounding the decision makers. The institution 
can also serve as a caretaker of appropriate design, by being held accountable for the 
deployment and serving as a mechanism to sanction poor design by those that design 
the technology.  
 
Chapter 5 sets out some basic requirements for how the institution should be expected 
to create a roster of decision makers, establish a nomination and appointment process 
and create rules concerning the transparency of the entire process and outcome.   Most 
importantly, the institution in the ODR eco-system is allowed to create a shorter process 
of appointment, because the technology can, and should be expected to be used to, 
eliminate some decision makers from selection, based upon a set of criterion designed 
to reduce partiality and dependence even in privately disclosed activities. The 
significantly shorter list of available decision makers could then be used to create a 
random list of potential decision maker, which the parties could then rank based 
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Notably, this is an area where technology, through automatically managing one tier of 
conflict checks, can add efficiency with no damage to RoL. 
 
Finally, the commitment to include arbitration as the final stage of alternative dispute 
resolution builds in a level of governance, one that needs to be specifically expanded 
in the ODR eco-system. The current need to comply with enforcement expectations 
embodied within the New York Convention makes the RoL a legal requirement and not 
merely aspirational. The enforcement mechanism offers final assurance of compliance 
with RoL, an independent decision making process, and the absence of negatively 
impactful dependence and partiality in the decision maker. Through the courts, those 
who build and deploy ODR models could be held accountable by demonstrating 
appropriate identification of risk, using impact assessments, with the requirement to 
explain the trade-offs that occur in the mitigation of those risks.  
 
However, this proposal assumes several things, first that arbitration is in fact the final 
stage of the process and second that courts are willing to review RoL, due process and 
human rights within the enforcement of an award. Neither of these are currently true 
assumptions. First, smart contracts are in vogue right now and many entities are 
considering how to use smart contracts in many traditional contracting arrangements. 
If smart contracts do become more mainstream, the enforcement mechanism will likely 
be less based in courts and more based in execution of code. Second, courts seeking to 
refuse enforcement of awards under the New York Convention frown upon expanding 
the potential grounds of refusal. There is no clear application of technology 
considerations within the convention, and some argue it would be well outside its 
drafters’ intentions. As such, stakeholders in the justice eco-system must begin to 
envision a world of technology-driven dispute resolution and must insist upon a 
commitment to basic RoL protections. A commitment such as this was undertaken by 
the international arbitration community as arbitration began to grow in popularity as an 
alternative to the justice system — something outside the traditional justice 
environment, and not without critics. Opportunistic disruption should not be allowed to 
overwhelm commitments to RoL. Thus, there should be a commitment to wider 
conversations amongst stakeholders from divergent, interested communities to create a 
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system of technology deployment that upholds justice as an essential consideration in 
the justice eco-system.  
 
This thesis reflects the law, jurisprudence, and doctrine until 14 August 2019. Thus 





As Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is now entering the justice environment in many 
new ways, especially in the Covid-19 world, the use of technology in the justice 
environment is growing, exponentially in many areas.  In many instances, technology 
is deployed to mimic existing systems, thereby using technology as nothing more than 
a simple digital communication device. In other deployments however, the technology 
community is seen as a vendor, selling a product- often without anyone considering the 
broader considerations necessary when any change in made to a justice environment.  
As such, the justice community must determine the fundamental attributes to be 
incorporated into the online justice environment and must determine how to advance, 
support, and engrain those attributes into the technology deployments. This thesis is the 
first attempt of any ODR scholar (at the time of writing) to identify the fundamental 
attributes that must be embedded in the decision-making portion of the ODR process.  
 
Although the thesis demanded a narrowing of issues to a topic that was capable of being 
resolved within the confines of a thesis, the narrowing of the topic does not diminish 
its importance. Instead, the thesis tackles one of the key aspects of any alternative to 
brick-and-mortar justice environments, the principle of a decision maker’s 
independence and impartiality. The issue is even more complex when technology is 
considered an actor in the decision making. As such, the thesis takes on the additional 
concern that arises in the deployment of technology, concerns of bias.   
 
Although narrowed to a specific aspect of potentially a much larger topic, and 
undoubtedly a subject of future debate, the exercise of identifying the issue, finding 
various potential approaches, identifying commonality and specifying a definition, and 
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then operationalizing those aspects into the design process of the decision making 
portion of the ODR world, is essential first step in advancing broader conversations in 
the area of online justice. It is in fact, the next in a series of conversations for many 
systems considering the use of technology in their justice environment. Court systems 
(around the world), APEC, even the World Economic Forum are working on these vary 
issues and that is no accident.  Scholars, lawyers, and court technology adopters are 
growing aware of the need to consider design principles, models, and essential 
attributes as key parts of initial conversations when considering alternative between 
providers and technology systems.  
 
The author makes no claim to this thesis being perfect, in fact- as an epilogue, it is fair 
to say the world is much different from the time of writing, as the global community is 
now in the midst of a Covid-19 online reality. Time and thesis limitations prevent the 
author from adding the new world to the thesis. However, for the first time the justice 
community- world-wide, is considering how technology can be used to improve access 
to justice.  Yet, as the author writes early in the paper, efficiency is no substitute for 
key attributes of the justice process, instead efficiency is a goal after ensuring essential 
attributes exist in the system.  
 
As such, the thesis contributes to the academic and justice community in ways 
unforeseen at the time of initially launching the thesis. This thesis has consistently 
advocated for the principle of judicial independence and impartiality: decision makers 
in the system must be both impartial and independent, without exception, even if the 
adherence to this rule of law principle conflicts with maximizing the efficiencies of the 
overall system. As it relates to the decision-making process that incorporates 
technology within the model, technology driven bias must be identified and mitigated 
against. To accomplish these goals, the ODR system must be examined through the 
lens of risk identification and mitigation principles. This thesis is the first, to examine 
the ODR model within the technology driven aspects of model design. And, the new 
reality of the growing support for wider use of technology and online alternative 
decision making does not change the argument, in any way.  
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Rule of law guides us to the broad essential principles, in this case, as explained in 
Chapter 1, the independence and impartiality of the decision maker is essential.  
Chapter 2 uses the well regarded, and widely supported alternative of arbitration to help 
define the specific parameter of those two key terms.  And, while the terms are not 
capable of operationalizing based on the arbitration institutional rules, as Chapter 2 also 
explains, court cases specific to arbitration lend us the parameters- and limitations of 
the terminology. The chapter clearly defines the terms- terms that are then brought into 
Chapter 5.  
 
To operationalize these terms, the thesis sets out, explains and supports the assertion 
that any system – or model- must adhere to the following seven rules of action: (1) the 
rule of law (RoL) must be protected within the online justice environment; (2) an 
independent and impartial decision maker is an essential RoL principle, such that no 
departure from the principle should be allowed; (3) it is the method of ensuring the 
independence and impartiality of the decision maker that is open for greater debate; (4) 
it is the model design that mitigates dependence and bias; (5) the reduction of 
negatively impactful bias is the current “best practice” standard; (6) there must be a 
human within the final step of the technology driven decision making model; (7) 
accountability is essential as ODR is part of the justice eco-system.  
 
Each key section within the thesis ends with a list of specific attributes that must be 
contained within the model and those attributes are then operationalized within the 
model. Each of these attributes are then incorporated in the model with Chapter 5 as 
explained in the Model conclusion, where the author cut and pastes the attributes from 
the end of each section  and then highlights how those are brought into the model.  
 
To date, there is no existing research that considers, in such specific and supported 
detail, the area of independence and impartiality in the ODR deployments. In fact, as 
Chapter 2 reveals, arbitration institutions themselves lack this level of specificity and 
operationalization. Simply put, the matter of definitions could have been a thesis, unto 
itself, as could an examination of rule of law in the area, but that would have left an 
emerging system without the benefit of academic scholarship demanding a robust 
examination and creation of clear, operationalized terms, and model design.  
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Appendix A: Details of collaboration and publications: 
 
The Accord Project, Dispute Resolution Working Group, Co-Organizer (2018-
Current). 
 
APEC Workshop for Developing a Collaborative Framework for Online Dispute 
Resolution (ODR)  Japan International Dispute Resolution Center, Osaka, Japan, US 
State Department (2018). 
 
GOVERNANCE OF ALGORITHMS: RETHINKING PUBLIC SECTOR USE OF ALGORITHMS FOR 
PREDICTIVE PURPOSES (with Ciabhan Connelly) in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK ON LAW 
AND ALGORITHMS, Cambridge Press, (expected late 2019). 
Information and The Regulatory Landscape: A Growing Need To Reconsider Existing 
Legal Frameworks, 24 WASHINGTON AND LEE SCHOOL OF LAW JOURNAL OF CIVIL 
RIGHTS & SOCIAL JUSTICE, 357 (2018). 
 
Building a Better HAL 9000: Algorithms, the Market, and the Need to Prevent the 
Engraining of Bias, (with Emma Arrington Stone Young and Scott J. Shackelford), 15 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY & INTELLECTUAL PROPERTy 215 (2018). 
 
The Consumer As Sisyphus: Should We Be Happy With ‘Why Bother’ Consent?, 
JOURNAL OF LEGAL STUDIES IN BUSINESS, Vol. 20, 1-26 (2017). 
A Meeting Of The Minds: Online Dispute Resolution Regulations Should Be 
Opportunity Focused, U.C. DAVIS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL, Vol 16(2) (2016). 
The Angel on Your Shoulder: Prompting Employees to Do the Right Thing Through the 
Use of Wearables, (with Timothy L. Fort & Scott J. Shackelford) 14 NORTHWESTERN 
UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF TECHNOLOGY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 139, 139-170 
(2016). 
Jury Glasses: Wearable Technology And Its Role In Crowdsourcing Justice, (with Scott 
J. Shackelford) CARDOZO JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 17:115, 115-153 
(2015). 
Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution in the Crowd, (with Abbey Stemler) 16 
CARDOZO JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 357, 357-394 (2015). 
The Dilemma of Private Justice Systems: Big Data Sources, the Cloud and Predictive 
Analytics, NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW & BUSINESS 
(Ambassador-online*)(2015) 
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Technology, Ethics And Access To Justice: Should An Algorithm Be Deciding Your 
Case? 35 MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 485, 485-524 (2014) (with Scott 
Shackelford). 
Yeah, But Did You See the Gorilla? Creating and Protecting an ‘Informed’ Consumer 
In Cross Border Online Dispute Resolution, 19 HARVARD NEGOTIATION LAW REVIEW 
129, 129-171 (Spring 2014).  
Building the Virtual Courthouse: Ethical Considerations for Design, Implementation, 
and Regulation in the World of ODR (with Scott J. Shackelford) 2014 Wisconsin Law 
Review 615 (2014). 
Confidentiality, In a Forum of Last Resort? Is the Use of Confidential Arbitration a 
Good Idea for Business and Society?, 16 AMERICAN REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION, 479 (2005) ISSN:1050-4109. 
Ethics for Commercial Arbitrators: Basic Principles and Emerging Standards (Co-
author with H. Gabriel), 5 WYOMING LAW REVIEW, 453-470 (2005) ISSN: 0023-7612.  
 
Appendix B: Influences and Influencers 
 
Shortly after I started developing this thesis, I was selected to participate in one of the 
first “Ethics of Predictive Algorithms” Workshops, hosted by Janine Hiller. At the time, 
I had written around the edges of this emerging area, but neither of us could have 
imagined how important this topic would quickly become. Shortly after the Workshop 
there were several books published considering similar areas, including Cathy O’Neil, 
Weapons of Math Destruction; Virginia Eubanks, Automating Inequality; Brett 
Frischmann, Re-Engineering Humanity; and some very important journal papers 
written by Andrew Selbst; Solon Barocas; Margaret Hu; Nizan Geslevich Packin; 
Kevin Werbach; John Bagby; Philip Nichols; David Nersessian; Yafit Lev-Aretz; Anne 
Washington; Jessica Eaglin. Each has influenced my thinking in ways that could never 
be fully captured in a footnote. They have wonderful writings in important areas, some 
have challenged me in person to think more creatively about solutions, and all have 
influenced my ability to digest and engage in these incredibly important areas of 
research. 
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Around the same time that prediction was emerging as a topic, ODR was seeing 
renewed interest as well. Vikki Rogers first got me involved with the U.S. efforts at the 
U.N. Working Group, and brought my attention to focus on a clear area of interest. 
Those important meetings led me to a wonderful ODR family: Darrin Thompson; Mike 
Dennis; Jeff Aresty; Colin Rule; Amy Schmidt; Nancy Welsh; Ethan Katsh; Nevena 
Jevremovic; Larry Bridgesmith; Sharon Salter; each has had an influence on me in 
immeasurable ways.  
 
Several of my co-authors have also greatly contributed to my thinking, Dr. Scott 
Shackelford, Abbey Stemler and Emma Young have all influenced my examination of 
various aspects of the digital world. As have those I have been privileged to workshop 
papers with, such as: Deven Desai; Ben Green; Gregg Bloom; Simon Boehme; Milton 
Mueller; Doc and Joyce Searls; and Jody Blanke, to name a few. And, those that I have 
been fortunate to hear speak, including Ryan Calo and Bruce Schneider. 
 
None of this would have been possible without my background in international 
commercial law and international commercial arbitration. The chapter on arbitration 
was the easiest to write thanks to my experiences with CCLS and those who fill its 
hallways, especially Dr. Loukas Mistelis, Dr. Julian Lew (QC) and Dr. Stavros 
Brekoulakis. And, of course, I have received guidance and immeasurable feedback 
Rosa Lastra.  
 
As of August 14, 2019 I declared this thesis closed to additions. Nonetheless a 
groundswell of interest is building in the area of AI Governance, and new frameworks, 
white papers, initiatives, legislation and working groups are formed every day. 
Momentum is building and it’s exciting to be contributing to these advancing 
conversations.  
 
I am incredibly proud to have been thinking about widespread use of algorithms early 
in the process. Proud of the people we have brought to campus at Indiana University, 
the trips I have done, being part of a growing effort to have people move beyond, 
design-and-dash, deliverable-focused technology and expand the conversation to 
include the humanities, pro-sociology, and socio-technical considerations. 
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Appendix C: Style Guide 
 
The following is a citation guide, based on a modified U.S. Law Review citation 
system, known as THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF CITATION. The style has 
been modified to accommodate a longer document, an international audience, and an 
online heavy research environment. As such, a style guide is included which has been 
specifically designed to assist the examiners in finding sources. 
 
Journal and Similar Citation 
Author, article title, JOURNAL CITATION, (year). 
-These citations may also include, page number, and a (descriptive 
summary of the point the source is being relied upon to support). 
Book Citation 
Author, BOOK TITLE, Publisher, (year). 
-These citations may also include, page number, and a (descriptive 
summary of the point the source is being relied upon to support). 
Author, Chapter title, cited in Author, BOOK TITLE, Publisher, (year). 
 
Materials, in general 
 
Author/Institution/Agency, title, institutional notation/number/etc., article number/ 
section/ page, (year). 
Cases 
U.S. cases- Name of Parties, citation, (year). 
Non-U.S. cases, in general- Parties Names, [year] citation.  
 
Online materials 
Author, article title, JOURNAL CITATION, (year). 
-These citations may also include, page number, and a (descriptive 
summary of the point the source is being relied upon to support). 
-These citations may also include a link to a webpage and a (Last 
viewed) date. The extra information was included due to (1) the 
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entrepreneurial nature of the environment, and/or (2) to citations that are 
less well known that the author believed might be more difficult for an 
examiner to discover.  
Short Citations 
Supra (previously) and infra (coming later in the text) are used to assist readers in 
finding prior discussions and to prevent repetitive lengthy footnotes.  
 Journals and similar documents 
  Author, short title, supra note number. 
 Books 
  Author, SHORT TILE, supra note number. 
 Cases  
  First party listed name, short court number, at location. 
Signals 
Are italicized internal notations to help the reader better understand the type of citation 
that is being put forward.  
See – is used when the citation is being done to give attribution to a source, but 
the citation is not a direct quote. Thus, the absence of a see signal means a direct 
quote is in the thesis.  
 
See also- is used when authors have written on the subject and may be useful to 
the reader to consider within the context of a broader discussion.  
 
See discussion- is a signal used to direct the reader to a section, footnote, or 
table in the thesis that contains additional or more expansive information and 
support.  
 
Id. is a signal used to prevent repetitive footnotes. The reader should look to the 
last citation in the prior footnotes. Id. is used when the material is a direct quote. 
 
See id. is a signal used to prevent repetitive footnotes. The reader should look 
to the last citation in the prior footnotes. See id. is used when the material is a 
paraphrasing or summary of the material. 
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See e.g., is a signal used to direct the reader to other available material that is 
an example of the point made in the sentence. It can be read as ‘for example.’ 
 
See generally, is a signal used to direct the reader to other available material 
that is highlighted for a general proposition. It is not used to support a specific 
point, but a general area being supported.  
 
[hereinafter]  is a signal used to create a short cite for a frequently used 
authority. The signal is at the end of the first footnote in which the authority 
appears.  
